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ABSTRACT 
A review of maritime accidents conducted in 2006 confirms that human error is the main contributing 
factor in maritime accidents. This study illustrates that major maritime accidents are not caused by 
technical problems but by failure of the crew to respond to the situation appropriately. 
Non-technical skills (NTS) encompass both interpersonal and cognitive skills such as situation 
awareness, teamwork, decision-making, leadership, managerial skills, communication and language 
skills, etc. In a crisis situation good NTS allow the deck officers to recognise a problem quickly and 
manage the situation and team safely and effectively. As a result, the evaluation and grading of deck 
officers’ NTS is necessary to assure safety at sea. 
This research aims to identify the links between maritime accidents and deck officers’ NTS and 
identifies significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS by using the Formal Safety 
Assessment concept. Taxonomy of deck officers’ non-technical skills was developed by conducting 
interviews with experts and collecting NTS weighting data for calculating each NTS weight by the AHP 
(Analytical Hierarchy Process) method. 
Based on the taxonomy of the deck officers NTS behavioural markers were developed for the assessment 
of their NTS in the bridge simulator. A set of bridge simulator crisis scenarios was developed to assess 
deck officers’ NTS.  
Two sets of Chief Mate volunteer students’ NTS performance was assessed in the bridge simulator. One 
set of students are those who have not obtained NTS training i.e. HELM (Human Element Leadership 
and Management) and the other set of students are those who have obtained the HELM training as part 
of their main course of study. All groups’ NTS performances are calculated by the ER (Evidential 
Reasoning) Algorithm and are compared to see if there are any improvements in the NTS performance 
with the HELM training. After comparison it was found that NTS performance of the groups with 
HELM training was only 0.8% better than the NTS performance of the groups without HELM training.  
HELM course effectiveness is evaluated and suggestions are given for further improvements to the 
course. Cost benefit analysis for improving deck officers’ NTS was carried out by Bayesian Network 
and Decision Tree Model.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Since the establishment of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1948, the 
existence of Classification Societies since 1760 and the intervention of other maritime bodies 
involved to improve safety, large numbers of marine accidents have continued to take place.  
The most well-known marine accidents include the Herald of Free 
Enterprise in 1987, with 188 fatalities; the Exxon Valdez in 1989 
leaving the polluted seas with 37,000 tons of crude oil; the 
Scandinavian Star in 1990 with 158 dead; the Estonia in 1994 with 900 
fatalities; the Erika in 1999 with up to 25,000 tons of oil spill; the 
Samina Express in 2000 with 80 dead and the Prestige in 2002 with 
63,000 tons of oil pollution (Goulielmos et al., 2012).  
Maritime accidents have many causes, as will be outlined in Chapter2, and until 1990 the IMO’s 
main focus was on the technical aspect of the safety of shipping but since then its emphasis has 
shifted towards human factors and the first step towards improving the human side was the 
introduction of ISM (International Safety Management) in 1998 (ibid). 
A review of maritime accidents’ databases from the UK, USA, Norway and Canada conducted 
by Barnett et al. in 2006 confirms that human error is the main contributing factor in maritime 
accidents. This study by Barnett et al. (2006) illustrates that major maritime accidents are not 
caused by technical problems but by failure of the crew to respond to the situation appropriately. 
The following conclusions were drawn; 
1. While the total number of accidents is declining, human error continues 
to be the dominant factor in 80% to 85% of maritime accidents. 
2. Failures of situation awareness and situation assessment 
overwhelmingly dominate. 
3. Human fatigue and task omission seem closely related to failures of 
situation awareness (ibid). 
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The MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) reported that among the technical failures 
caused there was team cohesion failure when non-standard emergency situations occurred 
which led to rising levels of personal stress. Engineer officers have shown lack of diagnostic 
skills while deck officers have failed to operate as an effective bridge team (Habberley et al., 
2001). 
Based on the above fact, it is now assumed that the training and assessment of the main non-
technical skills (NTS) of co-operation, leadership and management skills, situation awareness 
and decision making, needs to be established in the maritime industry.  
1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
In response to the ‘Green Lilly’ incident, in 2001 the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) 
commissioned a research project to study ‘simulator training for handling escalating 
emergencies’ (Habberley et al., 2001). There were six recommendations of this research 
project: 
1. A Training Needs Analysis (TNA) should be undertaken to analyse the 
training requirement and specify the functional requirements for the 
training equipment to be used within this training and assessment 
programme. 
2. The main non-technical skills of co-operation, leadership and 
management skills, situation awareness, and decision making, that have 
to be mastered in order to handle escalating emergencies, need to be 
more fully defined. 
3. A strategy needs to be developed to incorporate these skills into a 
training and assessment programme. 
4. Crisis management standards of competence are ill defined and 
consequently so are their “behavioural markers” by which the standard 
may be assessed. More research is needed in this area, particularly in 
assessing the team working competencies. 
5. Whatever training methods are used, crisis management training should 
be viewed as a long term process, embedded in the training of 
individuals from novice through to senior command, not as a set of 
“bolt-on” courses. 
6. The most cost effective training option will be determined by local 
factors. Therefore, no mandatory option should be considered. At 
present, until the research above is completed, assessment by Full 
Mission Simulator constitutes the only viable option (ibid). 
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This present study aims to undertake a research based on the recommendations in the MCA 
study ‘simulator training for handling escalating emergencies’ and conduct an extensive 
literature review of the NTS and then develop a taxonomy for the deck officers’ NTS and 
develop the behavioural markers for the training and assessment of these NTS. The research 
will also analyse the effectiveness of the HELM (Human Element Leadership and Management) 
training course at management level which has been made compulsory by the IMO since 2012 
for deck and engineer officers at management and operations level in the STCW Manila 
amendments in 2010. However this study is only about deck officers the reasons for which will 
be explained in Section 1.5.1. 
 1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THEIR HYPOTHESIS 
Firstly, the aim of this research is designed to contribute to the development and assessment of 
NTS required by deck officers by investigating its current practice after analysing empirical 
data from this study. The research will create a set of scenarios within a marine bridge simulator 
through which it will be possible to evaluate and grade the NTS of deck officers. The second 
aim is to develop a method which will enable trainers to quantitatively assess NTS in a ship’s 
bridge simulator and identify further training requirements. Within this aim the research will 
evaluate the effectiveness of HELM training as made compulsory for deck officers by the IMO 
in the Manila amendment (IMO, 2011) to the STCW convention.  
NTS encompasses both interpersonal and cognitive skills such as situation awareness, 
teamwork, decision-making, leadership, managerial skills, communication and language skills 
(Flin et al., 2003). In a crisis situation good NTS allow the deck officers to recognise a problem 
quickly and manage the situation and team safely and effectively. As a result, the evaluation 
and grading of deck officers’ NTS is necessary to assure safety and security at sea. Furthermore, 
evaluation of a deck officer’s NTS grade enables and facilitates maritime educators to assess 
the effectiveness of their training programmes.  
The research programme will have the following objectives: 
1. Complete a literature review, collect the available failure data and undertake a statistical 
analysis of maritime accidents. 
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2. Identify the links between maritime accidents and the deck officers’ NTS.  
3. Identify significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS. 
4. Develop a taxonomy for the deck officers’ NTS. 
5. Develop a set of scenarios as a method for demonstrating deck officers’ competency based 
on objective 4 and interviews with experienced deck officers at management level. 
6.  Develop a methodology for assessing deck officers’ NTS grade in a bridge simulator based 
on objective 5.  
7. Evaluate the deviation between deck officers’ NTS grades and assess the effectiveness of the 
training programmes and analyse training needs. 
The above objectives are developed to address challenges faced by the ever changing 
complexity associated with human element issues in seafarer training. Possible goals to be 
achieved in this research include:  
1. To develop training needs for facilitating the implementation of the HELM course.  
2. To develop terms of reference on human element issues with respect to training needs for the 
HELM course.  
3. To develop an evaluation system to see how trainees’ performance is improved through 
training programmes using the deliverables developed in this research. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
The thesis is compiled of eight chapters. Chapter One has outlined a brief introduction relating 
to the background and motivation of the research, the research aims and objectives, a statement 
emphasising the problems encountered and the structure of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature influencing the current study. It includes the 
accident data caused by human error and the importance of NTS in the maritime industry and 
most safety critical industries. An overview of the aviation industry’s CRM (Crew Resource 
Management) course evolution is given along with some other safety critical industries’ efforts 
into NTS training and assessment is reviewed. A detailed review of the main cognitive 
(situation awareness and decision making) and social (leadership and teamwork) NTS provides 
the basis of the research. This will serve to draw attention to the possible inadequacy and 
limitation of the current status, thus demonstrating the need and justification of this research. 
Flin et al. (2008)’s book “Safety at the sharp end” has influenced part of literature review, 
particularly Section 2.3, however a much larger body of literature is reviewed in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Three outlines the overall methodology of the research which is based on Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA). The use of mathematical models are explained which include the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP), Evidential Reasoning (ER), Bayesian Networks (BN)’s and the 
Decision Tree Model. Some limitations of each method are explained. The importance of 
ethical issues with reference to the present study are discussed.  
 
In Chapter Four the significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS are 
identified and a preliminary model with an hierarchal structure as a taxonomy for the deck 
officers’ NTS is developed and the elements of the taxonomy are justified. The interview 
schedule is developed to be conducted with the experienced seafarers to validate the 
effectiveness of the taxonomy. The interview is divided into three parts: 1) performance 
example (the interviewee is asked to describe a real case from his own experience that was 
particularly challenging), 2) distinguishing skills (the interviewee is asked to think of the skills 
and attributes he considers to be characteristic of a deck officers’ effective performance in crisis 
situations on the bridge of a ship), 3) sorting task (the interviewee was asked to rank the criteria 
that are presented in the model/taxonomy or suggest additional criteria). Furthermore, data 
presented by the interviews is carefully reviewed and a weight is assigned to each criterion by 
using a mathematical decision making method AHP.  
Chapter Five presents the behavioural markers for team working, leadership and managerial 
skills, situation awareness, and decision making developed by a relevant literature review. 
Based on the behavioural markers the assessors in a ships bridge simulator are able to mark 
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each element of a trainee’s NTS. For assessment of a delegate’s NTS in a ship’s bridge 
simulator, three sets of scenarios that are executable there are produced. Two sets of volunteer 
students after completion of their training programmes (i.e. STCW Chief Mate Certificate of 
Competency) are selected. One set of students are those who have not obtained the HELM 
training and the other set of students are those who have obtained the HELM training. Based 
on the developed scenarios, and developed behavioural markers, students’ NTS grades in a 
ships bridge simulator are assessed. The results are analysed and compared using a 
mathematical model, the ER Algorithm and a Utility Value. The main aim of using a utility 
approach is to obtain a single crisp number for the top-level criterion (the final result or goal) 
in order to rank the group performance for the purpose of the comparison. 
Chapter Six analyses the other safety critical industries’ efforts into NTS and the possibility of 
the adaption of such useful proven practices into the maritime domain. Based on some of those 
proven methods, options are created to improve the HELM training for deck officers. A cost 
benefit analysis is carried out using a BN and a Decision Tree Model for making decisions. 
Chapter Seven discusses the findings of the research in detail. It discusses and reflects on the 
achievements of the aims.  This chapter also ascertains whether this research has made a 
contribution to knowledge and highlights avenues for future research. 
Chapter Eight presents the conclusions of the overall research.  
Appendices include STCW and Merchant Navy Training Board (MNTB) HELM outcomes, 
Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU) ethical approval, introduction letter to participants, 
participants’ information sheets and consent form sample, NTS comparative data for AHP 
calculations collected from interviewers, simulator observation data and a list of published work 
as a result of this research. 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The following sub sections highlight the limitations of the study including the reasons for a 
deck officer only study and restrictions of using interview and simulator observations.  
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1.5.1 Reason for Focusing Deck Officers Only  
The reason this research is focused on deck officers’ only is that it is evident from the literature 
review that human element has proven to be major contributory factor for many maritime 
accidents and the majority of these accidents have been caused by deck officers’ errors. 
Examples such as data from UK Mutual (See Section 2.2) and UK Club (See Section 2.2) 
(Goulielmos et al., 2012), Herald of Free Enterprise disaster (Gill and Wahner, 2012), Torrey 
Canyon grounding (Hetherington et al. 2006) and other accidents show the high percentage of 
deck officers’ errors in maritime accidents. The incidence of accidents caused by engineer 
officers is very low as compared to deck officers, less than 5% (See Section 2.2.1), and hence 
engineer officers are not included in this research. 
1.5.2 Interview Study  
The research conducted attempts to highlight a comprehensive and practical analysis of the 
NTS required by a deck officer in crisis situations on the bridge of a ship. Lack of volunteer 
experts to be involved in the interview study made it difficult to gather the data. In the end only 
12 volunteer experts agreed to participate out of which only 8 experts’ results were consistent 
enough to be included in the study. The number of volunteer experts was expected to be 20 at 
the beginning of the research. 
1.5.3 Simulator Observation Study 
Due to time constraints the current study was not able to observe large numbers of groups of 
deck officer students in a ship’s bridge simulator. The study could only make observations of 
twelve groups of Chief Mate students, nine at LJMU and three at STC (South Tyneside College). 
Many colleges across the UK were contacted and asked to contribute to the research but only 
STC responded positively  
1.5.4 Overseas Data Collection 
Collection of data was envisaged from at least one overseas institute so as not be limited to 
research in only one country. For interview study, the researcher travelled to Malmo, Sweden 
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to conduct interviews with experienced seafarers who were pursuing higher education at the 
World Maritime University (WMU). However for the simulator study, contacts were also made 
with overseas nautical establishments and two institutes, Durban University, South Africa and 
the Seamen’s Training Centre, Karachi, Pakistan agreed to take part in the research. Both 
institutes could not deliver the HELM course in time: Durban University due to operational 
problems and the Seamen’s Training Centre could not obtain HELM course approval from the 
local administration in time. Hence the researcher could not make any NTS observations of the 
deck officers in the bridge simulator in any overseas nautical training institute. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The shipping industry has become safer over the past two decades, evidenced by an improving 
safety record during this period (Hetherington et al., 2006), however, accidents are still 
happening and analysts and researchers have found many causes, such as seafarer training and 
technical failure (MCA, 2010: v), fatigue (Akhtar and Utne, 2014), stress (Hetherington et al., 
2006) and human error (Gill and Wahner, 2012). Technical failures and seafarer training have 
been addressed in detail in the STCW 95 (Standard of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping, 1995) and measures have impacted positively on the industry (MCA, 2010: v). 
Recently the IMO introduced the STCW Manila amendment 2010, part of which focuses on 
NTS training, in an attempt to eliminate or minimise the effects of human error. 
NTS training was first introduced in aviation in the early 1980s (Helmreich et al., 1999) and 
then in other safety critical industries such as anaesthesia (Fletcher et al., 2003a), nuclear power 
(Crichton and Flin, 2004) and surgery (Yule et al., 2006) also adopted the training to improve 
safety and reduce accidents. Effectiveness of such training is measured in various studies and 
have mostly been found effective. For the purpose of this study only aviation and anaesthesia 
sector’s efforts into the development of such training will be discussed here as some of their 
good practices may be found beneficial and adapted into the maritime sector. The reason for 
focusing on aviation and anaesthesia is that the research data of these sectors is widely available 
(CAA, 2006; ANTS, 2014) 
2.2 CAUSES OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS 
Accidents in the maritime industry are not new and a major contributing factor to most of these 
accidents is human error (Safahani, 2015a). A major P&I club analysis shows that human error 
was responsible for more than 62% of all claims made (Ung and Shen, 2011). This figure has 
not reduced since but the other major contributing cause to accidents, technical failures, has 
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reduced by two thirds since then (MCA, 2010: v). Modern technical systems are quite advanced 
and in the maritime sector, STCW 95 has served its purpose in addressing the technical issues 
but now ‘the human element’ is recognised.  
2.2.1 Human Error 
Various studies have been conducted to analyse the effect of the human element in maritime 
accidents. Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) have suggested that the human error contribution 
to maritime accidents is as high as 96% whereas others suggest only 49% (Hetherington et al., 
2006). These studies will be discussed here to determine the major cause of maritime accidents. 
A report concerning the research of 100 sea accidents, conducted by Wagenaar and Groeneweg 
(1987) showed that the number of accidents caused by human error failure ranged from 7 to 58 
per accident. It was found there were 350 human error causes in a total of 2250 causes. The 
ratio suggests that human error is a minor factor in all accidents but in 345 of these human error 
was crucial. Only four of every 100 accidents occurred without the effect of any human error, 
hence 96% of accidents had one or more human error contributions and people involved in 
those accidents could and should have prevented the accidents (ibid). Accident reporting was 
not very concise in the 1980s (Hetherington et al., 2006) thus these conclusions should be 
treated with caution. 
In 1995-96, the Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand reported 49% (ibid) of shipping 
incidents were caused by human factors with the remaining incidents being caused by technical 
failure and environmental factors. Error of judgement and keeping an improper lookout were 
the most common human factors (ibid). Error of judgement can be classed as human error but 
keeping an improper lookout is a competency failure and may not fall under human error. 
The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987 is one of the recent disasters in which the master 
has shown poor situation awareness skills when the ship sailed with the bow doors open and 
capsized just outside of Zeebrugge harbour (DoT, 1987; Gill and Wahner, 2012). There was 
more to this accident than human error, as found in the investigatory report of the accident such 
as the vessel’s design vulnerability, shipboard failure to adhere to procedure, disregard of a 
prior significant incident and office management failure (ibid). All the other factors involved in 
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the accident increased the likelihood and seriousness of the consequences coming from human 
error (Gill and Wahner, 2012).  
 
Figure 2.1 Causes of main claims in UK Mutual Steamship Association Ltd (1991) 
Source: Constructed on data from “UK mutual” (1991) (Goulielmos et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 2.2 Persons involved in claims against UK Club (1993) 
Source: Constructed on data from UK Club (1993) (Goulielmos et al., 2012) 
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Data from UK mutual (Figure 2.1) shows that in 1991 deck officers’ errors are highest at 25% 
(Goulielmos et al., 2012) plus 7% of those of pilots, who can be considered as part of the bridge 
team. Subsequently the data from the UK Club (Figure 2.2) shows that in 1993 deck officers’ 
errors are the same at 25% (ibid) and pilots’ errors have reduced slightly to 6%. In the UK 
mutual data (Figure 2.1) it is evident that human error claims (deck officers, engineering 
officers, crew, shore persons and pilots) were 58% and the remaining were due to structural 
damage, mechanical failure, equipment failure plus some unknown and remaining. The point 
to consider here is that part of the unknown and remaining claims may be due to human error 
which would increase the human error contribution. The claims due to human error increased 
to 59% in 1993 as shown in the UK club data (Figure 2.2). 
The above data may be biased towards human error as it is not confirmed that reporting is very 
accurate. The percentage of human error causes in maritime accidents in the above data i.e 58% 
in 1991 and 59% in 1993 is quite low with respect to the other researches in other safety critical 
industries where human error accounts for more than 80% of accidents (Flin et al., 2008: 1; 
Stojiljkovic et al., 2012; Havold, 2000). 
The human error issue has been addressed by some other safety critical industries. In these 
almost 80% of all accidents are believed to be the result of human error contributions (ibid). 
2.2.2 Safety culture 
Apart from human error involvement in various safety critical industries’ accidents, other 
factors such as safety culture and safety climate are involved.  Wang et al. (2013) identifies the 
importance of human error but stresses focusing on the prerequisite of unsafe behaviour, unsafe 
supervision and organisational problems.  
A person’s attitude towards a company’s approach to safety, his perception of the magnitude 
of the risks he faces and his belief in the necessity, practicality and effectiveness of measures 
to control risk is called safety culture. It is made up of those shared beliefs, values and practices 
affecting the safety of surroundings. In a safe working environment, safe and professional 
practices are expected to be normal behaviour and are reinforced and supported by management 
(CASA, 2013: 172). In this type of culture, accidents tend to be reduced by safe practice by all 
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involved. 
The IMO defines safety culture as: “An organization with a "safety culture" is one that gives 
appropriate priority to safety and realises that safety has to be managed like other areas of the 
business.  For the shipping industry, it is in the professionalism of seafarers that the safety 
culture must take root” (IMO, 2015a) 
A study of Danish seafarers’ fatal injuries was carried out using the data of 147 cases obtained 
from maritime authorities, an insurance company, shipping companies, hospitals and death 
registers between 1986 and 1993.  The results show that injuries were 11.5 times higher than 
average rates of any male worker ashore in Denmark (Hanson, 1996). Other similar studies 
conducted in the United Kingdom have also shown similar results (Havold, 2007). Even with 
this high rate of injuries and fatalities, enough research is not carried out in this area to improve 
safety.  
To improve safety onboard ships, the International Safety Management (ISM) code came into 
force in 1998 through SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) Chapter IX, “Management for the safe 
Operations of Ships”. The purpose of the ISM code is to provide an international standard for 
the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention (MCA, 2015). Some 
recent studies conclude that the ISM has not achieved the goal it was meant to achieve 
(Bhattacharya, 2012; Lappalainen et al., 2012). Bhattacharya (2012) determined one of the 
reasons of the failure of ISM is the difference between the perception of managers and seafarers 
of the ISM Code and its expected outcomes.   
Employee relations with their managers and effective employee participation in the workplace 
health and safety management were found to be other causes to have impacted the injury rates 
in various workplace settings (Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013; James and Walters, 2002). In the 
shipping organisation structure, Bhattacharya and Tang (2013) found a separation between 
onshore management, onboard management and seafarers. This structure restricts seafarers, 
most exposed to workplace hazards, contributing to the health and safety management issues.  
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2.3 HUMAN ERROR AND NTS  
Human error is a general term which is used for the range of unsafe acts, omissions, unsafe 
behaviours and unsafe conditions or a combination of all these factors. It is now accepted in the 
maritime industry that human error is the major contributing factor in the accidents. A brief 
review of literature shows human error accounts for more than half of maritime accidents 
(Safahani, 2015a).  
NTS are those specific human competencies such as leadership, teamwork, situation awareness 
and decision making, which affect human error or its impact (Flin et al., 2003). By good use of 
these skills human error may be minimised (Helmreich et al., 1999). The four main NTS are 
subdivided into two categories; social and cognitive (Flin et al., 2003). Social skills are those 
which are easily observable i.e leadership and team-working (ibid) and cognitive skills are those 
which are difficult to observe i.e situation awareness and decision making (ibid). These skills 
and their relation to the maritime domain will be discussed in this section. 
2.3.1 Team working 
Team working is very important in effective operations in any safety critical industry. Teams 
must work towards a common goal and must function effectively from the beginning of the 
task. Team working skills such as co-ordination, co-operation and communication are very 
important for achieving the task goals, which rely heavily on effective team working for 
example effective control room operations in the nuclear power industry or berthing operations 
for a ship (Flin et al., 2008: 94) 
Team-building and maintaining  
Yukelson (1997) suggests that team-building is a continuous process and results in team 
members working together to achieve one common goal. Teamwork can improve the overall 
performance, effectiveness, and efficiency of organisations. Building high performance teams 
in safety critical organisations is a key to success. Martin and Davis (1995) studied the impact 
of outdoor pursuits on team-building by observing 22 soccer players in a 5 day army training 
course. The results suggested that by simply spending time together there is a positive impact 
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on players’ well-being.  
Supporting others 
It has been concluded by expert psychologists (Darch-Zahavy, 2004) that supporting others in 
team working enhances team performance and promotes a member’s comfort. Team support 
improves other team members’ team performance (Zaccaro et al., 2001)).  
Four facets of team support are identified here; 
1. Emotional: This form of team support refers to the notion of a shoulder 
to cry on, an encouraging word, and sympathetic understanding of 
another’s emotional pain. 
2. Informational: This refers to the extent to which team members 
exchange necessary information for the task functioning. 
3. Instrumental: This type of support focuses on the practical support that 
team members offer each other. It has to do with tangible assistance such 
as helping an overloaded member with his duties of substituting for him 
during illness. 
4. Appraisal: This support refers to the help individual team members can 
provide each other in making sense of a particular problem situation. 
Ideally this should provide a range of alternative solutions to any given 
problem situation (Darch-Zahavy, 2004). 
 
Conflict resolution 
Significant research has been carried out to understand how conflicts impact on team task 
outcomes (Kankanhalli et. al., 2006). Task and relationship are the two main categories of the 
conflict. With task conflict, team performance is decreased, decision making becomes poor, 
relationship conflict evokes stress and functioning of the group is affected (Ayoko et al., 2008). 
The difference between top performance executives and average performance managers is 
resolving conflict effectively (Hagemann & Stroope, 2012). This is a skill that can be learned 
over time (ibid). The following three skills and abilities of conflict resolution are identified; 
1. Fostering useful debate, while eliminating dysfunctional conflict. 
2. Matching the conflict management strategy to the cause and nature of 
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the conflict 
3. Using integrative.e (win-win) strategies rather than distributive (win-
lose) strategies (West, 2012: 64). 
 
Communication 
Communication is a key skill to effective and safe task operations in any safety critical industry 
(Clarke, 2012). Clear and concise communication will eliminate any doubts regarding the issue 
addressed hence operations can be performed successfully (Kleij, 2009). Language is one of 
the main communication problems found on ships. The STCW specify a fluency level in the 
ship’s declared language and it is suggested that this may not be currently achieved 
(Hethrington et al., 2006). 
Team working in maritime 
A study was conducted by the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (CTSB) in 1995 analysing 
273 incidents between 1981 and 1992 in Canadian waters (CSTB, 1995). The main aim of the 
study was to analyse the master/pilot and pilot/watch-keeper relationship with the main focus 
on team working and communication. Most respondents have agreed that teamwork is as 
important as technical proficiency with 96% of masters, 100% of bridge officers and 85% of 
pilots agreeing with the study. In a question to pilots asking if it is possible to establish an 
effective relationship with the master and Officer of the Watch (OOW), 45% of pilots said it 
was always possible and 36% said it was often possible. In response to experience working as 
a team 51% of masters, 46% of OOW and 38% of pilots stated that they always work as a team. 
In the same study it was found that poor communication or lack of understanding between pilot 
and master or OOW caused 42% of the incidents (ibid). The report concludes that 
“Notwithstanding the evidence that poor teamwork on the bridge results in accidents, there 
appears to be some reluctance to acknowledge that improved cooperation between pilots and 
masters can result in safer navigation in pilotage waters” (ibid). 
2.3.2 Leadership 
A leader motivates and inspires people whereas a manager organises the current operation and 
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plans for the future (Lau et al., 2014). Leadership and management are linked to and support 
each other in every organisation (Glamuzina, 2015). Leadership is defined as a process of social 
influence which motivates people to pursue set goals (Quinn and Quinn, 2015: 8). In a time of 
crisis a leader of an organisation is very important and becomes more so when making sense of 
the situation (Combe and Carrington, 2015). The literature has identified two types of 
leadership which are most effective: transformational and transactional (Batool, 2013). A 
transformational leader stimulates and inspires colleagues whilst a transactional leader offers 
rewards and punishments to employees based on their performance (ibid). 
Technical and routine problems can be solved by the knowledge of an experienced leader but a 
new problem requires a unique approach to the solution, which is called adaptive leadership. 
Five characteristics of adaptive leadership are identified below:  
1) Identify the adaptive challenge and frame key questions 
and issues;  
2) Let the organisation feel external pressures within a range 
it can stand;  
3) challenge current roles and resist pressure to define new 
roles too quickly;  
4) Expose conflict or let it emerge;  
5) Challenge unproductive norms. (Eubank et al., 2012) 
 
In this type of leadership a leader must remain on the scene of the problem, identify new 
challenges, raise productive questions and define new roles of the team members to fix the 
problem. 
Leadership under stress 
Stress is a mental condition which directly affects an individual’s ability to perform a job or 
lead a team. In an organisation there is a need for strategies to be put in place to limit the stress 
factors (Gill, 2006). A leader’s responsibility in any work domain is to make sure that 
operations are successfully completed by monitoring the process throughout. Sometimes in a 
demanding situation leaders in high risk organisations are required to manage an emergency 
situation or a crisis situation. A leader’s knowledge, skills and styles will be key factors in 
handling the situation (Flin et al., 2008: 141). 
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Leadership in maritime 
On-board ship it is the master’s job to show good leadership qualities and encourage team 
members to work together. The master needs to make sure that a positive team atmosphere is 
created. A good leader will work on realistic targets and will always conduct a risk assessment 
before changing any plan. The Titanic is one of the classic accident examples of non-technical 
skills’ failure as the master had shown poor leadership and decision making qualities. Capt. 
Smith increased the vessel’s speed to 22 knots to arrive one day earlier in New York without 
adding extra lookouts through a known iceberg field and relied heavily on the structure of the 
ship whereas another ship in the vicinity, MV Californian, stopped for the night and did not sail 
through the iceberg field (Brown et al., 2013).  
2.3.3 Situation Awareness (SA) 
SA has proven to be one of the major causes in many accidents in safety critical industries such 
as the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl in 1986 and Three Mile Island in 1979. In both accidents 
operators lost the SA and were working on a different mental model of the situation (Flin et al., 
2008: 18). The captain of the Herald of Free Enterprise sailed from the port of Zeebrugge not 
knowing the bow doors were open and the person responsible for closing the bow doors, (the 
assistant bosun), was sleeping in his cabin. The chief officer never counter checked the bow 
doors (DoT, 1987; Goulielmos and Goulielmous, 2005).  
Many researchers have now concluded that SA is one of the main causes of the accidents in 
many safety critical industries. During the First World War SA was identified as a very 
important tool by military aircraft crew. It received global attention when major researches on 
this topic were carried out in the 1980s by aviation and air traffic control. (Salmon et al., 2009: 
7). 
Several SA definitions are introduced but most are specific to certain domains. Mostly, they all 
point to ‘what is going on around you’.  Endsley (1995a) provides us with the generic definition 
of SA: “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.”  
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Banbury and Tremblay (2004: 3) reviewed 26 SA definitions available in the existing literature 
and divided them into two classes as a ‘State’ or as a ‘Process’. Sarter and Woods (1995) define 
SA as: “the term situation awareness should be viewed just as a label for a variety of cognitive 
processing activities that are critical to dynamic, event-driven, and multitasks fields of 
practice”. Two approaches to SA are identified in the literature: operator-focused approach and 
situation-focused approach. The operator-focused approach concentrates on cognition of 
human mental state and the situation-focused point of view links and maps the information to 
form a SA mental picture (Banbury and Tremblay, 2004: 5). 
Models of situation awareness 
Various SA models are available in the literature. All models are individually focused theories 
such as Endsley’s three level model (Endsley, 1995b), Smith and Hancook’s perception cycle 
model (Salmon et al., 2009: 14) and Bedney and Meisters’ Interactive subsystem approach to 
SA model (Salmon et al., 2009: 12). All SA models vary in terms of their basic psychological 
approach. The Endsley’s (1995b) three level model is a mental theory model that uses an 
information processing approach, Smith and Hancook’s model uses an ecological approach and 
Bedney and Meister’s approach is an activity based model to describe SA (Salmon et al.,  2009: 
12-13). 
Endsley’s (1995b) three level generic model (Fig 2.3) focuses on the effect of SA on the 
decisions made by an operator in crisis situations. Factors affecting SA are identified in the 
model. The three levels form a chain of information processing, with the first level being 
perception of the elements in the environment, the second level comprehends the information 
gained at the first level and projection of future status forms the third level (Salmon et al., 2009: 
10; Flin et al., 2008: 23). 
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Figure 2.3: Model of situation awareness (Source: Endsely, 1995b: 35) 
Level 1: Gathering information 
The first stage of Endsley’s (1995b) model of SA is called ‘perception of the elements in the 
current situation’. On a ship’s navigation bridge, this would mean the ship’s course and speed, 
traffic, weather, etc. An aircraft pilot would maintain the perception of his information 
regarding traffic in the vicinity of mountains or warning lights (ibid).  
To analyse the situation properly we need to obtain the right information. It is common to lose 
attention from one element or become focused on another and some key information is ignored. 
In 1978, a crash of a United Airlines DC-8 was caused because the fuel ran out, owing to the 
crew being too busy fixing a landing gear problem to observe the fuel indicator reading (Flin et 
al., 2008: 24). 
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Level 2: Interpreting the gathered information 
Level 2 of SA requires the operator to go beyond gathering the information. This level requires 
the operator to process the incoming information and assess the significance of the information 
in the light of goals. Based on level 1 information elements, the decision maker forms a 
balanced picture of the environment appreciating the importance of the objects and the events. 
A ship’s navigating officer must analyse the situation when two position fixing methods do not 
result in a position in the same place. Changes in expected results need to be investigated and 
this can be done by an experienced operator. In these circumstances a novice operator may just 
get the Level 1 SA information but will not be able to reach the level of interpretation. An 
experienced decision maker will be able to integrate various data elements along with the 
desired goals in order to assess the situation (Endsley, 1995b; Flin et al., 2008: 25). 
Level 3: Anticipating future status 
The third level of SA focuses on projecting the future. Based on the current information of the 
environment and the dynamics, an experienced operator can predict the future and take the 
necessary action to avoid any incident. If a military pilot knows that enemy aircraft is on the 
offensive in a known location then the pilot can predict the style of attack by doing mental 
simulation (Endsley, 1995b). Three levels of SA can be summarised as follows: 
SA is based on far more than simple perceiving information about the 
environment. It includes comprehending the meaning of that 
information in an integrated form, comparing it with operator goals, and 
providing projected future states of the environment that are valuable 
for decision making. In this respect situation awareness is a broad 
construct that is applicable across a wide variety of application areas, 
with many underlying cognitive processes in common (ibid). 
A study was carried out using the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database to 
determine SA related accidents. The search was conducted using the keyword ‘situation 
awareness’. The accidents were then categorised to each level and it was found that 76.3% of 
the accidents were related to level 1, 20.3% accidents were related to level 2 and 3.4% were 
related to level 3 (Jones and Endsley, 1996). The high proportion of level 1 accidents indicate 
that a robust training system is required to improve the basic level of SA in the safety critical 
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industries. 
Situation Awareness in Maritime Accidents 
An accident analysis was conducted of 177 maritime accident reports from eight countries. A 
wide range of accidents were included in the analysis such as collision, grounding and fire. The 
accidents occurred between 1987 and 2001 with the vessels’ year of build ranging from1952 to 
2000. Among all human error types 71% were found to be situation awareness (Grech et al., 
2002). Based on Endsley’s model (1995b) level 1 errors were 59%, level 2 errors were 33% 
and level 3 errors were 9% (Grech et al., 2002). 
2.3.4 Decision Making 
Flin et al. (2008: 41) defines decision making as “a process of reaching a judgement or choosing 
an option, sometimes called a course of action, to meet the needs of a given situation”. Good 
decision making is an essential skill for successful operation in any high-risk organisation. 
Human beings process information and make decisions in two modes. First is thinking which 
is automatic and the other is logical and deliberate (Beshears and Gino, 2015). There are 
different decision making techniques available to the decision maker (Flin et al., 2008: 41). 
These techniques are dependent on situations and circumstances and some of those relevant to 
safety critical decisions are described in this section. 
Traditional decision making theories 
There are two types of decision making the slower and the faster (Kahneman, 2012: 13). Slower 
decisions are to be taken where the decision maker has unlimited time and all of the relevant 
information is available to carry out a decision analysis. In a dynamic environment a decision 
may be required instantly as there is not enough time to generate options and then evaluate each 
of those options to choose the best one. In such circumstances decisions are made on the 
individual’s experience. To reach the right decision some very complicated thinking takes place 
in the mind of the experienced decision maker and a decision is reached based on his feeling or 
“gut feeling” (Flin, 1996: 141). 
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Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been increasing interest by applied psychologists and 
researchers in NDM.  The purpose of NDM research is to explain how expert decision makers 
reach decisions under uncertainty, stress and with limited information and time available. NDM 
has been useful in many high risk safety industries such as aviation, military, acute medicine 
and nuclear power generation (Flin et al., 2008: 44). 
The early NDM researchers conducted field research to find out which strategies people used 
to make decisions and how they made tough decisions under uncertain conditions. The 
researchers concluded that while making decisions people were not generating and evaluating 
options. Instead people were using experience to match the situation and then make a decision 
(Klein, 2008).  
Model of NDM 
Several NDM models have been produced in the 1980s including Ramussen’s (1983) model of 
cognitive control which used distinguished skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based 
behaviour and Hammond’s cognitive continuum theory which argues that decisions may vary 
as much as they rely on the intuition of the decision maker (Klein, 2008) 
Flin et al. (2008: 44) has produced a simplified model of decision making to suit a range of 
operational work settings (Figure 2.4).  
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Figure 2.4: Decision Making Model (Source: Flin et al., 2008: 44) 
Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) 
On 3rd July 1988, an AEGIS cruiser named the USS Vincennes accidently shot down an Iranian 
passenger airbus, flight 655, over the Arabian Gulf killing 290 people. Incorrect identification 
of the aircraft was made by a USS Vincennes crew member and it was assumed to be an enemy 
aircraft. Three main reasons for incorrect identification were: 1) The Iranian aircraft was 
operating on the edge of the commercial air corridor (instead of the centre) and was heading 
directly towards the USS Vincennes; 2) absence of electronic radiation which is made by 
commercial airliners; 3) there were reports that F-14 fighter aircraft were operating from the 
Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and an Iranian patrol aircraft (P-3) was flying in the area. The 
USS Vincennes made efforts to contact the aircraft to request a course change but there was no 
response from the Iranian passenger airbus. A very limited time to make a decision forced them 
to shoot down the aircraft (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998: 4). 
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As a result of this and some other incidents the Office of Naval Research sponsored a research 
and development programme named Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS). The 
programme started in 1990 and was completed in 1997 costing $18 million. The budget was 
divided into two halves; $9 million was used for decision support research and the remaining 
$9 million was used for training research (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998: 12). The goal of 
the programme was to develop training with the help of simulation to support the enhancement 
of decision making under stress (Hutcheon and Bevilacqua, 2010).  
The objectives and approach of the TADMUS project are described as follows: 
The TADMUS programme was designed to: define the decision 
problems facing navy tactical teams and develop measures of tactical 
decision performance; collect empirical data to document the impact of 
stress on decision making; and develop principles for decision support, 
information display, training system design and simulation that will 
mitigate these stress effects. Several emerging areas of research are 
being exploited to accomplish these objectives, including: recognition 
primed decision theory, shared mental models, human performance 
modelling and team training (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998: 10). 
Under the TADMUS programme, consistent baseline data was collected on tactical decision 
making under stress. The research domain was to examine the Air Warfare (AW) task in the 
ship’s Combat Information Centre (CIC). The CIC is the central information processing area 
where tactical decisions are made by the AW team detecting, tracking and identifying targets 
(Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998: 39). 
Smith et al. (2004) conducted a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the TADMUS training 
model. The study recruited 90 US Navy officers and divided them into fifteen teams. Eight 
teams had TADMUS training and the remaining seven had conventional US Navy training. 
Each team performed three threat detection scenarios. The teams with TADMUS training were 
found to be significantly better than those with conventional training in detecting threats and 
making decisions and it was concluded that the TADMUS training model was effective. 
The TADMUS programme mainly focused on navy decision making skills but the findings 
could be applied to other safety critical domains. 
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Decision Making in maritime operations 
Decision making is one of the very important NTS in maritime operations as it is in other safety 
critical industries. A poor decision made by the master of a ship may lead to loss of lives on-
board, loss of the ship and may pollute the waters. One of the best examples of poor decision 
making is the tanker Torrey Canyon grounding in 1967. The captain took a more direct route 
to save 6 hours in order to arrive at Milford Haven in time for the high tide. Even though the 
short route was deep enough, oil was moved to different tanks to reduce the draft by two inches. 
Nevertheless the vessel still went aground when passing through the Scilly Isles when trying to 
avoid collision with a fishing vessel and was not able to turn quickly enough (Hetherington et 
al., 2006). 
2.4  STCW AND THE 2010 MANILA AMENDMENTS 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
(STCW) sets qualification standards for masters, officers and watchkeeping personnel on 
seagoing merchant ships (Tally, 2012: 326). 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the IMO (International Maritime Organization) developed a 
comprehensive series of conventions to establish a framework of international law addressing 
maritime safety and in doing so the IMO recognized that one of the most important elements in 
the safe operation of any ship is the training and competence of its crew. (IAMU, 2010) It was 
noted that international regulations lacked a standard of competency for seafarers and as a 
result, in 1969, the IMO agreed to develop a draft STCW Convention (ibid).  
2.4.1 STCW 1978 and 1995 
The STCW was officially adopted by a conference at the IMO in 1978 to standardize the 
qualifications required for masters, officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant ships. 
The 1978 STCW Convention had many limitations such as vague requirements left to the 
discretion of the parties; unclear standards of competence; no IMO oversight of compliance; 
limited port state control and inadequacies which did not address modern shipboard functions 
at that time (Tally, 2012: 326; MCA, 2013b). As a result of the grounding of the MV Aegean 
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Sea in 1992 on the rocks of the Spanish port of La Coruna, the United States proposed 
conducting a comprehensive review of the 1978 convention (IAMU, 2010). This proposal 
suggested the review specifically consider the role of the human element in maritime casualties. 
The IMO and its members agreed to concentrate on areas relating to people, training and 
operational practices, rather than issues dealing primarily with improving ship construction and 
equipment standards (ibid).  
The STCW Convention was subsequently significantly amended in 1995 to include a code 
containing mandatory requirements and guidance information for the implementation of the 
convention. The comprehensive and detailed 1995 amendments established a level playing field 
among all parties to the convention to help ensure consistent training worldwide. These 
amendments also established competence based standards that placed emphasis on the 
requirements for training and assessments of skills in most facets of the mariner’s profession 
(IMO, 2015b; IAMU, 2010).  
The following are some notable changes made to the convention of 1995: 
Examination and Demonstration of Skills 
The requirements established minimum standards of competence for the range of certificates to 
be issued under STCW. The standards presented in tables specified competence; related a list 
of knowledge and associated competence; a method of demonstrating each competence and the 
criteria for assessing each competence (IAMU, 2010). 
Quality Standard System (QSS) 
The quality standard system required that all training, assessment and certification activities be 
continuously monitored to ensure achievement of a defined objective. The convention also 
required the quality standard system be subject to an independent evaluation every five years 
(ibid). 
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Port State Control 
The 1995 amendments empowered the port state control provision of the convention by 
allowing port state control officers to look beyond merchant mariner certificates and conduct a 
direct assessment of the competence of merchant mariners (ibid). 
2.4.2 Manila Amendments 
In January 2006, in the 37th session of the STW (Standards of Training and Watchkeeping) Sub-
Committee it was decided to review the STCW Convention to ensure that it met the new 
challenges facing the shipping industry today and in the years to come (Tally, 2012: 326). The 
new challenges being met included advancement in technology and the emergence of new 
equipment such as the Electronic Chart Display System (ECDIS). It was deemed necessary to 
prepare the officers to deal with new technology and discussion led to a list of human cognitive 
skills to cope with the technology and training of NTS, to avoid or minimise human error 
(Abou-Elkawam, 2015). 
At its 38th session of the Sub-Committee, and following detailed discussions, it was agreed that 
the present structure of the convention had more than adequately served its purpose and that 
there was no need to review it in great detail. It was then agreed that the review should only 
embrace the following principles (IAMU, 2010): 
1. Retain the structure and goals of the 1995 revision; 
2. Do not down scale existing standards; 
3. Do not amend the articles of the Convention; 
4. Address inconsistencies, interpretations, outdated provisions, MSC 
(Maritime Safety Committee) instructions and clarifications already 
issued and technological advances; 
5. Address requirements for effective communication; 
6. Address requirements for non-technical skills; 
7. Provide for flexibility in terms of compliance and for required levels of 
training and certification and watch keeping arrangements due to 
innovations in technology; 
8. Address the special character and circumstances of short sea shipping 
and the offshore industry; 
9. Address security-related issues.  
Within the scope of this study Table 2.1 shows an abridged version of the STCW changes (IMO, 
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2011: p122)  in relation to NTS training of management level officers of ships of 500 gross 
tonnage or more (See Appendix 1 for the complete list of STCW Section A-II/2); 
Table 2.1: Section A-II/2 –  
Masters and chief mates on ships of 500 gross tonnage or more (bridged version) 
Competence Use of leadership and managerial skills 
1 Knowledge of shipboard personnel management and training  
2 A knowledge of related international maritime conventions and recommendations, 
and national legislation 
3 Ability to apply task and workload management 
4 Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management 
5 Knowledge and ability to apply decision-making techniques 
6 Development, implementation, and oversight of standard operating procedures 
 
Based on the outcomes outlined in Section A-II/2 of the STCW Manila amendments, the 
Human Element Leadership and Management (HELM) training course became compulsory for 
all deck and engineering officers effective from 2012. The question arose here as to how the 
IMO reached the outcomes outlined in Section A-II/2. Did they conduct any formal research 
before reaching the conclusion that these are particular skills required by deck or engineering 
officers to overcome or minimise human error? A formal research was not conducted (Abou-
Elkawam, 2015) into the domain specific NTS or to formalise the taxonomy or behavioural 
markers to be used for training and assessment of the NTS of the deck or engineering officers 
in the way that other safety critical industries have done (See Section 2.5). During the review 
process of the STCW convention and code the IMO consulted all its member states (Davitt and 
Holford, 2015). However consultation proved a weak process in this case as it can be seen that 
statements, definitions and competence criteria are extremely broad (appendix 1) which allows 
for different views of each administration (ibid). This will lead to lack of consistency in the 
HELM courses delivered at different places (Wall, 2015).  
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2.4.3 HELM Training 
The IMO has now set minimum standards of NTS training by making HELM training 
compulsory for both operational and management level officers in the deck and engineering 
departments. This training can either be integrated into the main programme or delivered as a 
standalone course (MNTB, 2012). HELM (O) is the operational level course for which the 
required training time is 21 hours (MNTB, 2012) and HELM (M) is the management level 
course requiring training time of 35 hours.  
In the UK, the MCA and the MNTB has implemented HELM training (MCA; 2013a) as a stand-
alone short course for experienced seafarers wishing to transfer to officer grade and may be 
integrated for seafarers following the approved training programme. HELM (O) is of three days 
length and HELM (M) is of five days length. 
The course covers almost all elements of human factors and in the UK the MNTB has outlined 
the outcomes of the course based on the STCW Section II/2 of the Manila amendments. Since 
this research focuses on management level HELM training, the outcome and learning objectives 
(MNTB, 2012) of HELM (M) are presented in an abridged version in Table 2.2. A full list of 
HELM (M) outcomes is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 2.2: HELM (M) outcome and Learning objectives 
 
Outcome The learner can use leadership and managerial skills to control the operation 
of the ship and care for persons onboard at the management level.  
 Learning Objective 
1 Identify the principles and good practice in shipboard human resource management.  
2 Explain the relevance of the ‘human element’ in shipboard operations. 
3 Apply relevant and related international maritime conventions and recommendations, 
national regulations, codes of practice and guidelines, while using leadership and 
managerial skills to control the operation of the ship and care for persons onboard at 
the management level. 
4 Apply the principles of task and workload management, including planning, co-
ordination, allocation and prioritisation of human and physical resources 
5 Use project management as an aid to decision-making. 
6 Explain effective resource management techniques 
7 Apply the principles and practice of decision-making 
8 Lead and manage the development, implementation and oversight of standard 
operating procedures 
9 Identify the principles and good practice in shipboard training, learning, coaching, 
mentoring, assessment and developing shipboard personnel. 
 
 
By comparing the two tables of learning outcomes (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2), the MCA 
outcomes can be seen to be in more detail than those of STCW but again there is no literature 
suggesting that any research was conducted by the MCA before introducing the outcomes 
(Wall, 2015). A research similar to anaesthetists’ non-technical skills (ANTS) (See Section 
2.5.2) would have proved useful and may have more closely identified the necessary skills 
required by deck and engineering officers separately.  
Presently the same course is delivered to both deck and engineering officers however the trainer 
finds the delivery difficult (Wall, 2015). The main reason for this is that the college phase 
(Higher National Diploma - HND) is compulsory for chief mate students in which they will 
have studied some leadership and management issues whereas for second engineer students 
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(not following the approved training programme) the college phase is not compulsory and they 
only appear for the written exams (ibid). These exams are mainly technical in nature and thus 
they do not have any prior knowledge of the subjects of leadership and management (Wall, 
2015). Separate learning outcomes for both, deck and engineering officers, mainly focused on 
their specific areas of operation, may have been useful. 
The following list shows the requirements or the methods of study for the HELM course. 
Centres will need to present their training plans as part of the approval 
process. Centres are encouraged to fully engage learners in the learning 
process using interactive teaching methods supported by appropriate use of 
one or more of the following (MNTB, 2012):  
 
 Case studies;  
 Role play;  
 Scenarios;  
 Simulation; and  
 Team exercises 
. 
 
The above requirement is wide open to training institutes as to how they deliver the course, 
using maybe only one of the methods listed above, in addition to classroom teaching. The 
requirement did not make simulation a compulsory part of the course. Simulation is an essential 
tool for NTS training as can be seen from experience in other safety critical domains (see 
Section 2.5). Again, with proper research conducted by the IMO (Abou-Elkawam, 2015) into 
domain specific NTS for deck and engineering officers before the course implementation, this 
area would also have been clarified.    
There are two options for delivery of the course i.e. either integration into the main course or a 
stand-alone course (MNTB, 2012). In the MCA’s impact assessment report (MCA, 2013b) of 
the STCW Manila amendment, the reasons for stand-alone HELM courses are clarified. The 
main reason is to accommodate experienced seafarers who wish to transfer to officer training. 
Again the issue is clear here that although deck officers would have some training at a college, 
engineering officers (not following the approved training programme) will not go through any 
formal training (Wall, 2015) and would not be able to go through an integrated course. The 
integrated course has proven successful in aviation’s CRM course where underpinning 
knowledge of the CRM course is delivered within the main course (CAA, 2006). 
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HELM training is in its infancy and this may take time to approach perfection (Wall, 2015). 
The aviation industry took fifteen years from its first generation of the Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) course to fifth generation delivery (See section 2.5.1) and is said to be 
quite successful. It has also helped reduce accidents caused by human error (Diehl, 1991).  
2.5 SAFETY CRITICAL DOMAINS’ EFFORTS INTO NTS TRAINING AND 
ASSESSMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Some domains, such as aviation and anaesthesia, have conducted extensive research identifying 
domain specific NTS, training methods and behavioural marker systems for assessment. The 
Aviation industry is considered to be the pioneer in discovering the importance of NTS and 
researching and developing courses like crew resource management to supplement the main 
training. It is quite important to discuss the work of aviation and anaesthesia in the development 
of the NTS training and assessment to get an insight as to whether the maritime industry could 
benefit from their work and adapt some of their good practices. Some maritime research into 
NTS will also be discussed in this section.  
2.5.1 Crew Resource Management (CRM) - Aviation 
CRM training can be defined as  
a set of instructional strategies designed to improve teamwork in the 
cockpit by applying well-tested training tools (e.g., performance 
measures, exercises, feedback mechanisms) and appropriate training 
methods (e.g., simulators, lectures, videos) targeted at specific content 
(i.e., teamwork knowledge, skills, and attitudes) (Salas et al., 1999).  
The CRM or NTS include situation awareness, decision making, leadership, teamwork and 
communications. 
The concept of NTS was generated by the aviation industry when the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) in the USA investigated a number of airline accidents in the 1960s and 
1970s. As a consequence of the following accident and others, the idea of Cockpit/Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) was born,  
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On December 28, 1978, as a result of a relatively minor landing gear 
problem, a United Airlines DC-8 was in a holding pattern while awaiting 
landing at Portland, Oregon. Although the first officer knew the aircraft 
was low on fuel, he failed to express his concerns convincingly to the 
captain. The plane ran out of fuel and crashed, killing 10 (NTSB, 1998: 
20). 
A workshop was held in 1979, Resource Management on the Flight Deck, sponsored by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Human error aspects of the majority 
of air crash accidents were identified in this meeting. The main causes were found to be 
interpersonal communication, decision making and leadership failures. It was suggested that 
the training of NTS of pilots was required to reduce “pilot error” by making better use of the 
human resources on the flight deck. Since that time CRM training programmes have evolved 
in the United States into six generations.  (Helmreich et al., 1999).  
First Generation of CRM 
The first CRM programme (called Cockpit Resource Management at that time and was later 
changed to Crew Resource Management) was proposed and developed by United Airlines in 
1981 in the US and the course was called Command, Leadership and Resource Management. 
This was a seminar style training programme where participants diagnosed their own 
managerial style. The focus was on general concepts of leadership and general strategies of 
interpersonal behaviour but failed to provide definitions of appropriate behaviour in the cockpit 
(Helmreich et al., 1999; Kanki et al., 2010: 27). 
Second Generation of CRM 
NASA held a workshop in 1986 to discuss the progress of the CRM training programmes. By 
that time many airlines in the United States and around the world had started CRM training. It 
was concluded at this meeting that CRM training would disappear as a separate component of 
training and it would be a part of main flight training and flight operations (ibid).  
In the second generation of the CRM training programme the name was changed to Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) to focus on team oriented factors. The new programmes focused 
on specific aviation concepts related to flight operations and were more team oriented in nature. 
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The training conducted focused on team building, situation awareness and stress management 
(Helmreich et al., 1999; Kanki et al., 2010: 29). 
Third Generation of CRM 
In the early 1990s a new shape of CRM was introduced which integrated CRM with standard 
technical training. The idea was to focus on specific skills and behaviours that pilots could use 
to operate flights more effectively and in a safe manner. Flight automation was under focus as 
many airlines introduced modules covering CRM issues linked with flight automation. At this 
stage CRM was also offered to other groups such as flight attendants and maintenance 
personnel. A special CRM was designed for captains to target leadership skills. (Helmreich et 
al., 1999). 
Fourth Generation of CRM 
The Advanced Qualification Programme (AQP) was introduced by the Federal Aviation 
Administration as a tool to improve the training and qualification of the flight crew. AQP was 
a voluntary programme which required carriers to provide CRM for all flight crews. This also 
required integrating CRM concepts into technical training. The requirement was to address the 
human factors (CRM) issues in the training. (ibid). 
Fifth Generation of CRM 
The fifth generation of CRM outlines the fact that human errors are inevitable but the effects of 
errors can be minimised by applying the following three lines of defence (Helmreich et al., 
1999); 
1. The avoidance of error. 
2. The trapping of incipient errors before they are committed. 
3. Mitigating the consequences of those errors that occur and are not 
trapped. 
In addition to error management, airlines were required to take measures to determine the nature 
and source of error in their operations. The Aviation Safety Action Programme was announced 
by the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) which encouraged airlines to make incident 
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reporting compulsory within organizations to improve safety (ibid). 
Sixth Generation of CRM 
Based on the fifth generation’s error management theme, the CRM focus has widened from 
error management to threat management. In previous generations CRM skills and methods were 
applied to eliminate, trap or mitigate errors but the sixth generation focuses on the threats and 
errors which must be managed by flight crews to ensure safe flight (Wagener and Ison, 2014).   
NOTECHS 
The Federal Aviation Administration in the USA introduced the Advanced Qualification 
Program (AQP) in the 1990s and in the UK at the same time, the Civil Aviation Authority 
required a formal incorporation of non-technical (CRM) skills evaluation into all levels of flight 
crew training (CAA, 2006). The European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has introduced the 
following regulation to implement the training and assessment of NTS under the CRM 
framework:  
The flight crew must be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with 
a methodology acceptable to the Authority and published in the 
Operational Manual. The purpose of such an assessment is to: provide 
feedback to the crew collectively and individually and serve to identify 
retraining; and be used to improve the CRM training system (O’Connor 
et al., 2002a). 
Based on this legislation, a research project, JARTEL (Joint Aviation Regulation – Translation 
and Elaboration of Legislation), was initiated by the JAA Human Factors group in 1996, to 
develop a suitable method to identify and assess an individual pilot’s non-technical (CRM) 
skills. The project was sponsored by four European CAAs (Civil Aviation Authority). A 
research consortium consisting of pilots and psychologists from Germany, France, Holland and 
the UK was established to work on the NOTECHS (Non-Technical Skills).The system was to 
be used to assess the individual pilot’s skill. It was to be suitable for use across Europe on all 
flight routes and must accommodate all European cultures (Flin et al, 2003).  
A review was conducted of the existing behaviour rating system for pilots already being used 
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by larger airlines in Europe and the USA. It appeared that none of the systems could be adopted 
in their original form because the available systems were either unclear for a Pan-European 
basis, or specific to a particular airline. Therefore, it was decided by the project team that to 
assess pilots’ NTS a new taxonomy and rating method would be designed (ibid). 
The development method included a detailed examination of available behavioural marker 
systems to assess a pilot’s NTS. Airline captains with substantial experience worked as experts 
to advise on the final design of the NOTECHS system (ibid). The resulting NOTECHS system 
has four categories, each with elements of behaviour as shown in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: NOTECHS Taxonomy (Flin et al, 2003) 
Category Element 
1. Co-operation Team-building and maintaining 
Considering others 
Supporting others 
Conflict solving 
2. Leadership and 
Managerial Skills 
Use of Authority and assertiveness 
Providing and maintaining standards 
Planning and co-ordination 
Work load management 
3. Situation awareness Awareness of aircraft systems 
Awareness of external environment 
Awareness of time 
4. Decision Making Problem definition and diagnosis 
Option generation 
Risk assessment and option selection 
Outcome review 
 
Before designing NOTECHS the following principles were established. The aim of these 
principles was that each participant is assessed fairly within the NOTECH system (Kanki et al., 
2010: 186): 
1. Only observable behaviour is to be assessed – The evaluation must 
exclude reference to a crewmember’s personality or emotional attitude 
and should be based only on observable behaviour. Behavioural markers 
were designed to support an objective judgement. 
2. Need for technical consequence – For a pilot’s non-technical skills to be 
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rated as unacceptable, flight safety must be actually (or potentially) 
compromised. This requires a related objective technical consequence. 
3. Acceptable or unacceptable rating required – The JAR-OPS requires the 
airlines to indicate whether the observed non-technical skills are 
acceptable or unacceptable. 
4. Repetition required – Repetition of unacceptable behaviour during the 
check must be observed to conclude that there is a significant problem.  
5. Explanation required – For each Category rated as unacceptable the 
examiner must: (a) Indicate the Element(s) in that Category where 
unacceptable behaviour was observed. (b) Explain where the observed 
NTS (potentially) led to safety consequences. (c) Give a free-text 
explanation on each of the Categories rated unacceptable, using 
standard phraseology. 
 
The main JARTEL study was an experimental rating task study. Eight video recorded scenarios, 
filmed in a Boeing 757 simulator, were used for the study. The scenarios simulated realistic 
flight situations highlighting behaviours from the NOTECHS element. The pilots’ behaviours 
were rated (“poor practice” to “good practice”), using the NOTECHS system, by more than 100 
assessors. A briefing and practice session was given before the start of each session. The 
assessors were asked to rate captains’ and first officers’ behaviours in each of the eight cockpit 
scenarios using the NOTECHS rating. (Flin et al., 2003; O’Connor et al., 2002a). In the 
evaluation questionnaire, the assessors were very satisfied with the NOTECHS rating system 
and the results of the experimental phase of this project were quite satisfactory for the further 
development of the NOTECHS method (Flin et al., 2003). 
2.5.2 Anaesthesia 
It has been determined through critical incident reporting that NTS are the major cause of 
accidents in anaesthesia crisis management. To focus on this area the Anaesthetists’ Non-
Technical Skills (ANTS) tool has been developed recently for the training and assessment of 
anaesthetists NTS (Yee et al., 2005). The ANTS is a behavioural marker framework and was 
developed in a project between the University of Aberdeen Industrial Psychology Research 
Centre and the Scottish Clinical Simulation Centre (Matveeskii et al., 2008). The programme 
followed the concepts of CRM, which was developed to improve NTS of aviation personnel 
(Flin & Maran, 2004). 
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ANTS (Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills) 
The Scottish Council for Postgraduate Medical and Dental Education partnered in a project to 
investigate the NTS in anaesthetists. The project was called ‘The Identification and 
Measurement of Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills’. The main purpose of the project was to 
determine the importance of NTS required by the anaesthetists during operations. The project 
was divided into the following seven work packages (ANTS, 2014): 
1. “Review of Human Factors Research in Anaesthesia. Report written by 
G. Fletcher, R. Flin and P. McGeorge; between 1999 and 2003. 
2. Review of Behavioural Marker Systems in Anaesthesia. Report written 
by G. Fletcher, R. Flin and P. McGeorge; between (2000 - 2003). 
3. Interview Study to Identify Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills. Report 
written by G. Fletcher, R. Flin and P. McGeorge; between 2001 and 
2003. 
4. Review of Incident Data - Confidential 
5. Development of a Prototype Behavioural Marker System for 
Anaesthetista’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS). Report written by G. 
Fletcher, R. Flin, P. McGeorge, R. Glavin, N. Maran and R. Patey; 
between 2001 and 2003. 
6. Preliminary Evaluation of the Prototype Behavioural Marker System for 
Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS). Report written by G. 
Fletcher, R. Flin and P. McGeorge; between 2000 and 2003. 
7. Experimental Report. Report written by G. Fletcher, R. Flin, P. 
McGeorge, R. Glavin, N. Maran and R. Patey; between 2002 and 2003” 
(ANTS, 2014). 
 
The first work package of the project reviewed the human factors involvement in the 
anaesthesia sector. It describes the background of such a study of human factors in anaesthesia, 
as 80% of anaesthetic incidents are due to human error and most of them could have been 
avoided with the use of appropriate skills (Fletcher et al., 2003a).  
Incident reporting data was collected from around the world to analyse the extent of the 
problem. While collecting the incident data, limitation factors were considered.  One factor 
being that all incidents are not reported for a variety of reasons and another being the reported 
factors may not provide an actual picture of the incident. As long as limitations are considered 
then there is great benefit from analysing incident reports in any domain (Fletcher et al., 2003a). 
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Based on the interviews a taxonomy (Table 2.4) of anaesthetists’ NTS, a prototype behavioural 
markers’ system was developed for rating observed behaviours (Table 2.5) (Yee et al., 2005). 
After the preliminary evaluation of prototype behavioural markers system, the ANTS system 
was released to anaesthetics free of charge, for non-commercial use, by the University of 
Aberdeen in 2004 (Flin, 2013) and is now being used successfully across the world (Livingston, 
2014). 
Table 2.4: ANTS Taxonomy (Yee et al., 2005) 
Category Element 
Task Management Planning and preparing 
Prioritizing 
Providing and maintaining standards 
Identifying and utilizing resources 
Team working Coordinating activities with team member 
Exchanging information 
Using authority and assertiveness 
Assessing capabilities 
Supporting others 
Situation awareness Gathering information 
Recognizing and understanding 
Anticipating 
Decision Making Identifying options 
Balancing risks and selection options 
Re-evaluation 
 
 
Table 2.5: ANTS Rating System (Yee et al., 2005) 
Rating Level Description 
4 – Good 
Performance was of a consistently high standard, enhancing 
patient safety. It could be used as positive example for others. 
3 – Acceptable 
Performance was of a satisfactory standard but could be 
improved.  
2 – Marginal 
Performance indicated cause of concern. Considerable 
improvement needed. 
1 – Poor 
Performance endangered or potentially endangered patient 
safety. Serious remediation is required. 
Not observed 
Skill could not be observed in this scenario. 
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The system has now been translated into many languages and is being used in anaesthesia 
simulation training and assessment in various countries including the UK, USA, India and 
Canada (Bhagwant, 2012; Flin, 2013). 
2.5.3 NTS Research In Maritime 
NTS have been drawn to attention in other safety critical industries after the CRM development 
in aviation. To better evaluate the role of NTS in ship operation safety, a thorough research is 
required to underpin the criteria for behavioural markers for the assessment of NTS. Such 
research is limited in the maritime domain (Davitt and Holford, 2015) and mostly not initiated 
by any regulatory body but conducted by universities as part of PhD theses or published papers. 
The only notable research conducted by a regulatory body is the MCA’s ‘simulator training for 
handling escalating emergencies’ in which it has recommended further definition of the main 
NTS to handle escalating emergencies (Habberley et al., 2001). The MCA also produced a 
guide in 2006 outlining best practices in leadership and management (Davitt and Holford, 2015) 
which was based on a leadership research conducted by Arthur D Little (2004). Other notable 
researches are from Warsash Maritime Academy and the US Navy which will be discussed 
here.   
Warsash Maritime Academy 
After the success of various safety critical industries’ development of behavioural markers for 
the assessment of competence or NTS in the simulators, Gatfield (2008) conducted extensive 
research and was first to develop behavioural markers for assessment of competence of marine 
engineering officers in simulators (Long, 2010). In this research a crisis scenario was developed 
in the marine engine simulator which was run twelve times (video recorded) with three 
engineers in each run. The behavioural markers observed during the exercises were then rated 
against four criteria (ease of observation, ease of evaluation, frequency of occurrence and 
relevance to competence) to filter the behaviour markers. Filtration was deemed necessary so 
as to keep to a minimum amount, the right number of behaviour markers for the ease of 
assessment (Gatfield, 2008). 
Two groups of assessors, one group of six marine engineers and another group of six non-
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domain crisis management assessment experts were selected to assess each behaviour on a four 
rating scale (good, towards good, towards poor and poor). There was another group of seven 
expert crisis management assessors who were asked to use their ‘gut’ feeling to rank Chief 
Engineers in the scenario from best to worst crisis manager (ibid). It was concluded that the 
assessment framework be deemed as valid as there was a high degree of correlation between 
findings of assessors in all groups (ibid). 
The US Navy 
The US navy used a three stage methodology to develop domain specific behavioural markers 
for the Officer Of the Deck (OOD). The three stages comprised of literature review, focus group 
interview and critical incident review. The literature review identified lists of NTS found in 
other safety critical domains, such as aviation, anaesthesia and surgery, assumed to be necessary 
for effective performance (O’Connor and Long, 2011). A literature review identified little 
research was conducted in the maritime domain in the field of NTS (Heterington et al., 2006; 
O’Connor and Long, 2011).  
Focus group interviews were conducted to filter the list to only those skills which were 
applicable to the OOD watch station to draw an initial OOD NTS taxonomy (Table 2.5). To 
evaluate the validity of the developed taxonomy the critical scenarios were developed in the 
third stage. The scenarios were used to generate interview data for analysis (O’Connor and 
Long, 2011). The interviews conducted had four stages; 1) Interviewee explains a relevant 
incident; 2) Interviewer repeats incident back to interviewee to confirm understanding; 3) 
Interviewer expands the discussion on the incident and looks for the cues and factors affecting 
NTS and 4) Interviewer probes further to extract more knowledge about NTS links (ibid).  A 
total of 149 interview statements were collected and independently classified. The inter-rater 
reliability of all the analysis was found to be higher than normal hence no further changes were 
made to the original taxonomy (Table 2.6) (ibid). 
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Table 2.6: Initial OOD nontechnical taxonomy (Source: O’Connor and Long, 2011) 
Category Element 
Leadership Establishing authority 
Managing workload 
Maintaining the standards of the watch 
Decision Making Defining problem 
Generating possible solution 
Implementing best solution 
Situational awareness Actively gathering information 
Responding to changes in information 
Anticipating future events 
Communication Selecting correct medium 
Sending information clearly and concisely 
Effectively receiving information 
Managing stress Maintaining concentration 
Coping with stressors 
 
2.5.4 Effectiveness of non-technical skills training 
After discussing the various safety critical industries’ investigations into the training of NTS to 
improve safety, it is difficult to conclude that the reduction in accidents is actually due to the 
additional NTS training. Some research has been conducted to measure the effectiveness of 
NTS training which will be discussed here. 
Aviation 
In aviation, for instance, accidents are very infrequent in any one particular airline and thus it 
would be difficult to prove whether reduction in accidents is mainly due to NTS training (Diehl, 
1991). Evaluations were conducted of the US navy, the US air force and Petroleum Helicopters’ 
accident rates after the implementation of the CRM course and have shown a major decrease in 
the accident rates (Table 2.7) (ibid).  
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Table 2.7: Effects of CRM (Source: Diehl, 1991)  
Organisation Course Accident Rates 
US Navy,  
all Helicopters, Crewmembers 
CRM 28% Decrease 
US Navy 
A6 Intruder, Crewmember 
CRM 81% Decrease 
US Air force 
MAC Transports, Crewmembers 
CRM 51% Decrease 
Petroleum Helicopters Inc. 
Commercial pilots 
CRM  54% Decrease 
 
O’Connor et al. (2002b) conducted research into the methods to evaluate the effectiveness of 
flight crew CRM training in the UK. They found that participants involved in the CRM training 
were generally positive about the course and were willing to change the attitudes and behaviours 
but concluded that it was not possible to find out the impact of the training on the overall 
industry or whether the effects of the course had improved safety. 
A study of 74 NTS training evaluations was conducted by O’Connor et al. (2008). Only 16 
studies were selected for further study as having sufficient data. The study included six and 
three evaluations performed with military and civil aviators respectively, four studies with 
medical personnel’s NTS, two with civil aviation students and one with offshore oil production 
operators. It was found that generally NTS training effects were positive. It must be noted that 
all evaluation methods were either post training surveys or questionnaires asking participants’ 
view about the course (ibid). This evaluation method may not be very effective as it is only the 
course perception of the delegates.  
Anaeasthesia 
A study was conducted in Toronto, Canada, to investigate the effects of simulation training of 
anaesthesia crisis management and NTS ability of anaesthesia residents. A total of 20 
anaesthesia residents were recruited to participate in the management of three different 
simulated anaesthesia crisis situations in a patient simulator and those were assessed using the 
ANTS scoring system. Four main NTS were assessed in this study; each was further divided 
into a number of skill elements (Table 2.4). Each element was assessed on the ANTS rating 
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system (Table 2.5) which was further divided into half points to provide enough flexibility for 
rating. The results from the study suggested that a single simulated session of all three situations 
improved the NTS of the anaesthesia residents. (Yee et al., 2005).  
The Crisis Avoidance and Resource Management for Anaesthetists (CARMA) course was 
developed by anaesthetists and psychologists based on the ANTS system. The course focused 
on the NTS significant to anaesthetic practice.  Anaesthetists NTS of the participants were 
assessed in simulated crisis situations based on the ANTS framework. Over 100 anaesthetic 
professionals, with a positive perspective, attended the first CARMA course. Communication 
and improved team working were the key areas identified by the course (Flin and Maran, 2004). 
Maritime 
A study was conducted to evaluate maritime Bridge Resource Management (BRM) in the 
National University of Ireland by observing the US Navy’s BRM training (O’Connor, 2011). 
This study compared two groups of US Navy Surface War Officers (SWO); one with BRM 
training and the other without the training. The researchers found BRM training ineffective as 
it did not impact on the knowledge and attitude of the SWOs. The main reason for the 
ineffectiveness of the programme was found to be course content which did not meet the 
assessment needs of the surface warfare community.  
2.5.5 Maritime Industry’s Comparison with Aviation and Anaesthesia NTS 
Aviation introduced NTS training in the early 1980s, anaesthesia in the early 2000s and the 
maritime industry implemented HELM training in 2012. The high visibility of the aviation 
industry triggered the industry to become first to find ways to reduce the accidents as one small 
failure could lead to an accident which could result in the loss of hundreds of lives. One wonders 
why maritime is quite late in introducing such an important element of training. It may be 
because one major cargo ship accident does not attract headlines. This does not justify the 
regulators ignoring such a key contribution to accidents as there have been major passenger 
ship accidents with hundreds of casualties. One of the main causes of these accidents 
(Stojiljkovic et al., 2012; Havold, 2000), which would attract the attention of the world, is seen 
as human error. In STCW 1995, the IMO focused on technical aspects of the training which has 
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impacted positively on the reduction of maritime accidents (MCA, 2010: v).  
The comparison of maritime with anaesthesia is quite difficult as anaesthetists are dealing 
directly with patients and ship officers are either dealing with cargo and/or passengers. 
Anaesthetists have adopted CRM methods to develop the taxonomy and ANTS system of 
behavioural markers for the assessment of anaesthetists’ behaviours (Section 2.5.2). Such 
methodology is generic and could be adopted in the maritime industry to develop domain 
specific NTS.  
Aviation’s training model is quite impressive as NTS theoretical knowledge is covered in the 
initial training and the CRM course concentrates on the practical application of such skills by 
use of simulated exercises or case studies (CAA, 2006). The CRM course is repeated every 
three years, or when an individual changes aircraft or company. When the course is repeated it 
is focused on the weak areas within the individual or the company (ibid). The responsibility for 
conducting CRM courses is given to airline operators who must develop courses customised to 
company cultures and type of operations undertaken (O’Connor et al., 2002b). 
The Maritime industry could adopt the CRM training methods by incorporating the 
underpinning knowledge of the human element into the main course and then the HELM course 
is delivered at the end of the main course with some practical exercises. In the maritime industry 
repeating a course may prove helpful only if the course is developed and delivered by the 
shipping company. In this case the company will focus on the weak areas of the company 
culture and the individual. Whereas a course repeated in a college may not have any improving 
effect as the course will merely be a repeat of the same content.  
2.5.6 Other factors improving safety in aviation and anaesthesia 
Over the years the airline industry has become quite safe with one passenger fatality per 7.1 
million travellers which is a 42% improvement in the ten year period up to 2011 (Oster et al., 
2013; Hersman, 2011). Technological advancement in aircraft, avionics and engines have 
contributed to the overall safety in the aviation industry (Oster et al., 2013). Pilot training has 
improved to ensure airline safety through the use of sophisticated flight simulators (ibid). The 
use of checklists have improved ever since the method was introduced. Checklists alleviate the 
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burden of pilots from trying to remember the necessary steps. The FAA’s regulations require 
the check lists of all critical operations such as starting an engine check, a take-off check, an 
approach check and so on (Cote, 2015). A Ground Proximity warning system has significantly 
reduced the number of a certain type of accidents known as controlled flights into terrain (Oster 
et al., 2013; Cote, 2015). The other factors include a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, 
better weather prediction and runway incursions (Cote, 2015).  
One of the key elements in anaesthesia safety is the anaesthesia machine. Technological 
advancement in the last 100 years has improved the machine features significantly to improve 
patient safety. There has been improvement in patient monitoring, advances in anaesthesia 
machines, incubating devices, ultrasound for visualisation of nerves and vessels etc. The 
machine is required to be checked properly before being used on a patient to ensure patient 
safety (Subrahmanyam and Mohan, 2013). 
2.6 THE ROLE OF SIMULATOR IN NTS TRAINING AND ASSESSMENT 
Simulator training has proven to be very successful in high risk domains NTS training and 
assessments (Kozuba and Bondaruk, 2014; Wanger et al., 2013; Balci et al., 2014) which 
provides a realistic environment for trainees. Delegates can make mistakes without 
compromising safety and learn from their own mistakes.  
The importance of simulation training was first realised in the aviation industry in the early 20th 
century by building a wooden monoplane to give pilots some experience of lateral control. 
During the Second World War an analogue computer was designed to solve aircraft motion 
equations. In the late 1960’s a special purpose digital computer was developed for real time 
simulations. In 1971 the first television computer image generation system was produced to 
support simulator training of the pilots (The National Centre for Simulation, 2010). 
The role of simulation has now increased in aviation and is an essential part of pilot training. 
Simulation is now used not only for pilot training but also in research studies in aircraft design 
and air accident investigations (Kozuba and Bondaruk, 2014). 
Simulators are also quite a popular form of training in medicine since the method of training 
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offered is risk free. A study was conducted to analyse the effectiveness of simulator training on 
a trainee’s ability to diagnose congenital heart disease by using 10 trainees with 2 having little 
experience. After the tests results showed that there was significant improvement in the 
trainees’ ability in the diagnosis of the disease, it was concluded that simulator based training 
could be very effective in the diagnosis of it (Wanger et al., 2013). 
In a study, simulator training and traditional training of urology surgery were compared to 
investigate the effects of simulator training. Eight urologists were trained in a simulator and the 
other eight were trained using a conventional physical laparoscopic training box. All surgeons 
performed a specific surgery under the guidance. It was concluded that the simulator training 
method was an effective method with the group trained on simulators being slightly better than 
the other group (Balci et al., 2014). 
Many safety critical industries, such as aviation and anaesthesia, have now adapted simulation 
as the recommended method of training and its effectiveness is regularly tested in various 
researches worldwide (Winter et al., 2012; Michael et al., 2014). 
2.6.1 Simulator Training in the Maritime Sector 
Modern technology has introduced simulators for training and assessments in the maritime 
sector. The mathematical model of a ship created on a computer demonstrates graphically the 
ship and its movement through the water which is nearly realistic and helps learners to learn 
effectively (Mohovic et al., 2012). The training provided by this medium has many benefits 
such as navigating vessels through restricted waters, dealing with emergency or crisis situations 
or using navigational aids (Pelletier, 2006). The biggest advantage of providing training by 
simulator is the ability to create various scenarios in different meteorological conditions in 
different sea areas using different target ships (Sniegocki, 2005). 
One of the main disadvantages of simulator training is that many learners treat it as a video 
game and some of the master and mates students enjoy grounding a simulated VLCC ship in 
the British Channel rather than learning to navigate safely in the congested waters (Safahani, 
2015b). 
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The simulator training is being used in the compulsory training of the officer of the watch 
(OOW) and Chief Mate course. At the OOW level the course is called NAEST (O) (Navigation 
Aids and Equipment Simulator Training – Operational) and at chief mate level NAEST (M) 
(Management). The NAEST (O) course is a basic level course where use of equipment and 
basic watch keeping and navigation skills are taught to students undertaking the OOW course. 
Whereas NAEST (M) is a management level course where advance navigation skills are taught 
to the students undertaking the chief mate course (Wall, 2015).   
Bridge Team Management (BTM) or BRM is thought to be of CRM equivalent in the maritime 
sector and has been in operation for about two decades. Based on a seafarers’ survey it is 
believed that the BTM course in the maritime sector is valid (Hetherington et al., 2006). The 
course is only recommended by ISM Code there being no mandatory requirement by any 
regulatory body (ibid). In the United States, the NTSB recommends that deck officers on US 
flagged ships attend BRM training (ibid). This is only a recommendation which is limited to 
one country. To make this course mandatory to improve safety of shipping worldwide 
Hetherington et al. (2006) states “It would be necessary for the IMO to implement guidelines 
for this to become internationally recognized as important”. 
Various studies are conducted to analyse the effectiveness of simulator training. A comparative 
study was conducted by the Memorial University of Newfoundland to see the impact of 
simulator training on ice navigation with lifeboats. A total of 19 individuals were recruited with 
some experience of operating powerboats but no experience with lifeboats. The participants 
were divided into three groups. The group one participants were trained in the lifeboats in calm 
and open waters with STCW learning outcomes. Water barrels and rafts were placed along the 
course to simulate ice patches. Group two were also trained the same as group one but with 
additional classroom training. Group three was solely trained using simulator technologies 
including a 2 hour ice curriculum. After conducting tests of all three groups in the simulated 
ice waters it was concluded that those participants who have taken simulator training were less 
likely to sustain damage to the lifeboat in iced waters (Power et al., 2011). It can be argued that 
the group three also had extra training of ice curriculum which may also have impacted 
positively on the outcome. 
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2.6.2 Use of Simulators in Maritime Research 
Simulators have been used in various researches to analyse different maritime related topics 
such as the effectiveness of officer competence under various circumstances. These researches 
have proven beneficial as corrective measures have been taken to improve safety after the 
researches. Two notable researches, Project Horizon (WMA, 2012) and development of 
behavioural markers for the assessment of competence of engineering officers in crisis 
management (Gatfield, 2008), will be discussed here. 
In an EU funded project, Project Horizon, undertaken by Chalmers University of Technology 
in Goteberg and Warsash Maritime Academy at Southampton Solent University the effects of 
fatigue were measured scientifically. A total of 90 experienced deck and engineering officers 
were recruited to take part in the study which involved watch patterns of four hours on / eight 
hours off and six hours on /six hours off. The project used bridge, engine and cargo simulators 
to simulate a 40,000 dwt oil tanker to undertake two round voyages from Southampton to 
Rotterdam over a seven day period. The participants’ wore various sensors such as Actigraphy 
and Electroencephalogam to measure the sleep duration, record brain activity, eye movement 
and heart rates which enabled researchers to analyse the impact of sleepiness on decision 
making, situation awareness and other key skills. As a result researchers were able to use the 
data to develop a fatigue management tool kit to help arrange work schedules (WMA, 2012). 
Another remarkable study was conducted by Gatfield (2008) who developed the behavioural 
marker system for the assessment of marine engineering officers’ competency in an engine 
control room simulator (Section 2.5.3). It is crucial to develop a similar behavioural markers 
system for the assessment of participants in the simulators for deck officers. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Many safety critical industries introduced NTS training of their personnel quite a long time ago. 
The aviation industry is the one which realised the need for such training in the early 1980s and 
developed CRM training courses to improve NTS of airline pilots first and then the scope of 
the course was widened to include other crew members. The IMO has recently added NTS 
training to the course curriculum of the junior and senior officers with the deck and engine 
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departments of the maritime industry.  
So far there is no concrete evidence that reduction in accidents is due to the NTS training. Some 
researchers have conducted studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the course but the results 
are not very conclusive as most methods used were surveys and interviews. There was one very 
good comparative study conducted by Smith et al. (2004) which evaluated effectiveness of one 
element of NTS, Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS), and the training method 
was found effective (Section 2.3.4). 
As Diehl (1991) pointed out, it is difficult to analyse that reduction in accidents in any industry 
is actually due to the introduction of additional NTS training. The question there arises as to 
how accidents have reduced in the high risk industries such as aviation and anaesthesia. Some 
may argue that it may be due to the introduction of advanced equipments through which 
operators get more and quick information and they can make timely decisions. At the same time 
it can be argued that due to advanced equipment, operators are overloaded with information 
and cannot reach the second level of SA to make the right decision.    
Simulator training is valuable training and an assessment tool which provides a realistic 
environment. There is a problem of participants’ perception as some may think it is like a video 
game and do not take it seriously. Measures must be taken to make simulator sessions feel real 
and participants must put real effort to perform at their best. If delegates participate in simulator 
sessions with a positive attitude then the results obtained will be very helpful to research. 
Assessments in simulators are dependant on the behaviour markers used for the asessments. 
Well developed behaviour markers, by the use of simulator research, will assist the assesor to 
identify good and poor behaviours. A good system to aggregate the results will help to get final 
results of participants’ performance. 
It can be concluded that human element is a major contributory factor in accidents in all critical 
industries. The maritime industry regulatory body the IMO, has also realised this fact and has 
made human element training compulsory for deck and engineering officers in the STCW code 
Manila amendments. In an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of human element training, the 
HELM course for deck officers at management level, this research will compare delegates’ 
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performance with HELM training and without HELM training in a simulator. The observational 
results will be aggregated mathematically for the purpose of analysis. 
The next chapter will outline the methods used in the research to fulfil the thesis aims and 
objectives. The research methodology follows the concept of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
which is a structured methodology for use in the maritime domain for decision making.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A thorough research has been conducted of NTS in the previous chapter which highlighted the 
high importance of them among other factors to improve safety in various safety critical 
industries. The efforts of other safety critical industries, such as aviation, into the development 
and training of the NTS have proven successful as accident rates have reduced significantly 
(Diehl, 1991). This research concentrates on NTS required by deck officers for the safe 
operation of a ship.  
3.2 RESEARCH METHODODLOGY 
The proposed research is designed to contribute to the development and assessment of NTS 
required by deck officers. The research methodology followed the concept of Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA). This is defined by the MCA (2014) as “a structured, systematic five-step 
methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety including the protection of life, health, the 
marine enviroment using risk analysis, cost benefit and regulatory influence to facilitate 
decision making.”  
FSA is a new approach to maritime safety which involves using the techniques of risk and cost-
benefit assessment to assist in the decision making process (Wang, 2007: 71).  
Wang (ibid) found that the application of FSA may; 
1. Improve the performance of the current fleet, be able to measure the 
performance change and ensure that new ships are good designs. 
2. Ensure that experience from the field is used in the current fleet and that 
any lessons learned are incorporated into new ships. 
3. Provide a mechanism for predicting and controlling the most likely 
scenarios that could result in incidents. 
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Based on the formal safety assessment steps, as shown in Figure 3.1, the following methodology 
is derived to achieve the aims and objectives of this research; 
1. Identification of significant criteria and the development of taxonomy and behavioural 
markers.  
2. The assessment of deck officers’ NTS. 
3. Options that can improve deck officers’ NTS. 
4. Cost benefit assessment of the options. 
5. Decisions on which option to select. 
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Figure 3.1: Formal Safety Assessment steps  
3.2.1 Identification of significant criteria and development of taxonomy and behavioural 
markers (Step 1) 
The first step of the methodology, “the identification of significant criteria and development of 
a taxonomy and behavioural markers” is further subdivided into the following steps and covered 
in Chapter Four: 
Step 5 
Decisions making 
recommendation 
Step 4 
Cost benefit 
analysis 
Step 3 
Options that can 
improve deck 
officers’ NTS 
Step 2 
Assessment of 
Deck Officers’ NTS 
Decision Makers 
Step 1 
Identification of significant 
criteria and development 
of taxonomy and 
behavioural markers  
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1. Identify significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS through 
interviews. To validate the effectiveness of the developed model, questionnaires 
were designed to select the significant criteria that are applicable for evaluation of a 
deck officer’s NTS through interviews with experienced deck officers at 
management level. 
2. Develop a taxonomy, to be reviewed by experts, for deck officers’ NTS from a 
literature review. To assign a weight to each different criterion, questionnaires were 
designed to assign the possible values for ranking each different criterion through 
meetings and interviews with experienced deck officers. 
3. Development of behavioural markers’ assessment. A framework for this was 
constructed based on a literature review. 
4. The weights assigned by experts were aggregated by the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) method. 
The identification of significant criteria is conducted by exploring marine accident reports. 
Initially, based on a literature review, a taxonomy of deck officers’ NTS was developed and 
presented to volunteer experts for approval. Those approving the taxonomy were senior deck 
officers pursuing further studies either at the World Maritime University or Liverpool John 
Moores University. Experts were asked to assign a weight to each individual skill and element 
of the taxonomy and then the weights were aggregated by the well known pairwise comparision 
method AHP.  
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP was pioneered by Saaty and is often referred to as the Saaty method (Coyle, 2004: 1). 
The method is popular and widely used in decision making and rating tasks. It is a multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDM) method that helps the decision-maker to make the right decision in 
a complex situation (Ishikaza and Labib, 2009).  AHP case applications range from choice of 
career through to planning a port development (Coyle, 2004: 1).  
Application of AHP is found in a variety of domains such as a hybrid forecasting system (Kim, 
2013), a seafarer’s reliability assessment (Riahi et al., 2012), group decision making by 
aggregating individual judgements (Aull-Hyde, 2004), evaluation of deep drilling in DaGang 
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oilfields (Yi et al., 2014), environmental suitability analysis of resettlement site selection 
(Dagnachew Shibru et al., 2014) and new product development (Chin et al., 2008). 
To make decisions in an organised way to generate priorities Saaty (2008) decomposes the 
decision into the following steps; 
1.  Define the problem and determine the kind of knowledge sought. 
2. Structure the decision hierarchy from the top with the goal of the 
decision, then the objectives from a broad perspective, through the 
intermediate levels (criterion on which subsequent elements depend) to 
the lowest level (which usually is a set of the alternatives). 
3. Construct a set of pairwise comparison matrices. Each element in an 
upper level is used to compare the elements in the level immediately 
below with respect to it. 
4. Use the priorities obtained from the comparisons to weigh the priorities 
in the level immediately below. Do this for every element. Then for each 
element in the level below add its weighed value and obtain its overall 
or global priority. Continue this process of weighing and adding until the 
final priorities of the alternatives in the bottom most level are obtained.   
 
Numbers and measurements are the core of mathematics and mathematics is crucial to science. 
So far, mathematics has assumed that all things can be assigned numbers by some way. 
Naturally, all this is predicted on the consideration that one has the necessary factors and all 
these factors are measureable (ibid). 
To make comparison, a scale of numbers is required that indicates how many times more 
important one element is over another element with respect to what they are compared with, as 
shown in Table 3.1, based on Saaty (ibid) the scales are assigned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Table 3.1: The fundamental scale of absolute numbers (ibid) 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective. 
2 Weak or slight  
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgement slightly 
favour one activity over another 
4 Moderate Plus  
5 Strong importance Experience and judgement strongly 
favour one activity over another 
6 Strong Plus  
7 Very strong An activity is favoured very strongly 
over another; its dominance 
demonstrated in practice 
8 Very, very strong  
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one activity 
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation 
Reciprocals of 
above 
If activity I has one of the 
above non-zero numbers 
assigned to it when compared 
with activity j has the 
reciprocal value when 
compared with i 
A reasonable assumption 
There are three steps in following the AHP methodology (Bayazit, 2004). In the first step, group 
related components are arranged into an hierarchical order. With this approach a complex 
problem is structured into different hierarchical levels with a view of establishing the stated 
objectives of a problem. A matrix of pairwise comparisons is constructed in step 2. The strength 
of elements’ entries is indicated using the 1-9 number weight scales (Table 3.1). These values 
are used to determine the priorities of the elements of the hierarchy reflecting the relative 
importance among entities at the lowest levels of the hierarchy that enables the accomplishment 
of the objective of the problem. In step 3 these priorities are synthesized to obtain each 
alternative’s overall priority (ibid).  
A weight was assigned to each category and element of the NTS taxonomy by the interviewees 
in part 3 of the interview process (which will be explained later in Section 4.4). Using the AHP 
to calculate the relative importance of each attribute requires a careful review of its principles 
and background (Saaty, 1990). When considering a group of attributes for evaluation, the main 
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objectives of the technique are to provide judgements on the relative importance of these 
attributes and to ensure that the judgements are quantified to an extent that permits quantitative 
interpretation of the judgement among these attributes (Pillay and Wang, 2003). The weights 
were calculated of each skill and element of deck officers’ NTS to prioritise the highest ranking 
skills and elements. The calculated weights were used in further calculations in Chapter Five. 
There are other mathemetical methods available for expert judgement calculations but AHP 
was used here because this research is based on subjective judgement and AHP has been found 
to be the most suitable method to aggregate such judgements (Riahi, 2010). Salmon and 
Montevechi (2001) have conducted a research to compare the AHP method with other MCDM 
methods and concluded that for the attainment of good results, use of AHP will provide “an 
excellent, or may be, the optimum solution”.  The other methods available have some 
disadvantages with reference to this research. An ordinal sorting method for group decision 
making requires a group to agree on a category number (Jabeur and Martel, 2006),  which may 
only be possible if a group is working together or interviewed together. A multiple criteria 
decision model with ordinal preference data is another method for making decisions. In this 
method weighting is calculated by analysts by AHP and presented to experts (Cook and Kress, 
1990). This method is more suitable for marketing strategies (ibid) and hence was ignored in 
this research as this research required subjective judgements.  
Limitations  
A very low number of participants (See Section 1.5.2) was one of the limitations which was not 
expected initially. A higher number of participants may have produced different aggregated 
values for the skills and elements of deck officers’ NTS. 
3.2.2 Assessment of deck officers’ NTS (Step 2) 
The second step of the methodology, “the assessment of deck officers’ NTS” is further 
subdivided in the following steps and is covered in detail in Chapter Five: 
1. A set of simulator scenarios were developed for the assessment of deck officers’ NTS. 
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2. A sample of volunteer Chief Mate students, after completion of their training 
programme, were selected. Based on the developed scenarios (step 1), their qualitative 
characteristics (e.g. situation awareness, decision making, etc.) were assessed 
subjectively in a bridge simulator. All input data was aggregated by using the evidential 
reasoning algorithm. 
3. A utility value was assigned to each group performance for the purpose of comparisons. 
The utility value was obtained by calculation (Riahi et al., 2012).  
 
Simulation training is becoming an integral part of maritime training as it provides obvious 
advantages such as a realistic environment. Using the simulator tool for deck officers’ 
performance assessment, crisis senarios were  developed and student groups were assessed by 
using developed scenarios in a ship’s bridge simulator to observe their NTS behaviours. One 
set of chief mates volunteer students was those who have not obtained NTS training and the 
other set was those who have obtained this training by means of the HELM course. The 
performances were assessed on a five rating scale (very good to very poor) and a final value 
was calculated using the ER algorithm. Both sets of students’ NTS performance were 
compared, to analyse if there was any improvement in such skills of deck officers after the 
HELM training.  
Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
The theory of evidence was first generated by Dempster (1967) and further developed by 
Shafter (1976: 3). It is often referred to as Dempster-Shafter (D-S) theory of evidence. The D-
S theory was originally used for information aggregation in expert systems as an approximate 
tool and subsequently it has been used in decision making under uncertainty (Yager, 1992). In 
continuously researching and practising processes, based on the D-S theory, the ER algorithm 
has been developed (Riahi et al., 2012). 
The use of ER as a decision making tool has been widely reported in the literature (Riahi, 2010). 
An important achievement of applying ER to decision analysis is to incorporate it into 
traditional MCDM methods (Beynon et al., 2000) The ER approach has been developed 
particularly for MCDM problems with both qualitative and quantitative criteria under 
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uncertainty utilising individual’s knowledge, expertise and experience in the forms of a belief 
function (Riahi, 2010).  
ER is applied in many safety critical industries and other industries for different multi attribute 
problems and decision making. Riahi (2010) outlines the following advantages of the ER 
application in real world decision making: 
 It has the capability to handle incomplete, uncertain and vague data as 
well as complete and precise data. 
 It can efficiently provide its users with greater flexibility in allowing 
them to express their judgement in a quantitative manner. 
 It is capable of accepting or representing the uncertainty and risk that is 
inherent in decision making. 
 It has shown great effectiveness in processing and obtaining assessment 
output using mature computing software called the Intelligent Decision 
System (IDS). 
 It is a tool that offers a rational and reproducible methodology to 
aggregate data in an hierarchical evaluation process. 
ER has found wide applications in many real world decision making issues (Zhou et al., 2010) 
such as: the oil reserve forecast (Zhang et al., 2005), strategic research and development 
projects’ assessment (Liu et al., 2008), expert systems (Beynon et al., 2001), new product 
development (Chin et al., 2008), security market forecasting (Yang et al., 2004), radar fault 
diagnosis (Li et al., 2005), marine safety analysis and synthesis (Wang et al., 1995) and risk 
analysis (Srivastava and Liu, 2003). 
There are other methods available for solving MCDM problems such as TOPSIS or MACBETH 
but none of these methods address the uncertainty of belief degree (Xu and Yang, 2001). The 
other methods were criticised as ad hoc and to certain degree unjustified on theoretical and 
empirical grounds (Stewart, 1992) and the ER method, it was concluded was the most suitable 
method to aggregate qualitative and quantitative data under uncertainty using a belief degree of 
an expert assessor (Riahi, 2010) such as the data used to aggregate the deck officers’ NTS in 
this research. 
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Limitations 
Most students who were available for the research study were from India and there was only 
one student from Nigeria and so the research could not observe the participants from various 
cultural backgrounds which may have produced slightly different results. 
It is a known fact that cultural difference can affect the performance in a workplace (Hopkin, 
2009: 17). Students from different cultures may have produced different results. In the case of 
the one Nigerian student, it was evident that when he had a role of the master in group 6, the 
group performance was at the peak (see Section 5.5.6 and Table 6.1). The performance of the 
group was better due to good leadership skills possessed by the student which he had acquired 
previously as he did not take the HELM course before the observation. The fact that the group 
he lead had better results is not necessarily due to different culture as it could have been that he 
was a better manager. 
 
3.2.3 Options, cost benefit analysis and decision making (Step 3, 4 and 5) 
The remaining three steps of the methodology are covered in Chapter Six as follows: 
1. A comparison with other safety critical industries’ efforts into NTS research and 
training needs were conducted. The two main industries investigated were aviation 
and anaesthetics. Much has already been covered in chapter two. The possibility of 
the adoption of successful methods within aviation and anaesthesia were explored.  
2. A cost benefit analysis was conducted of all the options explored in step (1). This 
was carried to weigh the costs against benefits of all options. The analysis was 
carried out by Bayesian Network (BN) and the Decision Tree Model. 
3. Based on cost benefit analysis a decision was made as to which option to select. 
Based on the results obtained in step two of the methodology and literature review, a need for 
options for further improvements to deck officers’ NTS training were explored. This was done 
by the comparision with other safety critical industries’ NTS development in training and 
assessment and the possibility that their good practices can be adopted for the maritime domain. 
Suggestions to improve the NTS training of deck officers were given and, based on BN and 
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decision tree analysis, cost benefit analysis was conducted to analyse if the benefits were cost 
effective. 
BN and Decision Tree Model 
The BN model is a graphical method and graphs have proven to provide an excellent language 
for communication and discussing dependence and independence relations among problem-
domain variables (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2014: 17). A large and important class of assumptions 
about dependence and independence relations expressed in factorised representations of joint 
probability distribution can be represented very compactly in a class of graphs known as 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Chain graphs are a generalisation of DAGs, capable of 
representing a broader class of dependence and independence assumption (Fydenberg, 1989; 
Wermuth and Lauritzen, 1990).  
BNs represent a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies through a DAG. 
BNs are also known as  
“Bayesian Belief  Networks (BBNs)”, “Belief Networks”, “Causal 
Probabilistic Networks”, “Causal Nets”, “Graphical Probability 
Networks”, and “Probabilistic Cause-Effect” models are an emerging 
modelling approach of artificial intelligence research that aim to 
provide a decision-support framework for problems involving 
uncertainty, complexity and probabilistic reasoning (Fenton and Niel, 
1999).  
BNs were first developed at Stanford University in the 1970s (McCabe et al., 1998). The first 
book on BNs was published by Pearl in 1988 and since then several other text books have been 
published (Haddawy, 1999). The first world application of a BN was Munin (Andreassen et al., 
1989). Since then, BNs have spread quickly and been used extensively to model many real 
world problems (Burnell and Horvits, 1995).  
Absolutely anything can be modelled by a BN. The approach is based on conceptualising a 
model domain or system of interest as a graph of connected nodes and linkages. In the graph, 
nodes represent important domain variables and a link from one node to another represents a 
dependency relationship between the corresponding variables. Given their network structuring, 
BNs successfully capture the notation of modularity (i.e. a complex system can be built by 
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combining simpler parts). Due to their Bayesian probability formalism, BNs provide a rational 
technique to combine both subjective (e.g. expert opinion) and qualitative (e.g. monitoring data) 
information (Das, 2000).  
The reasons for choosing BNs can be summarised as follows:  
 They are graphical models, capable of displaying relationships clearly and intuitively. 
 They are directional, thus being capable of representing cause-effect relationships. 
 They handle uncertainty through the established theory of probability. 
 They can be used to represent indirect causation in addition to a direct one. 
BN decision trees are valuable techniques, which are used to make a decision from a set of 
instances (Janssens et al., 2005). In a decision tree there are two types of nodes: decision nodes 
and leaves. Leaves are the terminal nodes of the tree and they specify the ultimate decision of 
the tree. The case is routed down the tree according to the values of attributes tested in 
successive decision nodes and when a leaf is reached, the instance is classified according to the 
probability distribution over all classification possibilities (ibid). 
BNs are used in a number of studies in all domains such as the Hierarchical Bayesian approach 
for oil spill estimation as in the Deepwater Horizon accident (Yang et al., 2013), a Bayesian 
petrophysical decision support system for estimation of reservoir composition (Burgers et al., 
2010) and a quantitative risk assessment of the offshore drilling operation such as the blowout 
preventer failure during the Deepwater Horizon rig accident (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
Limitations 
The BN’s decision tree analysis was conducted based on the assumption that if one shipping 
company’s ship incurs an accident and that ship is a total loss, then what would be the size of 
that loss to that shipping company and then also if all the officers had the additional NTS 
training would that accident have been avoided? The example shipping company chosen was 
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Costa Cruise Lines and the accident ship was the Costa Concordia which partially sank in 2012 
with 32 fatalities. Human error was one of the causes of the accident. This company and the 
accident were chosen for the research because data was available and the accident was quite 
recent. 
3.4 ETHICAL ISSUES 
The research required interviews with senior deck officers and then observation of the 
performance of deck officers (Chief Mate students) in a bridge simulator. Liverpool John 
Moores University Research Ethics Committee guidelines were followed and formal approval 
(12/ENR/003) (Appendix 3) was obtained before conducting interviews with subject experts 
and simulator study participants. The following ethical issues were considered; 
 Subject matter was neither controversial nor sensitive. 
 Adult participants were requested to volunteer their participation to whom the study was 
explained in detail and consent was obtained.  
 The participants for the interview study were those who had senior management level 
experience onboard ships such as master or chief officer. 
 The participants for simulator observation were Chief Mate students who volunteered 
for the study. 
 An Interview Introduction Letter (Appendix 4) and an Interview Process Sheet 
(Appendices 5-6) were given out to potential participants. 
 All participants taking part in the interview study were given an Interview Participant 
Information Sheet and filled in the Interview Participant Consent Form. (An Interview 
Participant Information Sheet sample is shown in Appendix 7 and a Participant Consent 
Form sample is shown in Appendix 9). 
 All participants taking part in the simulator study were given a Simulator Participant 
Information Sheet and filled in the Simulator Participant Consent Form. (A Simulator 
Participant Information Sheet sample is shown in Appendix 8 and a Participant Consent 
Form sample is shown in Appendix 10). 
 The participants had the right to refuse to participate and withdraw from the study any 
time. (Appendices 9 and 10).  
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 Interviews took place at a private room at an agreed location. 
 The participants would not be identified in any report or publication that may result 
from the research and all the information will remain confidential. (Appendices 9 and 
10).  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined the methods used for the research, plus the reasons and limitations of each 
method used. The research methodology is based on Formal Safety Analysis which is divided 
into five steps.  The research methods used in this research explained in this chapter are AHP, 
ER and the BN Decision Tree Model. Based on interview data, AHP is used to prioritise the 
skills and elements of deck officers’ NTS, ER is used to aggregate deck officers’ NTS simulator 
observations for the purpose of analysing HELM training effectiveness and a BN Decision Tree 
Model is used to select the option to further improve the NTS training.  
The ethical issues were considered based on LJMU Ethics Committee guidelines and a formal 
approval was obtained before conducting the research. 
In the next chapter the significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS are 
identified and a preliminary model with an hierarchal structure as a taxonomy for the deck 
officers’ NTS is developed. The elements of the deck officers’ NTS taxonomy are justified. 
The interview schedule is developed to be conducted with experienced seafarers to validate the 
effectiveness of the taxonomy. Furthermore, data presented by the interviews is calculated using 
AHP. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF THE DECK 
OFFICERS’ NTS TAXONOMY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a taxonomy of NTS required for deck officers in crisis 
situations by collecting information from experienced seafarers to identify the NTS required to 
support senior deck officers in crisis situations. Within this research the term ‘NTS’ is used to 
describe senior deck officers’ attitude and behaviours in crisis situations which are not directly 
related to technical skills used to navigate a ship or to use the bridge equipment. This includes 
social and cognitive skills to deal with crisis situations and thus would cover skills and 
behaviours relating to teamwork, leadership, decision making, situation awareness and 
workload management. In a research conducted at Aberdeen University into anaesthetists’ NTS 
(Fletcher, et al. 2003a) importance is given to good NTS. By enabling anaesthetists to work in 
such a way as to reduce the chances of problems occurring, they allow the anaesthetist to be 
fully aware of the situation thus he or she will be able to anticipate the problem or deal with 
unexpected occurrences. The same could be applied to the shipping industry as good NTS allow 
the deck officer to recognise the problem quickly and manage the situation and team safely and 
effectively (Chauvin et al., 2013).  
While there are skills taxonomies and behavioural marker systems being used in training and 
assessment in other safety critical industries around the world, in the maritime industry, skills 
taxonomy is a relatively new concept and it is important to develop a skills taxonomy first. 
Based on a literature review of NTS and their use in the other safety critical industries, this has 
provided a valuable input as it indicates the type of areas that need to be addressed. Firstly, it 
was considered to conduct interviews to identify the NTS for deck officers.  
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4.2 METHODOLOGY 
To develop the taxonomy of deck officers’ NTS the following four steps were performed in this 
chapter; 
1. Identify significant criteria and their contributions to the deck officers’ NTS through 
interviews. To validate the effectiveness of the developed model, questionnaires were 
designed to select the significant criteria that are applicable for evaluation of a deck 
officer’s NTS through interviews with experienced deck officers at management level. 
2. Develop taxonomy for the deck officers’ NTS. To assign a weight to each different 
criterion, questionnaires were designed to assign the possible values for ranking each 
different criterion through meetings and interviews with the experienced deck officers. 
3. Development of behavioural markers’ assessment framework took place based on a 
literature review. 
4. The weights assigned by experts were aggregated by the AHP method. 
4.3 COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS (CTA) 
Human factors researchers use different methods of task analysis to design and evaluate 
systems, equipment and training, as it allows the tasks being carried out to be broken down into 
their constituent activities (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992: 4). Therefore, task analysis is a key 
component of training needs analysis, as the knowledge and skills needed to conduct them can 
be identified. Crandall et al. (2006: 9) defines the purpose of CTA is to capture the way the 
mind works, to capture cognition. A researcher who is carrying out a CTA study is usually 
trying to understand and describe how the participants view the work that they are doing and 
how they make sense of events. “If people are making mistakes in the workplace, the CTA 
study should explain what accounts for the mistakes” (ibid).  
Since many of the skills required for deck officers in crisis situations are cognitive, it was 
necessary to conduct CTA. Based on Seamster et al. (1997: 4) “CTA identifies and describes 
the cognitive structures (e.g. knowledge-base and representation skills) and processes (e.g. 
attention, problem solving and decision making) underlying job expertise, and the knowledge 
and skills required for similar job components.”  
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Crandall et al. (2006: 9) has identified following three primary aspects of CTA: 
 Knowledge elicitation. 
 Data analysis. 
 Knowledge representation. 
For a successful CTA study each of the above aspects are critical. Many researchers equate 
CTA with the first aspect, knowledge elicitation, because traditionally this has received most 
attention. However, Crandall et al. (2006: 9) argue that a good analysis of data is necessary 
otherwise collection of data become meaningless. 
4.3.1 Knowledge Elicitation  
Knowledge elicitation is the set of methods used to obtain information about what people know 
and how they know it: the judgement, strategies, knowledge and skill that underlie the 
performance. One way of classifying CTA knowledge elicitation is by the way data is collected. 
Four ways to collect data are listed as follows (Crandall et al., 2006: 10): 
1. Self-reports (i.e. people talk about or record their behaviour and strategies),  
2. Direct observation of performance or task behaviours,  
3. Automated collection of behavioural data   
4. Interviews  
 
Self-Reports 
Self-reporting methods vary from structured formats, such as surveys and questionnaires, to 
open-ended formats like diaries and logs.  The advantage of a self-reporting format is that data 
collection does not require a skilled interviewer to be present, making the system more efficient. 
The quality of data generated by questionnaires depends in part on the structure of 
questionnaires.  The research questionnaire method is useful for quantitative data collection 
because it reaches a wide variety of respondents through electronic media. The disadvantage of 
this method is that structured questionnaires do not allow for the element of discovery and 
exploration (Stone et al., 1999: 9; Crandall et al., 2006: 14). 
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A questionnaire method was considered inappropriate for the purpose of this research as data 
required is qualitative and would require using an exploratory technique to probe for 
information clarification.  
Direct Observations 
Direct observations can be conducted either at the workplace or in the simulated environment. 
If on-site observations are feasible, CTA researchers are strongly recommended to take 
advantage of the opportunity. The information obtained by this method is simply not possible 
to get any other way. “Observations provide opportunities for discovery and exploration of what 
the actual work demands are; what sorts of strategies skilled workers have developed for 
coping; how work flows across the environment, the team, and the shift and communication 
and coordination issues” (Crandall et al., 2006: 15). 
It is not practicable to create a crisis situation scenario in real life for the purpose of this 
research, because of the risk to human life and the environment. It would even be difficult to 
identify the required NTS in the simulated crisis situation as most elements in such situations 
are cognitive and not easy to be observed. An attempt needed to be made to identify NTS 
required for deck officers in crisis situations in the simulated crisis situation scenario within 
this research. 
Automated Collection of behaviour data 
Endsley (1988) developed SAGAT (Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique) to 
assess situation awareness, which is based on de Groot’s strategy for comparing chess players 
at different skill levels. De Groot’s method was to have a chess player study a game in progress 
and then unexpectedly remove all pieces. The players would then be asked to replace all the 
pieces. De Groot found that the more skilled players were more accurate in reconstructing the 
board than novice players. Similarly, the SAGAT method uses ‘time freezing’ in the midst of 
the aviation pilots’ simulated session by switching all the instruments off and pilots are asked 
to reconstruct the instrument values. According to Endsley (1988), the better a person’s 
situation awareness, the more accurate the reconstruction. It can be argued that situation 
awareness is improved with experience. 
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Interview 
There are a number of different approaches to interviewing; the most appropriate for this type 
of research would be structured interviews or semi-structured interviews. The disadvantage 
with structured interviews is that the interviewer has to know which questions to ask and the 
responses are then restricted by the question, there is no flexibility to investigate further. In a 
semi-structured interview there is more flexibility for the interviewer to investigate the issues 
that arise during the interview and questions can be adapted to individual circumstances. In this 
approach the interviewer needs to have a fair degree of understanding about the subject area to 
be able to know when to probe further and what to ask (Fletcher et al., 2003b).  
One of the most popular CTA techniques for investigating decision making expertise is the 
Critical Decision Making (CDM) designed specifically for looking at decision making in a 
naturalistic environment (Klien, et al. 1989). CDM has already been used effectively with neo-
natal intensive care nurses to identify the cues experienced nurses use for recognising problems 
with infants (Fletcher, et al. 2003b). The CDM is based on Flanagan’s (1954) Critical Incident 
technique, which is a method of identifying key behaviours and skills necessary for effective 
task performance. This approach is used in Anaesthesia by Altmaier et al. (1997) in the 
development of categories of behaviour defining aptitude for anaesthesia among anaesthesia 
residents. CDM involves subject matter experts recounting an incident, using the critical 
incident technique concept, for which their expertise was important in achieving the goals 
focusing particularly on the critical decision that was made. This process is repeated several 
times with various subject experts getting progressively more detail with each repetition. While 
most of the activity involves the interviewee recalling the events, the interviewer refines the 
interview structure using probe questions to obtain information about the cognitive decision 
making process being used. A particular concern of using recalled events is that the person may 
not remember the event exactly as it happened or their memory is subject to certain biases 
(Fletcher, et al. 2003b).  
The semi structured interview method would allow collecting as much information as possible 
within the time allotted regarding the critical decisions made during crisis situations on the 
bridge of a ship. This method is deemed appropriate as in crisis situations on the bridge of a 
ship as many components are cognitive, and therefore unseen, the only practical way to 
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investigate these skills is subjective assessment.   While CDM is used to investigate decision 
making methods, there are other CTA techniques available for collecting data about different 
types of task. 
One of the CTA techniques is ‘Knowledge Audit’. This CTA technique was used to draw expert 
knowledge to identify the key NTS required by deck officers for smooth operations. Experts 
were asked what skills or behaviours they considered necessary for a good deck officer. 
Baldwin et al. (1999) used a similar approach to investigate the skills required by basic surgical 
trainees. After collecting the data listing the skills, two further questions were asked. Firstly, 
how the skills are currently developed by trainees and secondly their opinion about differences 
or similarities in the skills needed for normal and crisis situations. 
As part of CTA, after interviews, a ‘rating method’ and ‘sorting method’ may be used to rate 
and sort the skills and elements of the developed taxonomy. In the ‘rating method’ experts are 
asked to rate different combinations of the concepts like repertory grid, representational skills 
and knowledge. The ‘sorting method’ is used to show how different concepts are grouped 
together by the experts and so is considered useful for identifying how their understanding of 
the task is structured (Fletcher et al., 2003b). In a similar study ‘Identification and measurement 
of anaesthetists’ NTS Fletcher et al. (2003b) used the sorting and rating task as the third part of 
the interview. The rationale behind this was to discover how anaesthetists view NTS and the 
relationship between them with regard to their own tasks. The participants would have to sort 
the NTS identified in the second part of the interview into groups or categories they thought 
appropriate. The experts were then asked to rate each of the sorted items on the scale of 1 – 7 
to rate the importance of the tasks according to their importance during the crisis situation. In 
this study a similar weighting task formed the third part of the interview and sorted items were 
rated on the scale of 1-9 to satisfy the AHP rating criteria.  
4.4 INTERVIEW PROCESS (Step 1) 
To develop a taxonomy of deck officers NTS, the interviews were conducted with experienced 
deck officers at management level to help identify the key skills to be included in the taxonomy. 
A semi-structured method of interviewing was considered suitable to extract maximum 
information from the interviewee regarding the NTS of the deck officer. Thus the aim of the 
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interview was to identify the non-technical aspect of deck officers’ task in crisis situations on 
the bridge of a ship and the skills needed for this, e.g. thinking and team working skills, decision 
making, situation awareness and leadership.  
The interview was divided into three parts: 
Part 1: Performance example – The interviewee was asked to describe a real case from his 
career that was particularly challenging which really tested his NTS. The example can be a real 
critical incident/near miss or a normal case where the experience and NTS were a significant 
outcome. The interviewee was asked in advance if he could think of this example before the 
interview. Furthermore this case was discussed to identify the most significant NTS 
components. 
Part 2: Distinguishing skills – The interviewee was asked to think about the skills which are 
necessary for effective performance for deck officers in the crisis situation on the bridge of a 
ship. 
Part 3: Weighting task – The interviewee was asked to assign a weight for the NTS taxonomy 
elements. The NTS taxonomy elements were presented to the interviewee which were already 
developed in this chapter. 
Approximate times for the three interview parts were: Part 1 – 45 minutes, Part 2 – 15 minutes, 
Part 3 – 15 minutes. All the given information was held in confidence. The information is kept 
as anonymous and will be destroyed as per LJMU regulations.  
4.4.1 Pilot Interview 
To support development of the interview schedule, a pilot interview was undertaken with a 
senior deck officer. This took place at a fairly early stage to help make minor changes to the 
interview questionnaire (Appendices 4-7). This questionnaire is adapted from the study of 
‘Identification and measurement of anaesthetists’ NTS (Fletcher et al. 2003b). The pilot 
interview recordings were listened by the researcher and the Director of Studies to make sure 
that the necessary information was being obtained from the interviews. 
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4.4.2 Identifying Participants 
The first criterion for the selection of the participants was that they must hold a Master Mariner 
certificate of competency. The other criterion for taking part in the study was that the 
interviewees volunteered to take part. Fletcher et al. (2003b) argues that those people who are 
very interested in human factors will be more inclined to volunteer and this might lead to 
potential biases. However, given the sensitivity of the information being discussed, it would be 
unethical to interview unwilling participants. In the ‘identification and measurement of 
anaesthetists’ NTS 25-30 interviews were considered acceptable initially and they received a 
very good response from consultant anaesthetists to volunteer (ibid). The researcher in this 
project visited the World Maritime University, Malmo, to conduct interviews with experienced 
master mariners pursuing further studies. The researcher’s aim was to conduct 10-15 interviews 
for this research but could only manage 12 interviews in total. 
4.5 BEHAVIOURAL MARKER SYSTEMS  
Behavioural marker systems are used for training and assessments of the participants in the 
simulators and were first developed in the aviation industry (Helmreich et al., 1999). Later on 
other safety critical industries such as anaesthesia and nuclear power generation have developed 
their own behavioural marker systems.   
Klampfer et al. (2001) propose the following for designing good behaviour marker systems: 
 Validity: in relation to performance outcome. 
 Reliability: inter-rater reliability, internal consistency. 
 Sensitivity: in relation to levels of performance. 
 Transparency: the observer understands the performance criteria 
against which they are being rated, availability of reliability and validity 
data. 
 Usability: easy to train, simple framework, easy to understand, domain 
appropriate language, sensitive to rater workload, easy to observe. 
 Can provide a focus for training goals and needs. 
 Baseline for performance criteria are used appropriately for experience 
level of a ratter. 
 Minimal overlap between components. 
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Klampfer et al. (2001) further suggest that behavioural marker systems are limited because they 
“cannot capture every aspect of performance and behaviour” due to the: 
 Limited occurrence of some behaviours such as conflict resolution.  
 Limitation of human observers such as distraction or overload (e.g. in 
complex situations, or when observing large teams) 
 
In developing behavioural markers systems for scrub practitioners’ non-technical skills 
(SPLINTS system) Mitchell et al. (2013) established the following design criteria: 
 Focus on the skills that are observable from behaviour. 
 Be set as hierarchical structure with three levels of description; category, 
element, and behaviour. 
 Use active verbs for skills and understandable language for definitions. 
 Show a simple structure and layout with a rating scale that fits on one 
page that it can be easily used. 
 
The behavioural marker assessment framework must, as far as possible, be designed to ensure 
that it is capable of capturing the fullest context of the environment in which the assessment is 
taking place (Gatfield, 2008). Behavioural markers are a valuable tool to assess or observe 
participants’ technical and NTS in the real life or preferably in the simulator.  
4.5.1 Development of behavioural markers 
A review of behaviour marker systems available in other safety critical industries was 
conducted in this section. Aviation’s NTS taxonomy and behavioural markers were a good 
starting point. The taxonomy and behavioural markers for deck officers were developed using 
a literature review. The taxonomy and behavioural markers were presented to each expert 
interviewee to confirm the elements of the taxonomy and behavioural markers of each element. 
After interviews a slight adjustment was made to the final taxonomy and behavioural markers 
(Table 4.1 – 4.5). 
The initial taxonomy and behavioural marker systems had 26 elements and 4 categories. Based 
on the experts’ opinion during the interviews and since some elements such as “conflict 
resolution” were non-observable; 6 elements out of 26 elements were removed from the 
taxonomy as well as behavioural markers.  
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Based on section 4.6 justification of the proposed taxonomy, as shown in Tables 4.2-4.5, a 
procedure for assessing the teamwork, leadership, situation awareness and decision making in 
a ship’s bridge simulator, was developed. As a result Tables 4.2-4.5 were used as behavioural 
marker assessment frameworks and they were used during NTS observations in a ship’s bridge 
simulator. There are five levels of performance in the behavioural marker systems ranging from 
very good practice to very poor practice. By using the behavioural markers an assessor is able 
to rate the students’ performance in a ship’s bridge simulator. All assessments are shown in 
Appendices 12-23. 
4.6 JUSTIFICATION OF THE TAXONOMY AND BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS (Step 
2 and 3) 
Based on Aviation Crew Resource Management training and the literature review, as shown in 
Table 4.1, the skills taxonomy for deck officers is illustrated. The elements of skills taxonomy 
are justified in the following sub section. 
4.6.1 Teamwork 
The need for people to work together as a team and to work in coordinated ways to achieve 
objectives which contribute to the overall aims of the organisation has become increasingly 
important as organisations have increased in size and become more complex (West, 2004: 9). 
Because of the rapidly changing organisational environments and structure, teams are the best 
way to enact organisational strategy. Organisations with a team-based structure can respond 
quickly and effectively in the modern fast-changing environment (Cohen and Bailey, 1997). 
Team working is very important to most work settings but is especially important in higher risk 
industries such as aviation, nuclear power industry, fire-fighting and maritime. Teams typically 
must function effectively from the moment they are established to achieve their team task. Team 
members must have a common understanding of how they will be expected to work together 
during the manoeuvring of a ship (CAA, 2003). For instance, onboard a ship, effective operation 
is highly dependent on the level of team performance involving skills such as communication, 
co-ordination, co-operation and control (Stanton, 1996: 197).  
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Table 4.1: NTS taxonomy of deck officers 
Category Element 
1. Teamwork 
Team-building and maintaining 
Considering others 
Supporting others 
Communication 
Information Sharing 
2. Leadership and 
Managerial Skills 
Use of Authority and assertiveness 
Providing and maintaining standards 
Planning and co-ordination 
Work load management 
Prioritisation 
Task delegation 
Initial Crisis Management 
3. Situation awareness 
Awareness of bridge systems 
Awareness of external environment 
Awareness of time 
Situation Assessment 
4. Decision Making 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
Option generation 
Risk assessment and option selection 
Outcome review 
 
Team-building and maintaining  
Team-building is a process of facilitating a group to accomplish a common task, “a process by 
which members of a group diagnose how they work together and plan changes which will 
improve their effectiveness” (Beer, 1980: 457). Onboard ships when a new crew joins team-
building events are rarely organised because of the busy schedule. Teams are built during the 
course of work.  
Considering others 
In the Crew Resource Management course of the aviation industry ‘considering others’ is 
defined as “acceptance of others and understanding their personal condition” (Flin et al., 2003). 
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Considering others and supporting others could be grouped together as one element. However 
the difference is a person may request support and consideration may come from top 
management without any demand from the employee. 
The Chief Officer’s consideration towards a crews’ mental state and feelings is very important 
onboard ship and especially during crisis situations. Considering proper rest periods and breaks 
for the crew in busy periods would improve the efficiency.  
Supporting others 
Team support refers to a broad spectrum of behaviours such as emotional team support, 
information team support, instrumental team support and appraisal team support. Emotional 
team support refers to sympathetic understanding of another’s emotional pain. Information 
team support refers to team members’ exchange of necessary information. Instrumental team 
support focuses on practical task support that team members offer each other. Appraisal support 
refers to helping each other in making sense of any problem situation (Drach-Zahavy, 2004). 
As teams become the common work unit in today’s organisations the value of supportive 
discretionary behaviour in those teams is proving crucial (Lepine and Dyne, 2001). West (2004: 
181) during his research found that the more team members provide support to each other, the 
greater the improvement in team members’ mental health and team performance. 
Superior officers’ support may be available in many forms onboard ships such as a new sailor 
being bullied by others such that he approaches the chief officer for support or the second officer 
needs the master’s support in the appraisal stage of the passage planning.  
Communication 
One of the core skills central to effective and safe production and performance in any high-risk 
industry is communication. Yusof (2003) believes that the purposes of communication in group 
work are mainly in regulating, controlling, motivating, expressing feeling and conveying 
information. Blundel (2004: 395) believes that most conflicts and crises that happen inside an 
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organisation are particularly caused by lack of transparent communication among members of 
the organisation.   
Information Sharing 
Information gathered by one team member can be transferred to his team members through 
feedback, help, advice or explanation. Exchange of information between team members brings 
information sources together and manipulates it into new information structures (Clark et al., 
2002).   
Distributing information from different sources among bridge team members (such as position, 
tidal stream, available depth or traffic) is called the Information Distribution Process (Van 
Offenbank, 2001). Information sharing or knowledge sharing within teams may occur via the 
advice-seeking behaviour of team members. A master on the bridge needs information about 
traffic or drift the ship is experiencing, as a master is likely to become more competent in 
handling the task (Woerkom & Sanders, 2009).  
Based on subsection 4.6.1, teamworking elements and behavioural markers, as shown in Table 
4.2, are illustrated. 
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Table 4.2: Teamworking elements and behavioural markers 
Element Very Good Practice Good Practice Acceptable 
Practice 
Poor Practice Very Poor Practice 
Team building and 
maintaining 
Fully encourages 
input and feedback 
from others 
Sufficiently 
encourages 
input and 
feedback from 
others 
Just enough 
encouragement of 
input and 
feedbacks from 
others 
Little  
encouragement of 
input and 
feedbacks from 
others 
Keeps barriers 
between team 
members 
Does not compete 
with others 
Little 
competition is 
evident 
Moderate 
competition is 
evident 
Sufficient 
competition is 
evident 
Competes with 
others 
Considering others Take notice of the 
suggestions of other 
team members 
Take 
substantial  
notice of the 
suggestions of 
other team 
members 
Take moderate 
notice of the 
suggestions of 
other team 
members 
Takes little notice 
of the suggestions 
of other team 
members 
Ignores suggestions 
of other team 
members 
Considers condition 
of other team 
members and take 
them into account 
Sufficiently 
considers the 
condition of 
other team 
members 
Moderate 
consideration of 
the condition of 
other team 
members 
Little 
consideration of 
the condition of 
other team 
members 
Does not take 
account of the 
condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed 
personal feedback 
Provide 
sufficient 
personal 
feedback 
Provide just 
enough personal 
feedback 
Provide little 
personal feedback 
Show no reaction to 
other team members 
Supporting others Provide ample help 
to other team 
members in 
demanding situation 
Provide 
sufficient help 
to other team 
members in 
demanding 
situation 
Provide adequate 
help to other 
team members in 
demanding 
situation 
Provide minimal 
help to other team 
members in 
demanding 
situation 
Do not help other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
Offers very good 
assistance 
Offers good 
assistance 
Offers enough 
assistance 
Offers little 
assistance 
Does not offer 
assistance 
Communication Establish total 
atmosphere for open 
communication 
Establish 
substantial 
atmosphere for 
open 
communication 
Establish 
moderate 
atmosphere for 
open 
communication 
Establish little 
atmosphere for 
open 
communication 
Blocks open 
communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
Communicates 
substantially 
effectively 
Communicates 
moderately 
effectively 
Communicates 
little effectively 
Ineffective 
communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team 
members 
Shares relevant 
information 
among all team 
members 
Shares moderate 
information 
among all team 
members 
Shares little 
information among 
all team members 
Does not share 
information 
properly among all 
team members 
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4.6.2 Leadership and Managerial Skills 
It is important for a leader to raise the level of honesty and ethical behaviour to become an 
example for the team members. Delegating tasks to the appropriate team member is one of the 
key skills of a good leader. Maintaining team moral with confidence, positive attitude and 
commitment will get tasks accomplished successfully. The team leader is responsible for 
building an efficient team in order to boost task performance by ensuring safe and efficient 
team functioning (Flin et al., 2008: 129). 
One of the examples of poor leadership is the Titanic disaster. Capt. Edward J. Smith was 
persuaded by White Star Line officials to proceed at a faster speed to arrive in New York a day 
early. Capt. Smith ordered the crew to light up the last two boilers to bring the speed to 22 
knots. He did not add extra lookouts to watch for icebergs through a known ice field. 
Unfortunately the ship did hit an iceberg and 1500 people lost their lives. It was the poor 
leadership by Capt. Smith, who counted too much on impressive strategy, structure and 
technology (Brown et al., 2013). 
Use of Authority and assertiveness 
Flin et al. (2003) describes ‘Use of Authority and Assertiveness’ as creating a proper challenge 
response atmosphere. The authority of a master on board a ship should be adequately balanced 
with assertiveness and other bridge team members’ participation. If the situation requires, 
decisive actions are expected (ibid) such as in pilotage waters when the master of a ship doubts 
any of the pilot’s actions. 
Providing and maintaining standards 
The master as a leader must comply with standard operating procedures for task completion. If 
the situation requires, it may be necessary to deviate from the standard procedures. Such 
deviation should take place with consultation with other bridge team members. Any deviation 
from standard procedures should be mutually supervised by the bridge team members (Flin et 
al., 2003). The captain of the Costa Concordia did not maintain the standard operating 
procedures on 13th Jan 2012 and decided to change his original voyage plan without the 
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agreement of the company and local authority and passed the vessel too close to the Giglio 
Island, Italy. As a result the cruise ship grounded on the rocks of Le Scole with 32 persons dead 
and 60 injured (Lieto, 2014). 
Planning and co-ordination 
An appropriate system of organised task sharing and delegation needs to be established to avoid 
fluctuation of workload and to achieve high performance. A ship’s master needs to make sure 
all bridge team members understand the goals, plans and intentions to communicate well. This 
will ensure a good co-ordination among the team members in all activities (Flin et al., 2003). 
Comprehensive planning is required to make safe passage from the loading port to the 
discharging port. Over the years it has been observed that many ships involved in groundings, 
collisions and other contact incidents was due to poor passage planning or deviating from the 
planned passage (Lieto, 2014). The passenger vessel Balmoral, carrying 213 passengers and 19 
crewmembers, grounded on Dagger Reef, Gower Peninsular, on 18th October 2004, in fine 
weather and good visibility. The reason of grounding established that the master deviated from 
the planned track and took the vessel even closer to land (MAIB, 2005a). 
Workload Management 
A major element of workload management is shifting the workload from busy times to quiet 
times. This will be done at the planning stage and identifies when high workload periods will 
occur. Mismanagement of workload will degrade bridge team performance. As a result, tasks 
need to be evenly distributed among the other bridge team members. A leader will need to 
identify and resolve the signs of stress and fatigue so that performance is not affected (Flin et 
al., 2003). 
MV Cosco Hong Kong grounded over Lixin Pai reef, in the South China Sea, in 2009, as a 
result of the increased workload on the OOW. The vessel was on a passage from Xiamen to 
Nansha, China at a speed of 21 knots when she encountered a large number of fishing vessels 
in the Dadanwei Shuidao channel. Even with the presence of a lookout/helmsman, the OOW 
manoeuvred the vessel himself by using the autopilot to the south of the track to keep clear of 
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the fishing traffic. In doing so he forgot about the presence of the Lixin Pai reef, over which the 
charted depth was only 3.1m, which was highlighted as a danger on the paper chart in use 
(MAIB, 2009a). Although he should have used a helmsman to steer the vessel and he himself 
should have concentrated on the other tasks, due to poor workload management he manoeuvred 
the vessel by using the autopilot. 
Prioritisation 
Clear prioritisation of primary and secondary operational tasks should be made by the leader. 
Primary tasks are those tasks that a sufficiently skilled crew is required for such as harbour 
approaches and secondary tasks are routine maintenances jobs. Secondary operational tasks are 
prioritised to retain sufficient resources for primary bridge duties (Flin et al., 2003), such as 
ship’s crew should not be engaged in heavy duties before port approaches instead priority 
should be given to retain sufficient rested crew members available for approach duties.  
Task Delegation 
When tasks are delegated by the team leader then a person is made responsible to perform one 
particular task. On the bridge of a ship the master needs to make sure the tasks are delegated 
properly to be sure that the whole operation is performed safely. In busy periods this is very 
difficult to manage and if tasks are not delegated properly omissions will happen which will 
lead to crisis (Fasano and Krischenman, 2012). On port approaches and for the successful 
operation, tasks are delegated to various team members, for instance OOW1 looking after the 
navigation of ship and plotting the position, OOW2 can be designated to dealing with all 
communications, helmsman designated to steering the vessel duties, lookout doing lookout 
duties and finally the master can look after the traffic and overall command.  
Initial Crisis Management 
The crisis is a situation which materialises unexpectedly and decisions are required urgently 
within a short period of time. In a crisis situation the sense of loss of control builds quickly and 
routine tasks become increasingly difficult. The leader should be able to identify specific threats 
and respond accordingly.  
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There are some initial procedures given in the Bridge Procedure Guide for the expected 
emergencies on ships such as steering failure, engine failure, collision, grounding, flooding, 
man overboard etc. Doubt is a particular indication of a crisis and a good watch officer must 
identify the cues of crisis building such as two methods of positioning, such as the GPS (Global 
Positioning System) position and a position obtained by radar ranges not being the same. 
Based on subsection 4.6.2, leadership and managerial skills’ elements and behavioural markers, 
as shown in Table 4.3, are illustrated. 
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Table 4.3 Leadership and managerial skills’ elements and behavioural markers 
Element Very Good 
Practice 
Good Practice Acceptable 
Practice 
Poor Practice Very Poor 
Practice 
Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness 
Takes full 
initiative to 
ensure crew 
involvement and 
task completion 
Takes substantial 
initiative to 
ensure crew 
involvement and 
task completion 
Takes moderate 
initiative to 
ensure crew 
involvement and 
task completion 
Takes little 
initiative to 
ensure crew 
involvement and 
task completion 
Hinders or 
withholds crew 
involvement. 
Takes full control 
if situation 
requires 
Takes substantial 
control if 
situation requires 
Takes moderate 
control if 
situation requires 
Takes little 
control if 
situation requires 
Does not show 
initiative for 
decision 
Motivates crew 
by full 
appreciation 
Motivates crew 
by sufficient  
appreciation 
Motivates crew 
by average 
appreciation 
Motivates crew 
by little 
appreciation 
Does not show 
appreciation for 
the crew 
Totally reflects 
on suggestions of 
others 
Substantially 
reflects on 
suggestions of 
others 
Moderately 
reflects on 
suggestions of 
others 
Shows little 
reflection on 
suggestions of 
others 
Ignores 
suggestions of 
others 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates 
complete will to 
achieve top 
performance 
Demonstrate 
sufficient  will to 
achieve top 
performance 
Demonstrate 
moderate will to 
achieve top 
performance 
Demonstrate little 
will to achieve 
top performance 
Does not care for 
performance 
effectiveness. 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
Completely 
encourages crew 
participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
Substantially 
encourages crew 
participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
Moderately 
encourages crew 
participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
Shows little 
Encouragement 
to crew 
participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
Does not 
encourage crew 
participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
Plan is well 
clearly stated and 
confirmed 
Plan is clearly 
stated and 
confirmed 
Plan is fairly 
stated and 
confirmed 
Plan is briefly 
stated and 
confirmed 
Plan is not 
clearly stated and 
confirmed 
Well clearly 
states goals and 
boundaries for 
task completion 
Clearly states 
goals and 
boundaries for 
task completion 
Fairly states 
goals and 
boundaries for 
task completion 
Briefly states 
goals and 
boundaries for 
task completion 
Goals and 
boundaries 
remain unclear 
Workload 
management 
Completely 
notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
Substantially 
notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
Moderately 
notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
Shows Little 
notification of 
signs of stress 
and fatigue 
Ignores signs of 
fatigue 
Allots good  time 
to complete tasks 
Allots sufficient 
time to complete 
tasks 
Allots just 
enough time to 
complete tasks 
Allots little time 
to complete tasks 
Allots very little 
time to complete 
tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very 
good 
prioritisation of 
tasks  
Demonstrate 
good 
prioritisation of 
tasks 
Demonstrate 
average 
prioritisation of 
tasks 
Demonstrate little 
prioritisation of 
tasks 
Demonstrate no 
prioritisation of 
tasks 
Task delegation 
 
Delegates tasks 
in very good 
manner 
Delegates tasks 
in good manner 
Delegates tasks 
in average 
manner 
Task delegation 
is quite poor 
Do not delegate 
tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial 
crisis situation 
very quickly and 
respond 
accordingly 
Identifies initial 
crisis situation 
quickly and 
respond 
accordingly 
Identifies initial 
crisis situation 
after some time 
and respond 
accordingly 
Identifies initial 
crisis situation 
quite late and 
respond 
accordingly 
Does not identify 
initial crisis 
situation 
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4.6.3 Situation Awareness (SA) 
Endsley (1995b) defines SA as: “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 
in the near future.”  
It has been widely established and accepted that SA is a contributory factor to many accidents 
and incidents in high reliability safety industries (Salmon et al., 2009; Flin et al., 2008: 18). The 
importance of situation awareness in assessing and predicting operator competence in a 
complex and stressed environment has become increasingly apparent. Many accidents 
(Hetherington, 2006) have happened due to loss of SA such as the one described below. 
 During the evening of 11th February 2011 MV Boxford collided with fishing vessel, Admiral 
Blake, in the English Channel while on passage from Antwerp, Belgium to Gioia Tauro, Italy. 
The accident happened at 1839hrs when the chief officer went to check container lashing on 
deck and left the master in command. The master was busy checking the emails, discussing 
room repairs with a fitter and checking log entries of fire and boat drills. The deck cadet was 
performing lookout duties and reported a fishing vessel crossing from the starboard to the port 
side. The master was overworked in the last 36 hours and had misinterpreted the situation as 
the fishing vessel was being overtaken. So he only altered 10 degrees starboard and returned to 
discuss the repairs. But later his vessel collided with the fishing vessel with no casualties 
(MAIB, 2011). This accident is one of many accidents that happened due to loss of SA. 
Awareness of Bridge Systems 
Active knowledge of the mode and state of bridge systems, such as radar, Automatic Radar 
Plotting Aids (ARPA), ECDIS, Global Positioning System (GPS), echo sounder etc., need to 
be maintained. Any changes in the systems’ state need to be considered such as unexpected 
depth from the echo sounder or unexpected appearance of land feature on the radar (Flin et al., 
2003). In the case of the Royal Majesty grounding the bridge team members failed to recognise 
the GPS position failure due to a faulty antenna for more than 34 hours. The Chief Officer, 
navigating officer and second officers were plotting GPS positions based on the DR (Dead 
Reckoning) position during that time. The echo sounder alarm settings were not changed from 
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harbour settings of zero metres and hence did not warn of the problem in advance (NTSB, 
1995). 
Awareness of external environment 
To avoid a crisis situation, a bridge team member is required to have active knowledge of the 
current and estimated position of the ship, weather information and traffic. This information 
must be shared among other bridge team members and necessary action needs to be taken to 
prevent consequences (Flin et al., 2003). MV Maersk Newport sailed from Le Havre for 
Algeciras on 10th November 2008 into force 9 winds with rough seas. Despite the forecasted 
poor weather no specific weather checks and measures had been carried out. The port anchor 
chain lashing arrangement failed because neither the extra lashing arrangements were fitted nor 
was the windlass brake sufficiently tightened (MAIB, 2009b). 
Awareness of time 
To avoid a crisis situation, a bridge team member needs to have a sense of available time and 
thinking ahead and to consider future conditions and contingencies (Flin et al., 2003). In a 
collision avoidance scenario, the rules (International Regulations for Preventing Collision at 
Sea) state that action taken to avoid collision shall be made in ample time. In a collision case 
between MV Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope, watch officers of both ships spent valuable 
time on arguing the responsibilities of the action by the text messaging facility on AIS until 
finally they passed each other at a range of 0.2nm. (MAIB, 2005b) 
Situation assessment 
Situation assessment is the evaluation and interpretation of information obtained from different 
sources (including ship’s position, course, speed, radar traffic, weather etc.). After conducting 
proper situation assessment of a changing situation, bridge team members must be able to 
recognise possible future problems. On 17th October 2006, MV Maersk Dover, which was en-
route from Dover to Dunkerque, passed just one cable astern of MV Apollonia. The OOW on 
the Maersk Dover observed MV Apollonia at 1.9nm at 040° on her starboard bow, only when 
he was called by the deep sea pilot onboard the Apollonia. The OOW on the Maersk Dover did 
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not do a proper situation assessment and initially made a succession of small alterations of 
course to starboard using the autopilot and then ordered the helmsman to begin hand steering 
to manoeuvre to avoid collision (MAIB, 2007) 
Based on subsection 3.6.3 SA elements and behavioural markers, as shown in Table 4.4, are 
illustrated. 
Table 4.4 Situation awareness elements and behavioural markers 
Element Very Good 
Practice 
Good Practice Acceptable 
Practice 
Poor Practice Very Poor 
Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors 
and report 
changes in 
systems’ states 
Substantially 
monitors and 
report changes in 
systems’ states 
Moderately 
monitors and 
report changes in 
systems’ states 
briefly monitors 
and report 
changes in 
systems’ states 
Do not monitors  
changes in 
systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full 
information 
about 
environment 
(own ship’s 
position, traffic 
and weather) 
Collects 
sufficient 
information about 
environment 
(own ship’s 
position, traffic 
and weather) 
Collects average 
information 
about 
environment 
(own ship’s 
position, traffic 
and weather) 
Collects little 
information 
about 
environment 
(own ship’s 
position, traffic 
and weather) 
Does not collect 
information 
about 
environment 
(own ship’s 
position,  traffic 
and weather) 
Shares complete 
key information 
about 
environment with 
team members 
Shares sufficient 
key information 
about 
environment with 
team members 
Shares average 
key information 
about 
environment with 
team members 
Shares little key 
information 
about 
environment with 
team members 
Does not share 
key information 
about 
environment with 
crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss 
time constraints 
with other team 
members 
Substantially 
discuss time 
constraints with 
other team 
members 
Moderately 
discuss time 
constraints with 
other team 
members 
Briefly discuss 
time constraints 
with other team 
members 
Does not discuss 
time constraints 
with other crew 
members 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full 
assessment of 
changing 
situation 
Makes substantial 
assessment of 
changing 
situation 
Makes moderate 
assessment of 
changing 
situation 
Makes little 
assessment of 
changing 
situation 
Does not make 
an assessment of 
changing 
situation 
4.6.4 Decision Making 
In aviation, Decision Making is defined as “The process of reaching a judgement or choosing 
an option” (Flin et al., 2003). Although this definition is labelled as aeronautical decision 
making, this may be a universal definition for all high risk industries. Like an aeroplane pilot a 
ship’s master also makes different types of decisions in different situations.  
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Decisions are dependent on various factors such as available options and support, crew 
qualifications and demands, company’s standard procedures and policies for making decisions 
(ibid).  
Problem definition and diagnosis 
A decision maker should collect all the necessary information to determine the nature of the 
situation. Consider all explanations for the observed problem (Flin et al., 2003). Onboard a 
ship, an example of a problem may be a close quarters’ situation with various vessels at once 
or risk of collision or encountering fog in an area of heavy traffic. The first step for the OOW 
is to identify the problem and then generate the options for its solution. 
Option generation 
Option generation is a critical link in the decision-making process (Adelman et al., 1995). In a 
crisis situation, a decision maker will need to generate several options before analysing each to 
make a decision. A decision maker will formulate different approaches to deal with the problem. 
This will depend on available time and information (Flin et al., 2003). In a situation of close 
quarters in congested waters with various vessels at once, the OOW will generate the options 
of alteration of the course or reduction of speed. 
Risk Assessment and option selection 
Risk is the probability that a small hazard will turn into a crisis situation. The business 
dictionary defines risk assessment as “the identification, evaluation and estimation of the levels 
of risk involved in a situation, their comparison against benchmarks or standards and 
determination of an acceptable level of risk” (Business Dictionary, 2015). A decision maker 
will evaluate the level of risk and choose the best option. In the above close quarters’ situation 
with various vessels at once, the OOW will need to choose the best option from the generated 
options of alteration of the course or reduction of speed.  
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Outcome review 
A decision maker will consider the effectiveness of the chosen option against the current plan, 
once the course of action has been implemented (Flin et al., 2003). Onboard a ship any decision 
taken by the officer in charge must be reviewed for the outcome. He or she will run a forecast 
simulation in his mind regarding the effectiveness of his decision. 
Based on subsection 4.6.4, decision making elements and behavioural markers, as shown in 
table 4.5, are illustrated. 
Table 4.5 decision making elements and behavioural markers 
Element Very Good 
Practice 
Good Practice Acceptable 
Practice 
Poor Practice Very Poor 
Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all 
information to 
identify problem 
Gather sufficient 
information to 
identify problem 
Gather just 
enough 
information to 
identify problem 
Gather little 
information to 
identify problem 
Failure to 
diagnose the 
problem 
 Review all casual 
factors with other 
crew members 
Review enough 
casual factors 
with other crew 
members 
Review some 
casual factors 
with other crew 
members 
Review very few 
casual factors 
with other crew 
members 
No discussion of 
probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all 
alternative option 
States enough 
alternative option 
States some 
alternative option 
States very few 
alternative option 
Does not search 
for information 
Asks crew 
members for all 
options 
Asks crew 
members for 
enough options 
Asks crew 
members for 
some options 
Asks crew 
members for very 
few options 
Does not ask 
crew for 
alternatives 
Risk Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and 
shares all 
estimated risk of 
alternative 
options 
Considers and 
shares substantial 
estimated risk of 
alternative 
options 
Considers and 
shares just 
enough estimated 
risk of alternative 
options 
Inadequate 
discussion of 
limiting factors 
with crew 
No discussion of 
limiting factors 
with crew 
Confirms and 
states all selected 
options/agreed 
action 
Confirms and 
states enough 
selected 
options/agreed 
action 
Confirms and 
states some 
selected 
options/agreed 
action 
Confirms and 
states very few 
selected 
options/agreed 
action 
Does not inform 
crew of decision 
path being taken 
Outcome review Complete 
checking of 
outcome against 
plan 
Substantial 
checking of 
outcome against 
plan 
Average 
checking of 
outcome against 
plan 
Little checking of 
outcome against 
plan 
Fails to check 
selected outcome 
against plan 
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4.7 ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP) (Step 4) 
Based on the literature reviews and with the help of information collected from experienced 
seafarers through interviews as presented in Appendices 4 - 10, a generic decision making 
model, as shown in Figure 4.1, is illustrated and approved. Furthermore, data presented by the 
interview, as shown in Appendix 11, are carefully reviewed and a weight is assigned to each 
criterion by using a mathematical decision making method called the AHP (Table 4.9). The 
process of evaluating a weight of a criterion is presented in the following subsection. 
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Figure 4.1: Deck Officers’ Non-technical Skills Taxonomy 
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4.7.1 The AHP method  
Riahi et al. (2012) has used Saaty’s quantified judgements on pairs of attributes Ai and Aj 
represented by an n-by-n matrix D. The entries aij are defined by the following entry rules. 
Rule 1. If  aij = α, then aji = 1/α, α ≠ 0  
Rule 2. If Ai is judged to be of equal relative importance as Aj, then aij = aji = 1 
 1 a12 … a1n 
D = 1/a12 1 … a2n 
 … … … … 
 1/a1n 1/a2n … 1  
 
Where i, j = 1, 2, 3, …, n and each aij is relative importance of attribute Ai to attribute Aj. 
Having recorded the quantified judgments of comparison on pair (Ai, Aj) as the numerical entry 
aij in the matrix D, what is left is to assign to the n contingencies A1, A2, …, An a set of numerical 
weights w1, w2, …, wn that should reflect the recorded judgements. Generally weights w1, 
w2,…, wn can be calculated by using the following equation;  
ωk =
1
n
∑
akj
∑ aij
n
i=1
(k = 1,2,3, … . , n)
n
j=1
 
 (4.1) 
Where aij represents the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. 
The weight vector of the comparison matrix will provide the priority order but it cannot confirm 
the consistency of the pairwise judgement. The AHP provides a measure of the consistency of 
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the pairwise comparisons by computing a Consistency Ratio (CR) (Riahi et al., 2012). The CR 
is devised in such a way that a value less than 0.10 is deemed consistent in the pairwise 
judgement. A decision maker should review the pairwise judgements if the resultant value is 
more than 0.10.   
The CR value is calculated according to the following equations; 
CR =
CI
RI
 
          
(4.2) 
CI =
λmax − n
n − 1
 
          
(4.3) 
λmax =
∑ [(∑ wkajk)/wj]
n
k=1
n
j=1
n
 
      (4.4) 
Where CI is the Consistency Index, RI is the average random index (Table 4.7), n is the matrix 
order and λmax is the maximum weight value of the n-by-n comparison matrix D. 
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Table 4.7: Value of RI versus matrix order (Saaty, 1990) 
n RI 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0.58 
4 0.9 
5 1.12 
6 1.24 
7 1.32 
8 1.41 
9 1.45 
10 1.49 
 
Numerical example  
The following numerical example shows the method of evaluation of weights of main criteria 
(i.e. Situation Awareness, Decision Making, Leadership and Team Work) by an anonymous 
expert judgement (Table 3.8). 
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Table 4.8: Anonymous expert judgements 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
1. Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision Making        
 
 x         
Leadership 
 
      x           
Teamwork 
 
         x        
 
2. Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision Making’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
 x         
Teamwork 
 
          x       
 
 
3. Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
          x       
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 a11 a12 a13 a14 
D = a21 a22 a23 a24 
 a31 a32 a33 a34 
 a41 a42 a43 a44  
 
The matrix for main criterion was obtained from the table 4.8 as follows; 
 SA DM LS TW 
SA 1 1 1/3 2 
DM 1 1 1 3 
LS 3 1 1 3 
TW 1/2 1/3 1/3 1  
 
Weights of main criteria are calculated using equation 4.1; 
ω1 =
1
n
(
a11
(a11 + a21 + a31 + a41)
+
a12
(a12 + a22 + a32 + a42)
+
a13
(a13 + a23 + a33 + a43)
+
a14
(a14 + a24 + a34 + a44)
) 
 
ω1 =
1
4
(
1
(1 + 1 + 3 + 0.5)
+
1
(1 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
0.3333
(0.3333 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
2
(2 + 3 + 3 + 1)
) 
ω1 = 0.207260 
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ω2 =
1
n
(
a21
(a11 + a21 + a31 + a41)
+
a22
(a12 + a22 + a32 + a42)
+
a23
(a13 + a23 + a33 + a43)
+
a24
(a14 + a24 + a34 + a44)
) 
 
ω2 =
1
4
(
1
(1 + 1 + 3 + 0.5)
+
1
(1 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
1
(0.3333 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
3
(2 + 3 + 3 + 1)
) 
ω2 = 0.297538 
 
ω3 =
1
n
(
a31
(a11 + a21 + a31 + a41)
+
a32
(a12 + a22 + a32 + a42)
+
a33
(a13 + a23 + a33 + a43)
+
a34
(a14 + a24 + a34 + a44)
) 
ω3 =
1
4
(
3
(1 + 1 + 3 + 0.5)
+
1
(1 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
1
(0.3333 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
3
(2 + 3 + 3 + 1)
) 
ω3 = 0.388447 
 
ω4 =
1
n
(
a41
(a11 + a21 + a31 + a41)
+
a42
(a12 + a22 + a32 + a42)
+
a43
(a13 + a23 + a33 + a43)
+
a44
(a14 + a24 + a34 + a44)
) 
 
ω4 =
1
4
(
0.5
(1 + 1 + 3 + 0.5)
+
0.3333
(1 + 1 + 1 + 0.333)
+
0.3333
(0.3333 + 1 + 1 + 0.3333)
+
1
(2 + 3 + 3 + 1)
) 
ω4 = 0.106755 
The weight values are found as 0.207260 (ω1), 0.297538 (ω2), 0.388447 (ω3) and 0.106755 
(ω4). Consistency ratio is calculated by using equations 4.2 - 4.4.  
Based on equation 4,
 
 was calculated as follows: 
ω1x = (1 × 0.207260) + (1 × 0.297538) + (0.333333 × 0.388447) + (2 × 0.106755) = 0.847790 
ω2x = (1 × 0.207260) + (1 × 0.297538) + (1 × 0.388447) + (3 × 0.106755) = 1.21351 
ω3x = (3 × 0.207260) + (1 × 0.297538) + (1 × 0.388447) + (3 × 0.106755) = 1.62803 
ω4x = (0.5 × 0.20726) + (0.33 × 0.297538) + (0.33 × 0.388447) + (1 × 0.106755) = 0.43905 
 
λmax =
(
0.847790
0.207260) + (
1.21351
0.297538) + (
1.62803
0.388447) + (
0.43905
0.106755)
4
= 4.118196 
max
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The mean value for max is 4.118196. If any of the max turns out to be less than n, which is 4 
in this case, then there is an error in the calculation, which requires a thorough check.  
The CI is calculated as follows; 
CI =
λmax − n
n − 1
=
4.118196 − 4
4 − 1
= 0.03939 
Based on table 3.7, the Random Index (RI) for 4 criteria is 0.9. As a result, the CR value was 
calculated as follows; 
CR =
CI
CR
=
0.03939
0.9
= 0.04376 
The CR value for the main criteria is found 0.04376. CR value of less than or equal to 0.1 
indicates that judgements are acceptable (Saaty, 1980). As a result, the consistency of pair-wise 
comparisons for main criteria is acceptable. The same calculation technique is applied to obtain 
weights of sub-criteria and to check the consistency of the expert opinions. 
4.7.2 Geometric Mean Method 
AHP initially was developed as a decision making tool for individual decision makers but by 
the use of the geometric mean method individual pairwise comparison metrics of any number 
of experts can be aggregated (Aull-Hyde et al., 2006).  
Experts’ judgement can be aggregated by using the geometric mean method; 
GeometricMeanij = [e1ij. e2ij. e3ij … ekij]
1
k 
(4.5) 
Where, ekij is the k
th expert judgement on pair of attributes Ai and Aj. 
4.8 DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected by conducting interviews with 12 experienced senior deck officers both in 
UK and Malmo (Appendix 11), Sweden. Only eight participants’ results were considered for 
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the following study as the remaining four participants’ weighting data was inconsistent in light 
of the AHP formula. Table 4.9 shows the weights of all elements of the NTS. 
Table: 4.9 NTS weights 
Category Element 
1. Teamwork  
(0.1914) 
Team-building and maintaining (0.2066) 
Considering others (0.1860) 
Supporting others (0.1831) 
Communication (0.2436) 
Information Sharing (0.1807) 
2. Leadership and 
Managerial Skills 
 (0.2878) 
Use of Authority and assertiveness (0.1579) 
Providing and maintaining standards (0.0857) 
Planning and co-ordination (0.1437) 
Work load management (0.1280) 
Prioritisation (0.1255) 
Task delegation (0.1316) 
Initial Crisis Management (0.2276) 
3. Situation awareness 
(0.2863) 
Awareness of bridge systems (0.2433) 
Awareness of external environment (0.2375) 
Awareness of time (0.1860) 
Situation Assessment (0.3332) 
4. Decision Making  
(0.2346) 
Problem definition and diagnosis (0.2447) 
Option generation (0.2069) 
Risk assessment and option selection (0.2426) 
Outcome review (0.3058) 
 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, with the help of the literature review, a deck officers’ NTS taxonomy was 
developed. The taxonomy was required to see which NTS and associated elements are 
important for a deck officer to possess to deal with crisis situations. To confirm the taxonomy 
elements’ interviews were conducted with experienced seafarers. In the interviews participants 
discussed a real life scenario where they had to use NTS to deal with the situation. After the 
scenario discussion they were presented with the taxonomy to confirm the elements which all 
participants acknowledged. They were then asked to assign a weight for each individual skill 
and associated element against the other on a scale of 1-9 (Appendix 11). This individual 
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weighting was then calculated by AHP to aggregate the final weight. This weighting was used 
in the next chapter where simulator assessments were carried out to analyse the actual skills 
possessed by a seafarer who has just completed the chief mate certificate of competence 
training. Further simulator assessments were carried out of the students with additional NTS 
training, HELM, and results were calculated and compared by the ER Algorithm.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF STUDENTS’ NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS IN 
SIMULATED CRISIS SITUATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the behavioural marker assessments for team-working, leadership and 
managerial skills, situation awareness, and decision making developed by a relevant literature 
review and interviews with experts. Based on the behavioural markers the assessor in a ships’ 
bridge simulator was able to mark each element of a participant’s non-technical skill. For 
assessment of a participant’s NTS in a ships’ bridge simulator, three sets of simulator scenarios 
were produced in this section of research. Two sets of volunteer Chief Mate students were 
selected. One set of students are those who have not obtained the additional NTS training, 
HELM course, and the other set of students are those who had obtained the HELM training. 
Based on the developed scenarios and developed behavioural markers, students’ NTS 
behaviours were assessed in a ships’ bridge simulator. The results were analysed and compared 
using the ER Algorithm. 
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
Simulation training is becoming an integral part of maritime training as it provides obvious 
advantages such as a realistic environment. The simulation training allows trainees to make 
mistakes and then learn from their errors in a safe environment. This allows trainers the ability 
to train and assess technical and non-technical skills (Hassan et al., 2013). 
This chapter is divided into the following steps: 
1. A set of scenarios were developed for the assessment of deck officers’ NTS. 
2. Sample of volunteer students, after completion of their Chief Mate training programme, 
were selected. Based on the developed scenarios (step 1), their qualitative NTS 
characteristics were assessed subjectively in a bridge simulator. All input data was 
aggregated by using an evidential reasoning algorithm. 
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3. A utility value was calculated for each group’s performance for the purpose of 
comparisons.   
In the first step the scenarios were developed to test the students’ NTS. After the scenarios 
were developed volunteer students, who have completed their Chief Mate course of study, were 
selected and assessed in a ships’ bridge simulator. The students were divided into two groups, 
one who did not gain the training of NTS and other had obtained NTS training by means of 
HELM as part of the approved training programme. The students were assessed using the 
behavioural marker system (table 4.2 – 4.5) which was devised in Chapter Four. 
The ER algorithm uses the expert weightings for each skill (Table 4.9) and the assessment 
ratings were calculated to find the aggregate of the overall performance of each group. This 
was carried out in step two and used to compare the performance of the groups with NTS 
training and the groups without the training. 
In step three, a utility value was calculated and assigned to each group’s NTS performance for 
the purpose of comparisons. 
5.3 ER ALGORITHM  
The ER algorithm can be analysed and explained as follows (Riahi et al., 2012): 
Let R represents a set with five linguistic terms (i.e. very poor, poor, average, good and very 
good) with their associated belief degrees (i.e. β) and be synthesised by two subsets 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 
from two different assessments. Then, for example, R, 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 can separately be expressed 
by: 
R = {β1Very Poor, β2Poor, β3Average, β4Good, β5Very Good} 
R1 = {β1
1Very Poor, β1
2Poor, β1
3Average, β1
4Good, β1
5Very Good} 
R2 = {β2
1Very Poor, β2
2Poor, β2
3Average, β2
4Good, β2
5Very Good} 
Suppose that the normalised relative weights of two assessments in the evaluation process are 
given as 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 (𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 1). 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 can be estimated by using an AHP technique. 
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Suppose that 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 (m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are individual degrees to which the subsets 𝑅1 
and 𝑅2 support the hypothesis that the evaluation is confirmed to the five linguistic terms. 
Then, 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 are obtained as: 
 M1
m =  w1β1
m 
M2
m =  w2β2
m           
(5.1) 
Suppose that H1 and H2 are the individual remaining belief values unassigned for 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 
(m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Then H1 and H2 are expressed as: 
 H1 =  H̅1 + H̃1 
H2 =  H̅2 +  H̃2          
(5.2) 
Where ?̅?𝑛 (n = 1, 2) represent the degree to which the other assessor can play a role in the 
assessment, and ?̃?𝑛 (n = 1, 2) is caused by the possible incompleteness in the subsets 𝑅1 and 
𝑅2. ?̅?𝑛 (n = 1 or 2) and ?̃?𝑛 (n = 1, 2) are described as: 
 H̅1 = 1 −  w1 =  w2 
H̅2 = 1 − w2 =  w1 
H̃1 =  w1(1 − ∑ β1
m)
5
m=1
 
H̃2 =  w2(1 − ∑ β2
m
5
m=1
) 
(5.3) 
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Suppose that 𝛽𝑚′ (m = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) represents the non-normalised degree to which the 
reliability evaluation is confirmed to each of the five linguistic terms as a result of the synthesis 
of the judgements produced by assessors 1 and 2. Suppose that 𝐻′𝑈  represents the non-
normalised remaining belief unassigned after the commitment of belief to the five linguistic 
terms because of the synthesis of the judgements produced by assessors 1 and 2. The ER 
algorithm is stated as: 
βm
′
= K(M1
mM2
m +  M1
mH2 +  M2
mH1) 
H′̅̅ ̅U = K(H̅1H̅2) 
H′̃U = K(H̃1H̃2 +  H̃1H̅2 +  H̃2H̅1) 
K = ( 1 −  ∑ ∑ M1
TM2
R)−1
5
R=1
R≠T
5
T=1
 
(5.4) 
After the above aggregation, the combined degrees of belief are generated by assigning 
𝐻′̅̅ ̅𝑈 back to five linguistic terms using the normalisation process: 
βm =  
βm′
1 −  H′̅U
        (m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
HU =  
H′̃U
1 −  H′̅U
 
(5.5) 
Where, HU is the unassigned degree of belief representing the extent of incompleteness in the 
overall assessment.  The above gives the process of combining two subsets. If three subsets are 
required to be combined, the result obtained from the combination of any two subsets can be 
further synthesised with the third subset using the above algorithm. In a similar way, the 
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judgements of multiple assessors of lower-level criteria in the chain system (i.e. components 
or subsystems) can be combined.      
5.3.1 Numerical example 
As an example, based on the ER algorithm two quantitative data (e.g. R1 and R2) are aggregated 
as follows: 
R1 stands for ‘Problem definition and diagnosis’ (sub criteria of decision making) assessed for 
a team performance (Appendix 12) 
R2 stands for ‘Option generation’ (sub criteria of decision making) assessed for a team 
performance (Appendix 12) 
 
 Very Poor Poor Average Good Very Good Weight (wn) 
R1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.2447 
R2 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.2069 
 
  w1 + w2 = 0.2447 + 0.2069 = 0.4516 
Normalised weights  w1 = 0.2447 × 2.21435 = 0.54185 
Normalised weights  w2 = 0.2069 × 2.21435 = 0.45815 
 
β1
1 = 0, β1
2 = 0.5, β1
3 = 0, β1
4 = 0.5, β1
5 = 0   
β2
1 = 0.5, β2
2 = 0.5, β2
3 = 0, β2
4 = 0, β2
5 = 0   
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M1
1 = w1β1
1 = 0.54185 ×  0 = 0 
M1
2 = w1β1
2 = 0.54185 ×  0.5 = 0.27093 
M1
3 = w1β1
3 = 0.54185 ×  0 = 0 
M1
4 = w1β1
4 = 0.54185 ×  0.5 = 0.27093 
M1
5 = w1β1
5 = 0.54185 ×  0 = 0 
 
M2
1 = w2β2
1 = 0.45815 ×  0.5 = 0.22908 
M2
2 = w2β2
2 = 0.45815 ×  0.5 = 0.22908 
M2
3 = w2β2
3 = 0.45815 ×  0 = 0 
M2
4 = w2β2
4 = 0.45815 ×  0 = 0 
M2
5 = w2β2
5 = 0.45815 × 0 = 0 
 
H̅1 = 1 − w1 = 1 − 0.54185 = 0.45815 
H̅2 = 1 − w2 = 1 − 0.45815 = 0.54185 
 
H̃1 =  w1 (1 − (β1
1 + β1
2 + β1
3 + β1
4 + β1
5)) = 0.54185 (1 − (0 + 0.5 + 0 + 0.5 + 0)) = 0   
H̃2 =  w2 (1 − (β2
1 + β2
2 + β2
3 + β2
4 + β2
5)) = 0.45815 (1 − (0.5 + 0.5 + 0 + 0 + 0)) = 0 
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H1 =  H̅1 + H̃1 = 0.45815 + 0 = 0.45815 
 
H2 =  H̅2 + H̃2 = 0.54185 + 0 = 0.54185 
K = ( 1 −  ∑ ∑ M1
TM2
R)−1
5
R=1
R≠T
5
T=1
 
K = (1 − ∑(M1
TM2
1
5
T=1
+ M1
TM2
2 + M1
TM2
3 + M1
TM2
4 + M1
TM2
5))−1 
K = (1 − [(M1
1M2
2 + M1
1M2
3 + M1
1M2
4 + M1
1M2
5) + (M1
2M2
1 + M1
2M2
3 + M1
2M2
4 + M1
2M2
5)
+ (M1
3M2
1 + M1
3M2
2 + M1
3M2
4 + M1
3M2
5)
+ (M1
4M2
1 + M1
4M2
2 + M1
4M2
3 + M1
4M2
5)
+ (M1
5M2
1 + M1
5M2
2 + M1
5M2
3 + M1
5M2
4)])−1 
K = 1.2288 
H̅U′ = K (H̅1H̅2) = 0.3050 
B1′ = K(M1
1M2
1 + M1
1H2 + M2
1H1) = 0.1289 
β1 =
B1′
1 − H̅U′
= 0.18547 
B2′ = K(M1
2M2
2 + M1
2H2 + M2
2H1) = 0.3857 
β2 =
B2′
1 − H̅U′
= 0.55496 
B3′ = K(M1
3M2
3 + M1
3H2 + M2
3H1) = 0 
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β3 =
B3′
1 − H̅U′
= 0 
B4′ = K(M1
4M2
4 + M1
4H2 + M2
4H1) = 0.1805 
β4 =
B4′
1 − H̅U′
= 0.25971 
B5′ = K(M1
5M2
5 + M1
5H2 + M2
5H1) = 0  
β5 =
B5′
1 − H̅U′
= 0 
The following result is obtained from the above calculations: 
 Very Poor Poor Average Good Very Good 
R12 = R1 R2 18.547% 55.496% 0 25.971% 0 
The calculation is repeated for R3 and R4 and then again repeated to aggregate the R12 (i.e. R1
 R2) and R34 (i.e. R3 R4) to find the final value of the ‘decision making’ element of the 
group. 
5.4 BRIDGE SIMULATOR SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENTS (STEP 1) 
The students were assessed on the last three exercises of the NAEST (M) bridge simulator 
course which is an eight days long course. The students were divided into sub groups and were 
assessed on the following scenarios; 
5.4.1 Scenario 1 
Two similar exercises were used for this scenario. One was set in Southampton and other in 
Algeciras. Both exercises are detailed as below. 
The vessel was alongside the jetty in Southampton or Algeciras. Each team would have to pilot 
their own vessel and maintain all the records as agreed by the members. Each team would need 
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to manoeuvre their own vessel with use of a bow thruster (team was not allowed to use tugs). 
There would be a number of inbound as well as outbound vessels during the departure. A 
grounded vessel in the vicinity of the Nab tower with a salvage operation underway would 
request a wide berth (Southampton only).  
Just after passing Fawley Terminal in Southampton or coming out of the breakwater in 
Algeciras, Gyro No. 1 would start to drift at a rate of 1°/sec. Based on the position of each 
vessel at time of passing; there would be the possibility of interaction with large inbound 
containerships.  
The exercise would require effective teamwork, situation awareness, leadership, and decision 
making skills. 
5.4.2 Scenario2 
The exercise was set in the approaches to the Bosphorus, Turkey. The master would commence 
the exercise in a debrief room and would be ready to be called to the bridge when required. 
The bridge equipment would need to be tested and checklists required to be completed prior to 
the exercise.  The vessel would proceed to an anchorage for bunkering.  
There would be a number of vessels in the concerned area (anchored, approaching, overtaking 
and numerous ferries crossing). The strong tide setting would make it hard to steer. The 
exercise would continue until the vessel was alongside a jetty. As time permits the vessel 
proceeded through the Bosphorus towards the Black Sea.  
A number of south bound vessels, strong cross currents and ferry operations would require 
strict adherence to and monitoring of the passage plan as well as collision avoidance 
manoeuvres. The exercise would require effective teamwork, situation awareness, leadership, 
and decision making skills. 
5.4.3 Scenario 3 
The exercise would commence with a handover/ takeover of a watch. A Third Officer (3/O) 
from each of the three bridges would commence the exercise as an Officer of the Watch (OOW). 
An instructor would act as a lookout and would be on a walkie-talkie / telephone. Sufficient 
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time would be given to the trainees prior to the commencement of the exercise such that they 
were able to check all the equipment and familiarise themselves with the pre-prepared passage 
plan.  
A delegate from each of the three bridges would be in the role of Second Officer (2/0) and he 
would proceed to the bridge for takeover of the watch. The handover/ takeover would take 
place using the appropriate procedure and checklists. When agreement was reached, each 
relieved OOW would return to the debrief room and was ready to take up the role as a chief 
officer (C/O) in an assigned bridge.  
Bridge 1 was situated in such a way that in the initial 20 minutes of running the exercise it was 
just in visual range of a target showing a strobe light (normally fitted on a life raft). This target 
had no or very poor radar returns. The target would be detected if radar controls are set 
appropriately. Another target to the north (i.e. distressed vessel) would provide a weak radar 
return but would not be in the visual range. Bridges 2 and 3 were in the Very High Frequency 
(VHF) range of Bridge 1.  
The exercise was based on a scenario set in the Global Maritime Distress Safety System 
(GMDSS) sea area A2 (i.e. Medium Frequency range). Delegate assignment were in ranks of 
master, chief officer (C/O) and third officer (3/O) / lookout for all three bridges.  
The exercise would progress in the anticipation that the OOW on Bridge 1 would identify the 
life raft, summon the Master and instigate a search and rescue plan. In the event that the OOW 
does not take the appropriate action, the virtual lookout (i.e. instructor) would call the bridge 
and report the sighting. The exercise would then be conducted in line with delegates’ response; 
one of the bridges would be tasked with the On Scene Commander (OSC) role. There would 
be minimum intervention by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). There would 
be other vessels in the area. A warship to the west would be in MF (Medium Frequency) range 
and has an operational helicopter. A fishing vessel to the north would offer assistance and has 
the benefit of low freeboard. Her position would be such that an Emergency Position-Indicating 
Radio Beacon (EPIRB) position of the casualty could be checked if utilised immediately. The 
exercise would test all the non-technical skills of the delegates involved.   
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5.5 STUDENTS’ PERFORMANCE (Step 2) 
The following is the students’ performance against each scenario. Students were rated against 
their performance on the behavioural markers assessment framework (Appendices A12 – A23). 
5.5.1 Group 1 performance / Scenario 1 (Wednesday 17/04/2013) – NO HELM 
The group was formed in the beginning of the NAEST (M) (Navigation Aids, Equipment and 
Simulator Training - Management) course and the teambuilding element was evident. The 
passage plan was already prepared a day before the exercise. The group tested all bridge 
equipment and completed the check lists. The exercise started when the bridge team was ready. 
Initially they had some doubts about departing the berth without tugs. The use of the bow thrust 
helped them to depart without any problems. The vessel was manoeuvred slowly and left the 
berth and headed towards the channel. The vessel speed was about 8 knots in the channel. The 
master was overall in charge, C/O and OOW were performing navigation and communication 
duties respectively. At one point the own vessel grounded and then re-floated quickly. The gyro 
started drifting but the bridge team considered that the vessel was drifting due to tide/current. 
The OOW suggested that the drifting was due to the gyro failure but the master did not 
investigate it further and it was assumed that the vessel was drifting due to heavy current. The 
master only realised the gyro failure once the large alteration of the vessel’s course was 
observed (i.e. about half an hour after the initial drift). Immediately action was taken by 
switching to gyro 2 and controlling the situation.  
Gyro failure during the exercise was the key moment and it was expected that the bridge team 
would identify and take corrective measures immediately. The group’s poor performance was 
due to lack of situation awareness of the team and then the master’s over reliance on C/O 
information and not taking control of the situation himself.  
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A12.1, A12.2, A12.3 and A12.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set is evaluated as shown in Table 
5.1 and Figure 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: ER results of group 1 
Very Poor 35.39% 
Poor 33.71% 
Average 28.05% 
Good 2.85% 
Very Good 0.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.1: ER results of group 1 
5.5.2 Group 2 Performance / Scenario 2 (Thursday 18/04/2013) – NO HELM 
This was an exercise with a number of vessels in the area (anchored, approaching and 
overtaking) with numerous ferries crossing. The vessel was passing through the Dardanelle’s 
TSS (Traffic Separation Scheme). At one point own vessel was in the opposite lane of the TSS 
due to the strong current. There was a tug on the starboard side being overtaken. The target 
was not initially picked up on the radar but was later on picked up visually. No immediate 
action was taken by the students. When the tug was less than one mile away the master of own 
ship started to alter the vessel’s course in successions of 5° to port and the ship nearly went 
into the opposite lane for the second time in this exercise. As a result the target only passed one 
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cable ahead of own ship. Immediately after passing the tug the own vessel collided with a 
fishing vessel which was not observed in the panic of clearing the tug.  
This team have shown that the effect of training and procedures will be relinquished as a result 
of panic. The group has shown poor NTS and there was very weak leadership and teamwork. 
The group has also shown lack of situation awareness.  
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A13.1, A13.2, A13.3 and A13.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, the output set is evaluated as shown in Table 
5.2 and Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.2: ER results of group 2 
Very Poor 10.52% 
Poor 70.0% 
Average 19.49% 
Good 0.0% 
Very Good 0.0% 
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Figure 5.2: ER results of group 2 
5.5.3 Group 3 performance / Scenario 3 (Friday 19/04/2013) – NO HELM 
The exercise was set in the Western approaches to the English Channel. The exercise started 
with the OOW on the bridge and after some time the C/O arrived on the bridge to take over the 
watch. After the OOW left the bridge the C/O was alone on the bridge. Restricted visibility 
was encountered after about 30 minutes of the start of the exercise. The master was informed 
and the fog signal activated. Soon after that a survival craft was sighted and its position noted. 
The master carried out a Williamson Turn to recover the casualties from the life raft. A 
SECURITY message was transmitted on VHF channel 16 (but not on 2182). At the end of the 
turn a survival craft was sighted and the vessel stopped. Half an hour after the sighting a 
Mayday Relay message was received from Falmouth Coastguard as they got information from 
a sunken vessel’s EPIRB. Three more vessels in the area responded and joined the search and 
rescue operations. After consultation with Falmouth Coastguard own vessel assumed on scene 
commander (OSC) role. Own vessel recovered five persons from the life raft out of twelve. 
One of the five rescued persons was badly wounded. The Master contacted the warship Halifax 
(which was in the area and offered assistance) for medical evacuation. The Halifax informed 
the master that a helicopter would be arriving in 30 minutes. Three more persons were rescued 
by one of the other vessels. Another vessel sighted two more survivors in the water. The 
helicopter was diverted towards the two survivors in the water. As per instruction of the OSC, 
after some time the injured person on own vessel became unconscious and required evacuation. 
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As per Falmouth Coastguard all four vessels proceeded to the rendezvous position to start a 
parallel search. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A14.1, A14.2, A14.3 and A14.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set is evaluated as shown in Table 
5.3 and Figure 5.3. 
Table 5.3: ER results of group 3 
Very Poor 4.15% 
Poor 35.02% 
Average 60.83% 
Good 0.0% 
Very Good 0.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.3: ER results of group 3 
5.5.4 Group 4 performance / Scenario 1 (Tuesday 07/05/2013) – NO HELM 
The group was formed in the beginning of the course and a teambuilding element was evident. 
The passage plan was already prepared a day before the exercise. The exercise started with the 
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vessel berthed in Gibraltar and there was restricted visibility. There was a pilot onboard who 
helped to manoeuvre the vessel. 15 minutes after the pilot’s departure the vessel made head on 
contact with another vessel just outside the harbour. The target was not plotted on the ARPA. 
Port Control was informed and the gyro started to drift at this stage. Clues to gyro drift were 
ignored as the “binoculars visual channel” was showing true heading which was different from 
the actual heading. It was considered that the error is due to heavy current. Although OOW1 
informed the master regarding the gyro failure the master ignored him. The Gyro drift problem 
was detected 45 minutes after its initial failure.  
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A15.1, A15.2, A15.3 and A15.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using ER, an output set is evaluated as shown in Table 5.4 and Figure 
5.4. 
Table 5.4: ER results of group 4 
Very Poor 47.66% 
Poor 44.89% 
Average 7.45% 
Good 0.0% 
Very Good 0.0% 
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Figure 5.4: ER results of group 4 
5.5.5 Group 5 performance / Scenario 2 (Wednesday 08/05/2013) 
The exercise started in the Dardanelles TSS. Half an hour into the exercise the vessel ahead of 
own vessel went aground and own vessel had to reduce speed. After some time the vessel re-
floated but by then own vessel could not control steering and moved into the opposite lane as 
a result of panic. There was a vessel coming down in the opposite lane and she passed on the 
port side very close and consequently the own vessel lost steering control and touched the 
breakwater on its starboard side and grounded. 15 minutes after grounding the vessel re-floated 
and was underway. Due to heavy currents own vessel experienced difficulty in steering 
throughout.  
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A16.1, A16.2, A16.3 and A16.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set is evaluated as shown in Table 
5.5 and Figure 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: ER results of group 5 
Very Poor 7.26% 
Poor 46.58% 
Average 45.59% 
Good 0.57% 
Very Good 0.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.5: ER results of group 5 
5.5.6 Group 6 performance / Scenario 3 (Thursday 09/05/2013) – NO HELM 
The exercise was set in the Western approaches to the English Channel. The exercise started 
with OOW1 on the bridge and after some time OOW2 arrived on the bridge in order to take 
over the watch. After OOW1 left the bridge OOW2 was alone on the bridge. Restricted 
visibility was encountered after about 30 minutes after the start of the exercise, the master was 
informed and the fog signal activated. Soon after that a distress message was received on 
Digital Selective Calling (DSC) and a Mayday Relay received from Falmouth Coastguard on 
RT (Radio Telephony); own vessel reported to Falmouth Coastguard and requested to proceed 
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to a distress position. The master was summoned on the bridge and altered the vessel’s course 
to the distress position with ETA in 40 minutes; the master delegated tasks very well. Passenger 
Ferry Mukran was assigned OSC role. 
The search pattern was advised by OSC and own vessel proceeded to delegated search position. 
The vessel started a parallel search once she arrived at the search position. About 90 minutes 
into the exercise, a target was sighted 4 nautical miles on the starboard beam. The OSC was 
informed and altered the vessel’s course towards the target with a speed of 21.5 knots. 
After approaching the life raft, the Bosun informs that there are no signs of life in the life raft. 
The ship crew was unable to launch the rescue boat due to heavy weather. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A17.1, A17.2, A17.3 and A17.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in Table 
5.6 and Figure 5.6. 
Table 5.6: ER results of group 6 
Very Poor 0.00% 
Poor 28.11% 
Average 31.02% 
Good 37.24% 
Very Good 3.62% 
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Figure 5.6: ER results of group 6 
5.5.7 Group 7 performance / Scenario 1 (Monday / 05/08/2013 AM) – WITH HELM 
The group was formed in the beginning of the course and the teambuilding element was 
evident. The passage plan was already prepared the day before the exercise. The vessel was 
alongside in the port of Algeciras. Visibility was less than one mile. The group tested all bridge 
equipment and completed the check lists. The exercise started when the bridge team declared 
ready. Initially they had some doubts about departing the berth without tugs when they were 
told no tugs were available. The use of a bow thrust helped them to depart without any 
problems. The vessel was manoeuvred slowly and left the berth and headed towards the 
channel. The Chief Officer was assumed to have a pilot exemption certificate so he manoeuvred 
the vessel in the beginning and then the master took over. A change of command from pilot to 
master was not clearly defined. After coming out of the harbour the plan was adjusted to avoid 
oncoming traffic. A helm order miscommunication took place with no incident happening 
(Master gave helm order starboard 20°, helmsman responded port 20°). The error was not 
picked up by the master. After sometime the engine room requested the reduction of the speed 
to slow ahead due to some problems in the engine room. This was followed and the problem 
was rectified very soon. Overall group performance was found to be average with some good 
practices in situation awareness and team working. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A18.1, A18.2, A18.3 and A18.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
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Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in Table 
5.7 and Figure 5.7. 
Table 5.7: ER results of group 7 
Very Poor 1.58% 
Poor 20.53% 
Average 64.17% 
Good 13.73% 
Very Good 0.00% 
 
 
Figure 5.7: ER results of group 7 
5.5.8 Group 8 performance / Scenario 2 (Monday / 05/08/2013 PM) – WITH HELM 
The exercise started in the middle of the Dardanelles TSS. The master passed control to the 
C/O who was assumed to have a pilotage exemption certificate. The master did not show any 
leadership qualities throughout the exercise. A vessel ahead of the own vessel was proceeding 
at 7.5 knots as a result the own vessel reduced its speed and preferred not to overtake. Due to 
heavy currents it was difficult to steer and whilst the helmsman performed hard a port on the 
steering, the rudder stuck there. The instructor was advised and by using a limit switch the 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Very
Poor
Poor Average Good Very
Good
Series1
123 
 
problem was rectified.  Half an hour into the exercise the vessel went out of control and ran 
aground. At one point the own vessel passed within a short distance of an anchored naval 
vessel. The vessel went out of control again and went into the inshore traffic zone on the 
opposite lane and then collided with the shore and grounded. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A19.1, A19.2, A19.3 and A19.4 as 
assessed by the researcher. As a result, after feeding the input data into the generic model (i.e. 
Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck Officers’ NTS) and by help of the ER algorithm, an output set 
was evaluated as shown in Table 5.8 and Figure 5.8. 
Table 5.8: ER results of group 8 
Very Poor 46.37% 
Poor 47.21% 
Average 6.42% 
Good 0.00% 
Very Good 0.00% 
 
 
Figure 5.8: ER results of group 8 
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5.5.9 Group 9 performance / Scenario 3 (Monday / 07/08/2013 PM) – WITH HELM 
The exercise was set in the Western approaches to the English Channel. The exercise started 
with the OOW on the bridge. Half an hour into the exercise the OOW sighted a life raft and 
called the master. The OOW also sighted a vessel with visible smoke. After few minutes a 
second life raft was sighted and the engine was stopped. (No distress relay sent and rescue party 
was not prepared.) After 15 minutes of the sighting of the first life raft and the vessel with 
visible smoke a VHF distress relay was sent without a MAYDAY prefix. After another 15 
minutes a 2182 KHz message sent regarding the life raft sighting (2182 KHz is the international 
calling and distress frequency). The OOW decided to be the OSC without consulting with the 
master. Tasks were delegated very late, 45 minutes after the first sighting and a rescue party 
prepared. Own vessel was diverted to the first life raft to execute a rescue. The Bridge team 
relinquished the second life raft and only focused on the first life raft. A Distress message,  
relayed by Falmouth Coastguard was received and own vessel was informed that there were 
thirteen persons onboard the fishing vessel which caught fire. Five persons were rescued from 
the life raft and eight persons were remained unaccounted for. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A20.1, A20.2, A20.3 and A20.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in Table 
5.9 and Figure 5.9. 
Table 5.9: ER results of group 9 
Very Poor 4.93% 
Poor 78.27% 
Average 16.80% 
Good 0.00% 
Very Good 0.00% 
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Figure 5.9: ER results of group 9 
So far only LJMU students’ behaviour markers were assessed in the ship’s bridge simulator for 
the purpose of this study. To widen the research area it was decided to gather data from other 
maritime institutes in the UK. Only one institute, South Tyneside College, positively responded 
to the request sent to various maritime institutes across the UK. The researcher travelled to 
South Shields to observe the students’ behaviour markers of those Chief Mates’ students who 
had already completed the HELM course. The assessed exercises were part of the NAEST 
course and were different from the exercises used at LJMU for the assessments. This actually 
provided diversity of the exercise scenario. 
5.5.10 Group 10 performance (STC) (Wednesday / 27/11/2013 PM) – WITH HELM 
The exercise was set in Storebaelt TSS. The exercise started with a vessel ahead of the own 
vessel which was being overtaken. Own vessel’s speed was 15.4 knots and the speed of other 
vessel was 15.0 knots. One vessel was crossing from port to starboard and another vessel was 
crossing from starboard to port. The own vessel altered its course to Starboard 10°. The engine 
room required 15 minutes’ notice to changeover from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil; however, the 
master only gave notice to the engine room as marked on the planned chart. 20 minutes into 
exercise a vessel was observed on the starboard bow. Own vessel altered its course to 25° 
starboard in successions. One hour into the exercise the GPS malfunctioned. All three bridge 
team members actually thought that with GPS failure they were not able to plot a position by 
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radar. Later on one of the students was able to plot the position with radar. One and a half hours 
in to the exercise the own vessel finally reached the destination and managed to drop the anchor. 
It was poor to average teamwork throughout the exercise. In summary, the students’ lack of 
anticipation skills and inability to adapt to the changing situation was observed. Not using the 
radar for fixing a position immediately after GPS failure was due to the lack of technical skills, 
as a result and due to the panic, control of the situation was lost.  
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A21.1, A21.2, A21.3 and A21.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in table 
5.10 and Figure 5.10. 
Table 5.10: ER results of group 10 
Very Poor 1.30% 
Poor 45.13% 
Average 48.93% 
Good 3.33% 
Very Good 0.0% 
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Figure 5.10: ER results of group 10 
5.5.11 Group 11 performance (STC) (Thursday - 28/11/2013 AM) – WITH HELM 
This was a restricted visibility exercise. There were several targets in the 12 miles range scale 
on the radar. The target on the starboard bow altered course to her port and gave a very close 
CPA (Closest Point of Approach) to own ship so the master decided to alter course 20° to 
starboard to increase the CPA to 9 cables. After 20 minutes of the first alteration another target 
appeared on the starboard bow with risk of collision. The Master first considered a reduction 
of speed but then he altered course 8° to starboard. There was a target behind own ship which 
was going to clear in 3 minutes after the alteration and the master announced that he would 
reduce speed after three minutes. The master reduced the speed and also made a succession of 
small alterations of course to starboard. Once the vessels cleared, own vessel made a broad 
alteration of course to port to come back to the original course. The exercise was stopped at 
this stage. 
Overall it was an average performance by the group with some good elements such as team 
working. The students were poor in situation awareness and situation assessment. Leadership 
was of average standards. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A22.1, A22.2, A22.3 and A22.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Very Poor Poor Average Good Very
Good
Series1
128 
 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in table 
5.11and Figure 5.11. 
Table 5.11: ER results of group 11 
Very Poor 0.0% 
Poor 35.01% 
Average 49.74% 
Good 11.92% 
Very Good 0.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.11: ER results of group 11 
5.5.12 Group 12 performance (STC) (Thursday - 28/11/2013 PM) – WITH HELM 
The exercise was set in the Singapore Strait with own vessel in the west bound lane. The 
exercise started with a vessel crossing from starboard with risk of collision. Own vessel reduced 
speed to Dead Slow Ahead and altered course 10° to starboard and then 20° to starboard to 
avoid collision. After clearing the target vessel own vessel returned to course slowly. Once 
back on course another target was observed on the starboard bow with risk of collision. This 
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time the master increased speed to pass ahead of the target and as a result the target vessel 
passed very close to the stern of own vessel. Sometime time after this own vessel reduced speed 
to Half Ahead to let the MV Souter Bay overtake own vessel with a CPA of 1.4 cables. The 
own vessel further reduced to Dead Slow Ahead to let MV Tyne Trader overtake. The own 
vessel called the Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) to inform them of a speed reduction. 
The speed was increased to Slow Ahead fifteen minutes after reduction. Five minutes after 
increasing to slow ahead own vessel altered course to port for a vessel ahead which had reduced 
speed. Own vessel also reduced speed. Five minutes after the master ordered hard starboard 
when he was informed that the steering was not taking effect and the helmsman assumed a 
steering failure. The master did not investigate further and assumed the case and called for 
engineers. During this process own vessel missed another vessel very close. Engineers 
inspected the steering gear and informed that the steering was working properly and it never 
failed. By this time the vessel was heading in the opposite direction of the traffic lane. The 
master ordered hard a starboard to take a turn to the starboard side whereas there was more 
clear area on the port side. While altering course to starboard own vessel only missed another 
vessel by a very narrow margin. 
The students lacked situation awareness and situation assessment skills. Leadership was quite 
weak as the master should have investigated the steering failure. Actually at that time the vessel 
was doing about 3kts and the steering needed some more speed to be effective. This was again 
down to lack of technical skills. The lack of anticipation resulted in poor decisions made by 
the master such as turning from the starboard side whereas there was much more room on the 
port side. 
The students’ behaviour markers are tabulated in Appendix A23.1, A23.2, A23.3 and A23.4. 
As a result, after feeding the input data to the model (i.e. Figure 4.1; Taxonomy of Deck 
Officers’ NTS) and by using the ER algorithm, an output set was evaluated as shown in table 
5.12 and Figure 5.12. 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 5.12: ER results of group 12 
Very Poor 28.03% 
Poor 42.60% 
Average 25.02% 
Good 01.69% 
Very Good 0.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.12: ER Results of Group 12 
5.6 OBTAINING UTILITY VALUE (STEP 3) 
The main aim of using a utility approach was to obtain a single crisp number for the top-level 
criterion (the final result or goal) of each alternate in order to rank them. Let the utility of an 
evaluation grade Hn be denoted by 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) and 𝑢(𝐻𝑛+1) > 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) if Hn+1 is preferred to Hn; 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) can be estimated using the decision marker’s preferences. If no preference information 
is available, it could be assumed that the utilities of evaluation grades are equidistantly 
distributed in a normalised utility space. The utilities of evaluation grades that are equidistantly 
distributed in a normalised utility space are calculated as 
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𝑢(𝐻𝑛) =
𝑉𝑛−𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
  
(5.6) 
Where Vn is the ranking value of the linguistic term Hn that has been considered, Vmax is the 
ranking value of the most-preferred linguistic term HN and Vmin is the ranking value of the least-
preferred linguistic term Hl. 
The utility of the top level or general criterion S€ is denoted by u(S(E)). If βH ≠ 0 (i.e. the 
assessment is incomplete, 𝛽𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ) there is belief interval [βn,(βn+ βH)], which 
provides likelihood that S(E) is assessed to Hn. Without loss of generality, suppose that the 
least-preferred linguistic term having the lowest utility is denoted by 𝑢(𝐻𝑙) and the most-
preferred linguistic term having the highest utility is denoted by 𝑢(𝐻𝑁). Then the minimum, 
maximum and average utilities are defined as follows respectively (Riahi et al., 2012); 
𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) + (𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝐻)𝑢(𝐻𝑙)
𝑁
𝑁=2
 
𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) +
𝑁−1
𝑛=1
(𝛽𝑁 + 𝛽𝐻)𝑢(𝐻𝑁) 
𝑢𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑆(𝐸)) =
𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝐸)) + 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆(𝐸))
2
 
(5.7) 
Obviously if all the assessments are complete, then 𝛽𝐻 = 0 and the maximum, minimum and 
average utilities of S(E) will be the same. Therefore, u(S(E)) can be calculated as  
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
(5.8) 
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The above utilities are used only for characterising an assessment and not for criteria 
aggregation. 
5.6.1 Numerical example  
First 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) values were calculated for belief values (Very Good = 5, Good = 4, Average = 3, 
Poor = 2, Very Poor = 1)  
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) =
𝑉𝑛 − 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
𝑢(𝐻5) =
5 − 1
5 − 1
= 1 
𝑢(𝐻4) =
4 − 1
5 − 1
=
3
4
= 0.75 
𝑢(𝐻3) =
3 − 1
5 − 1
=
2
4
= 0.5 
𝑢(𝐻2) =
2 − 1
5 − 1
=
1
4
= 0.25 
𝑢(𝐻1) =
1 − 1
5 − 1
= 0 
Following Group 1’s (17th April 2013) ER algorithm output values were used for the example 
calculations; 
β1 = 0.3539 
β2 = 0.3371 
β3 = 0.2805 
β4  = 0.0285 
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β5 = 0.000 
Total  1.000 
If β1+ β2+ β3+ β4+ β5=1 then following equation will be used; 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) =  𝛽1𝑢(𝐻1) + 𝛽2𝑢(𝐻2) + 𝛽3𝑢(𝐻3) + 𝛽4𝑢(𝐻4) + 𝛽5𝑢(𝐻5) 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = 0.2459 
5.7 COMPARING THE STUDENTS’ PERFORMANCE WITH AND WITHOUT 
HELM TRAINING 
After conducting extensive simulator observations (Section 5.5) a comparison was made 
between the average performance of the groups with HELM and groups without HELM. To do 
this the utility value of each group is used and a mean of each group is calculated to compare 
the average group performance.  
Table 5.13 shows each group’s non-technical performance based on utility value with their 
respective rank and Table 5.14 shows the rank wise sequence of all groups. It can be seen from 
Table 5.14 that all the groups are staggered in the ranks which indicates that the groups with 
HELM training have not performed any better than groups without HELM training.  
Table 5.15 compares the average utility value of the groups with HELM and without HELM. 
The improvement of the average value of groups with HELM is only 0.8% which is nearly 
negligible.  
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Table 5.13: NTS group performance ranks 
    Utility Value Rank 
Group 1 Without HELM Training 0.2459 (24.59%) 10 
Group 2 Without HELM Training 0.2724 (27.24%) 8 
Group 3 Without HELM Training 0.3917 (39.17%) 4 
Group 4 Without HELM Training 0.1459 (14.59%) 12 
Group 5 Without HELM Training 0.3487 (34.87%) 6 
Group 6 Without HELM Training 0.5409 (54.09%) 1 
Group 7 With HELM Training 0.4751 (47.51%) 2 
Group 8 With HELM Training 0.1501 (15.01%) 11 
Group 9 With HELM Training 0.2797 (27.97%) 7 
Group 10 With HELM Training 0.3888 (38.88%) 5 
Group 11 With HELM Training 0.4423 (44.23%) 3 
Group 12 With HELM Training 0.2576 (25.76%) 9 
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Table 5.14: NTS group performance ranks wise 
Rank     Utility Value 
1 Group 6 Without HELM Training 0.5409 (54.09%) 
2 Group 7 With HELM Training 0.4751 (47.51%) 
3 Group 11 With HELM Training 0.4423 (44.23%) 
4 Group 3 Without HELM Training 0.3917 (39.17%) 
5 Group 10 With HELM Training 0.3888 (38.88%) 
6 Group 5 Without HELM Training 0.3487 (34.87%) 
7 Group 9 With HELM Training 0.2797 (27.97%) 
8 Group 2 Without HELM Training 0.2724 (27.24%) 
9 Group 12 With HELM Training 0.2576 (25.76%) 
10 Group 1 Without HELM Training 0.2459 (24.59%) 
11 Group 8 With HELM Training 0.1501 (15.01%) 
12 Group 4 Without HELM Training 0.1459 (14.59%) 
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Table 5.15: NTS group comparison 
Without HELM Training With HELM Training 
0.2459 (24.59%) 0.4751 (47.51%) 
0.2724 (27.24%) 0.1501 (15.01%) 
0.3917 (39.17%) 0.2797 (27.97%) 
0.1459 (14.59%) 0.3888 (38.88%) 
0.3487 (34.87%) 0.4423 (44.23%) 
0.5409 (54.09%) 0.2576 (25.76%) 
Average = 32.4% Average = 33.2% 
 
Based on Table 5.15, the average utility value of groups with the HELM training is only 
improved by 0.8%. It was evident during the observations that the students with the HELM 
training did not apply the NTS which were taught during the course. Generally students were 
found weak in situation awareness and decision making. Lack of anticipation resulted in poor 
decisions. In some instances task delegation was not clear which resulted in task omission.  In 
some instances leadership was quite weak such as the chief officer was actually controlling the 
master. 
Feedback from students regarding the course and the body language of the students showed 
that they only enjoyed parts of the course where sessions were interactive. It seemed difficult 
for students to adapt to the new concept of NTS with topics like situation awareness, decision 
making, leadership, teamwork and communication.  
At this stage an analysis of students’ performance against their academic achievements was 
carried out to see if there is any relation between the two. 
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5.8 ANALYSIS OF STUDENTS’ ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE 
It was decided to analyse the students’ academic performance to see if there is any link between 
their academic performance and their practical performance. If academically weak students are 
performing weakly then it can be said that weak students’ NTS are weak. To do this we used 
AHP again to obtain the weights; 
     Master      C/O    OOW 
Master  1 2 3 
C/O  1/2 1 2 
OOW  1/3 1/2 1 
 
Following weights are obtained from AHP calculations; 
Master  = w1 = 0.5396 
C/O  = w2 = 0.2970 
OOW  = w3 = 0.1634 
 
Following equation is used to achieve group’s average results; 
𝐴𝑅 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑅𝑖 =  𝑤1𝑅1 + 𝑤2𝑅2
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝑤3𝑅3 
(5.9) 
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Where, 
𝐴𝑅 stands for Average academic results for the group 
𝑅𝑖 stands for Academic results of i
th student 
𝑊𝑖 stands for the weight of the i
th person’s role 
 
Group 1’s results are found as follows; 
𝐴𝑅 = (0.5396 x 74) + (0.2970 x 73.22) + (0.1634 x 65.88) 
𝐴𝑅 = 72.4415 
The results obtained from equation 5.9 for each individual group were compared with the 
Utility Value obtained for the group ER calculations in Chapter 4. Only LJMU student groups 
were used for the following study as the researcher did not have access to STC students’ 
academic results. 
It can be seen from Table 5.16 that there is no link between students’ academic results and 
simulator performance. Group four’s, for instance, utility value is lowest and academic results 
are second highest. Group one is highest in the academic marks but stands to rank 7 in utility 
value. Academic results of all groups range from 64% to 72%, hence a difference of only 8% 
whereas utility values range from 14% to 54%, a difference of 40%. 
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Table 5.16: Group non-technical performance against academic achievements 
 Utility Value Average Academic Results (AR) 
Group 1 0.2459 (24.59%) 72.4415 
Group 2 0.2724 (27.24%) 69.1997 
Group 3 0.3917 (39.17%) 69.6401 
Group 4 0.1459 (14.59%) 71.3070 
Group 5 0.3487 (34.87%) 67.7628 
Group 6 0.5409 (54.09%) 68.0092 
Group 7 0.4751 (47.51%) 69.1886 
Group 8 0.1501 (15.01%) 64.2523 
Group 9 0.2797 (27.97%) 68.9911 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Group non-technical skills performance against academic achievements 
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5.8.1 Sample Correlation 
The measure which is most widely used to gauge the strength of the relationship between pairs 
of data is called sample correlation, represented by r. The sample correlation is a measure of 
how closely the points on a scatter plot lie on a straight line. If the points lie exactly on a straight 
line with positive slope, r = 1, whereas with a negative slope, r = -1. The more the points 
scatter about the line the closer r is to 0. When r = 0 there is no linear relationship between the 
points although they might form some other pattern (Swift, 1997: 815). 
The sample correlation is calculated with following equation; 
𝑟 =
𝑆𝑥𝑦
√𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑦𝑦
 
(5.10) 
Where; 
𝑆𝑥𝑥 = ∑ 𝑥
2 −
(∑ 𝑥)
2
𝑛
 
𝑆𝑦𝑦 = ∑ 𝑦
2 −
(∑ 𝑦)
2
𝑛
 
𝑆𝑥𝑦 = ∑ 𝑥𝑦 −
∑ 𝑥 ∑ 𝑦
𝑛
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Table 5.17: Sample correlation values 
Utility Value = x Academic Performance = y x2 y2 
0.2459 72.4415 0.0605 5247.7709 
0.2724 69.1997 0.0742 4788.5985 
0.3917 69.6401 0.1534 4849.7435 
0.1459 71.3070 0.0213 5084.6882 
0.3487 67.7628 0.1216 4591.7906 
0.5409 68.0092 0.2926 4625.2513 
0.4751 69.1886 0.2257 4787.0624 
0.1501 64.2523 0.0225 4128.3581 
0.2797 68.9911 0.0782 4759.7719 
∑ x = 2.8504 ∑ y = 620.7923 ∑ x2=1.0500 ∑ y2=42863.0418 
 
𝑆𝑥𝑥 = ∑ 𝑥
2 −
(∑ 𝑥)
2
𝑛
=  1.0500 − 
(2.8504)2
9
= 0.1472 
𝑆𝑦𝑦 = ∑ 𝑦
2 −
(∑ 𝑦)
2
𝑛
= 42863.0418 −  
(620.7923)2
9
= 42.6996 
𝑆𝑥𝑦 = ∑ 𝑥𝑦 −
∑ 𝑥 ∑ 𝑦
𝑛
= 196.5727 −  
1769.5064
9
=  −0.0391 
Therefore; 
𝑟 =
𝑆𝑥𝑦
√𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑦𝑦
=  
−0.0391
√0.1472 𝑥 42.6996
=  −0.0156 
The sample correlation between students’ academic results and their practical performance 
utility value is found to be -0.0156, which means there is no linear relationship between the 
two. 
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5.10 CONCLUSION 
In this part of the research volunteer chief mate students were assessed in a ship’s bridge 
simulator crisis situation. The students were divided into two groups, one group with HELM 
course training and other without HELM course training. The students were assessed in a 
bridge simulator using a behavioural marker system (Tables 4.1 – 4.4) which was devised as 
part of the literature review and confirmed by the experts during the interviews conducted in 
the first part of the project.  
The assessor observed the students’ NTS in a ship’s bridge simulator by using behavioural 
markers, the assessment data were aggregated by the ER algorithm. As part of the ER 
calculations, a utility value was obtained for each group’s NTS, which provided a crisp number. 
The utility value of each group is used to compare the performance of the groups with HELM 
course training and the groups without the training in the section 5.7. It is evident from the 
comparison that there is no improvements in the NTS of the students who have taken the HELM 
course. 
A comparison of students’ academic performance and their NTS performance was carried out 
in section 5.9 by taking the average percentage of each student’s academic results at the 
completion of the Chief Mate programme of study. The average results were aggregated by 
AHP for each group and then compared with the utility value of each group’s NTS performance 
to find any relationship between the two. It was found by correlation method that there was no 
relationship between the students’ academic performance and their practical performance. 
Chapter Six is going to explore and analyse the options to improve the HELM training for deck 
officers. Other safety critical industries’ efforts are reviewed and the possibility to adapt their 
proven methods into the maritime domain are analysed. With different options a cost benefit 
analysis is conducted by Bayesian Network and Decision Tree Model to decide which option 
makes a suitable choice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONTROL OPTIONS AND COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
IMPROVING DECK OFFICERS’ NTS TRAINING 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter students’ NTS performances were measured based on the developed 
scenarios in a ship’s bridge simulator. After comparing the average performance of the groups 
with HELM and groups without HELM (Table 5.15) across two nautical training 
establishments in the UK and after analysing students’ performance against their academic 
achievements (Section 5.8.1) it is now clear that the HELM training course in its present form 
is not very effective. Based on other safety critical industries efforts into NTS training and 
assessment, this chapter suggests the improvements to the HELM training course and examines 
costs associated with the improvements.  
To improve the NTS training course, HELM, firstly it is necessary to develop domain specific 
NTS taxonomy and behavioural markers for the assessments in the simulator. This study has 
achieved this with some limitations and could be evaluated and further improved with wider 
research. Secondly, based on other safety critical industries efforts into NTS research, a training 
model is required to be developed. Both elements are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
A cost benefit analysis would be carried out using BN’s Decision Tree Model to work out if 
there are any benefits to the industry of applying such methods to improve HELM training. To 
conduct a cost benefit analysis an example shipping company, Costa Cruise Lines, is chosen 
in this research. The accident of the Costa Concordia in 2012, which was mainly caused by 
human error (Lieto, 2014), cost the company £480m. By calculating the costs of further NTS 
research and training and comparing the same with the cost of the accident an analysis is 
undertaken to see if it is beneficial to the company to implement the additional training to 
improve the NTS of company’s deck officers.  
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6.2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this chapter is divided into the following three steps; 
1. Based on the comparison with other safety critical industries’ efforts into NTS research 
and training conducted in Chapter Two, the possibility of the adaption of the successful 
methods of aviation and anaesthesia are explored and options are generated.  
2. A cost benefit analysis is conducted of all the options explored in step 1. The analysis 
is carried out by Bayesian Network and Decision Tree Model. 
3. Based on the cost benefit analysis, a decision is made for which option to select. 
6.3 ADAPTION OF OTHER SAFETY CRITICAL DOMAINS’ NTS RESEARCH AND 
TRAINING METHODS (Step 1) 
Based on the deck officers’ NTS taxonomy and behavioural markers for the training and 
assessment an effective training model may be developed by conducting a workshop where 
educational and subject experts and psychologists are to be invited. The first task would be to 
find out what would be the best mode of training such skills. Aviation, anaesthetics and other 
safety critical industries use simulator based training to train the NTS of their personnel.  
Many safety critical industries have conducted a thorough research into domain specific human 
elements before implementing a NTS training course. Anaesthetics, for example, conducted 
the domain specific NTS research, which took five years for six full time researchers before 
implementing a comprehensive and reliable NTS assessment tool called the Anaesthetists’ 
Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) (Yee et al., 2005) (See Section 2.5). Although this present 
research has developed deck officers’ NTS taxonomy and behavioural markers with some 
limitations (See Section 1.5), a further research, with industry support, could improve the 
outcomes further. Further research is suggested to develop the behavioural markers for the 
assessment of deck officers NTS in a bridge simulator based on the methods carried out by 
Gatfield (2008) (See Section 2.5.3) for engineering officers. This would further improve the 
training and assessment of deck officer’s NTS in the simulators. An evaluation of deck officers’ 
taxonomy and behavioural markers in this new research is also required to be conducted to 
measure the effectiveness of the developed methods. The cost associated to conduct further 
research and evaluation is discussed later in Section 6.4.2. 
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In aviation much of the NTS theoretical knowledge is covered in the initial training and it is 
not repeated when delegates attend a CRM course in the end. Whereas in the maritime domain 
HELM is a five day course where theoretical knowledge is taught together with practical 
exercises. When students start the course they do not have any prior underpinning knowledge 
of the subject. One of the students’ suggestion in the workshop conducted after the course (See 
Section 5.9) was to integrate the HELM course into the main chief mate course. This was then 
discussed with research supervisors and all agreed that this method may improve the training.  
The research supervisors agreed to the suggestion that the underpinning knowledge of NTS is 
integrated into the main course and then extensive simulator training conducted at the end with 
carefully thought out exercises developed to cover each skill and element of the NTS. This 
method is followed by CRM and research suggests that the course is quite effective (See 
Section 2.5.4). The present idea of delivering underpinning knowledge within five days of the 
course may not be very effective as it does not give enough time for students to study the NTS 
material. It is possible that if a module is introduced into the main course by teaching 3-4 hours 
every week over 10-12 weeks, this would give an opportunity to students to absorb the 
knowledge slowly and then the exam at the end will test their NTS theoretical knowledge. The 
outcome may be that NTS skills are more readily attained. 
In the maritime industry presently training institutes are responsible for conducting such 
training and the HELM course is offered only as one off training. In the aviation industry flight 
operators are responsible for conducting NTS training of flight crew and the course is repeated 
regularly (See Section 2.5). 
In a similar way to aviation, shipping companies may need to develop the NTS training specific 
to their own area of operation. The courses may be developed by focusing on different cargo 
operations such as oil, chemical, cargo, container and bulk. The course needs repeating 
regularly and a deck officer’s NTS assessment would be conducted before the repeat of the 
course. This would help to identify the weak areas of an individual and the repeat course would 
focus on those areas to improve the performance. The whole process of the NTS training model 
needs evaluating for the purpose of analysing its effectiveness. The costs associated with the 
new course and the evaluation costs are discussed later in Section 6.4.2. 
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6.4 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Step 2) 
Cost benefits are calculated using a Decision Tree Model which is based on BN’s interference 
formulism.  
6.4.1 Interference Formulism of BN 
The basis of reasoning under uncertainty in BNs is called Bayesian interference formulism, 
which is developed for the task of computing the probability of each value of a node in a BN 
when other variables’ values are known (Richardson, 1997). The uncertainty may be due to 
imperfect understanding of the domain, incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the 
time where a given task is to be performed, randomness in the mechanism governing the 
behaviour of the domain, or a combination of these.  One of the main advantages of BNs is that 
they allow interference based on observed evidence. The model can be updated in accordance 
with observation using Bayes rule. For random variables “X1” and “X2”, as shown in Figure 
5.1, Bayes rule states:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
P(X1|X2) =
P(X2|X1)P(X1)
∑ Pall..i (X2|X1 = xi)P(X1 = xi)
 
        (6.1) 
Assume for instance that variable “X2” is observed to be in state xj. The probability of a 
parameter value given the observation is referred to as the posterior probability. This 
distinguishes it from the prior probability held by the analyst prior to collection and analysis of 
the observation. By applying Equation 4.1 to each state of “X1” the probability distribution “P( 
X1 | X2 = xj )” is computed: 
    
P(X1|X2 = xj) =
P(X2 = xj|X1)P(X1)
∑ Pall..i (X2 = xj|X1 = xi)P(X1 = xi)
 
                 (6.2) 
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Figure 6.1: BN consisting of two nodes 
Similar computations may be performed for large networks, allowing users to investigate 
different scenarios. Manually updating by this method is practical only if the network is small 
and each node represents only a few states. However, in the 1980s researchers discovered 
propagation algorithms that make it possible to break the overall graph down into smaller sub-
sets within which information flows are largely self-contained (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 
1988). With the introduction of software tools that implement these algorithms it is now 
possible to use BN to solve a complex problem without doing it manually.  
6.4.2 Decision Tree calculation 
The improvement in the deck officers’ NTS will improve a shipping company’s performance 
and hence will improve the profits. The company has to make a decision whether to take an 
action or not to improve the deck officers’ performance. The company is uncertain whether the 
performance of the company’s deck officers (i.e. Deck Officers’ Performance or DOP) is high, 
average or low. The cost of an action is C1. It is believed by taking an action and enhancing the 
performance of the deck officers (i.e. with average performance) the reliability of the 
company’s vessels will increase and accordingly the profit and net profit associated with an 
action will be increased. The profit and net profit can be estimated as B1 and (B1 – C1) 
respectively. Similarly for the deck officers with low performance, the profit and net profit 
associated with an action can be estimated as B2 and (B2 – C1) respectively. An assessment 
programme (i.e. Audit) will help the company to determine the company’s performance (i.e. 
CP). The cost of an assessment programme (i.e. Audit) is C2. Based on the performance data 
from Chapter 4 (see Section 5.7) as shown in Table 5.1, and the following rule, it can be 
observed  that 0%, 50% and 50% of the company’s deck officers have high, average and low 
performance respectively. Based on experts’ opinion the relationship between a company’s 
performance and its employees is shown in Table 6.2. 
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If a group’s NTS is less than 0.33, then the performance is Low. 
If a group’s NTS is between 0.33 and 0.66, then the performance is Average. 
If a group’s NTS is between 0.66 and 1.0, the performance is High. 
Table 6.1: NTS performance data 
    Utility Value 
Group 1 Without HELM Training 0.2459 (24.59%) 
Group 2 Without HELM Training 0.2724 (27.24%) 
Group 3 Without HELM Training 0.3917 (39.17%) 
Group 4 Without HELM Training 0.1459 (14.59%) 
Group 5 Without HELM Training 0.3487 (34.87%) 
Group 6 Without HELM Training 0.5409 (54.09%) 
Group 7 With HELM Training 0.4751 (47.51%) 
Group 8 With HELM Training 0.1501 (15.01%) 
Group 9 With HELM Training 0.2797 (27.97%) 
Group 10 With HELM Training 0.3888 (38.88%) 
Group 11 With HELM Training 0.4423 (44.23%) 
Group 12 With HELM Training 0.2576 (25.76%) 
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Table 6.2: Conditional probability table 
                 DOP  
CP 
High (H) Average (A) Low (L) 
High (H) 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Average (A) 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Low (L) 0.05 0.1 0.7 
 
Based on Bayes chain rule the following equation can be evaluated; 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) 
×  (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) = (0.8 ×  0) + (0.1 × 0.5) + (0.1 × 0.5) = 0.1 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴)  
×  (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) = (0.15 ×  0) + (0.8 × 0.5) + (0.2 × 0.5) = 0.5 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) = 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴)  
×  (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × (𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) = (0.05 × 0.1) + (0.1 × 0.5) + (0.7 × 0.5) = 0.4 
 
Based on equation 17: 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻)
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
0.8 ×  0
0.1
= 0 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
0.1 × 0.5
0.1
= 0.5 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻)
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𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐻) =
0.1 ×  0.5
0.1
= 0.5 
 
(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴)
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
0.15 ×  0
0.5
= 0 
 
(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
0.8 ×  0.5
0.5
= 0.8 
 
(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐴) =
0.2 ×  0.5
0.5
= 0.2 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐻 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
0.05 ×  0
0.5
= 0 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿)
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
0.1 𝑥 0.5
0.4
= 0.125 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿|𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿) × 𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿)
𝑃(𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑂𝑃 = 𝐿 | 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿) =
0.7 ×  0.5
0.4
= 0.875 
(6.3) 
A decision tree is a diagram that represents, in a special organised way, the decisions and the 
main external or other events that influence uncertainty, as well as possible outcomes of all 
those decision and events. Figure 6.2 shows a decision tree representation and solution to this 
problem. In Figure 6.2, squares represent decisions and the lines coming out of each square 
show all available distinct options that can be selected at the decision analysis point. For 
instance, as shown in Figure 6.2, to perform an assessment programme (i.e. Audit) or not to  
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perform, two lines coming out of “audit square” show all available distinct options (i.e. Yes or 
No) that can be selected by the manager. Circles show various circumstances that have 
uncertain outcomes and the lines that come out of each circle denote a possible outcome of that 
uncertainty. For instance, the “circle R” shows the result of an assessment programme and the 
line that comes out of “circle R” denote possible outcomes of that uncertainty (i.e. a company’s 
performance is high, average or low). Based on Equation 6.3 the probability of each outcome 
is written on each respective line. Based on Figure 6.2, the manager can calculate the overall 
desirability of those choices. For instance, if a manager makes a decision to perform the audit 
and based on the audit’s result the company’s performance is found to be high, then the 
desirability for taking an action can be calculated as follows: 
0 × (𝐶1 +  𝐶2) + 0.5 × [𝐵1 − (𝐶1 +  𝐶2)] + 0.5 ×  [𝐵2 − (𝐶1 +  𝐶2)] 
= 0.5 ×  𝐵1 + 0.5 × 𝐵2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐶2) 
 (6.4) 
If the assessment (i.e. evaluated by Equation 6.4) is lesser than “-C”, then no action has to be 
taken. Thus: 
0.5 × B1 + 0.5 × B2 − (C1 +  C2) < (−C2) 
 
0.5 × B1 + 0.5 × B2 < C1 
 (6.5) 
If the company makes a decision to perform the audit, with similar techniques Equations 6.4 
and 6.5 are evaluated, the desirability for the other choices can be assessed. Thus, the three 
conditions can be summarised as follows: 
1. If a company’s performance is high and 𝐶1 > 0.5 𝑥 𝐵1 + 0.5 𝑥 𝐵2, then take no action. 
2. If a company’s performance is average and 𝐶1 > 0.8 𝑥 𝐵1 + 0.2 𝑥 𝐵2 , then take no 
action. 
3. If a company’s performance is low and 𝐶1 > 0.125 𝑥 𝐵1 + 0.875 𝑥 𝐵2, then take no 
action. 
 
As an illustrative example, the Italian Cruise liner Costa Cruise Line own 27 ships with 
revenues of 3.1 billion euros and 2.3 million guests in year 2011 (Costa Cruises, 2014). One of 
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the Costa Cruise Line ships, Costa Concordia partially sank when it ran aground at Isola del 
Giglio on 13th January 2012 with loss of 32 lives. The accident was mainly caused by human 
error (Lieto, 2014). After the salvage of Costa Concordia the total cost of the accident is 
estimated to be $800 million (£480 million) (NBC News, 2014).  
For the purpose of the following calculations it is assumed that the total loss to the company 
due to poor performance of the deck officers is £480 million due to the accident. For the 
company to turn the loss into a profit it has to take some actions. After taking an appropriate 
action profit will become B2 for a company having officers with low performance as explained 
earlier in this section. 
Assume B2 = 2 x B1. Thus: 
B1 +  B2 = £480m 
B2 = 2 ×  B1 
B1 = £160m 
B2 = £320m 
The company may decide to improve the NTS of the deck officers by introducing further 
Human Element training. This needs evaluation based on the proposed methodology in the 
research (see Section 5.3.1), developing a NTS training model (see Section 5.3.2) and 
implementing a CRM style training cycle (See Section 5.3.3). The cost of evaluation of NTS 
taxonomy is estimated as £200,000. For 27 ships a company would have 216 deck officers so 
the training cost of deck officers is £216,000 (i.e. 216 x £1000). So the total estimated cost of 
C1 is £416,000. The cost of an assessment programme (i.e. C2) is estimated as £200,000. The 
assessment programme could be implemented by sending experts onboard ships to assess the 
performance of the deck officers in the real life such as a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) 
program. During LOSA observation, an observer records and codes potential threats to safety, 
how the threats were addressed and the errors generated, how the errors were managed and 
how the observed behaviour could be associated with incidents and accidents (Pedigo et al., 
2011).  
154 
 
1. £416,000 > 0.5 x 160m + 0.5 x 320m  
£416,000 > £240m  =  Condition not satisfied 
2. £416,000 > 0.8 x 160m + 0.2 x 320m  
£416,000 > £192m  =  Condition not satisfied 
3. £416,000 > 0.125 x 160m + 0.875 x 320m  
£416,000 > £300m  =  Condition not satisfied 
As a result conditions 1, 2 and 3 are not satisfied. Consequently and based on Figure 6.2, the 
expected profit associated with this strategy is calculated as: 
0.1 ×  {− 0 × (C1 +  C2) + 0.5 ×  [B1 − (C1 +  C2)] + 0.5 × [B2 − (C1 +  C2)]} +  
0.5 ×  {− 0 ×  (C1 +  C2) + 0.8 ×  [B1 − (C1 +  C2)] + 0.2 ×  [B2 − (C1 +  C2)]} + 
0.4 {− 0 ×  (C1 +  C2) + 0.125 ×  [B1 − (C1 +  C2)] + 0.875 ×  [B2 − (C1 +  C2)]} = 
= £239,384,000 
(6.6) 
Based on Figure 6.2, the expected profits associated with taking an action and not performing 
the assessment programme is calculated as: 
 0 𝑥 (−𝐶1) + 0.5 (𝐵1 − 𝐶1) + 0.5 (𝐵2 − 𝐶1) = 
0.5 𝐵1 + 0.5 𝐵2 −  𝐶1 = £239,584,000 
(6.7) 
Based on Equations 6.6 and 6.7, the optimal strategy is to take an action immediately. 
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For the above example and by assuming that the utility function is a linear function of the 
monetary profit, a BN decision making model, as shown in Figure 6.3, is illustrated.  In Figure 
6.3, squares represent decisions and diamonds (i.e. U1 and U2) represent utilities. The values 
for U1 and U2 are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. In Figure 6.3, the expected profits associated 
with taking an action and performing the audit (i.e. yes) or not performing the audit (i.e. no) 
are estimated as £239.38m and £239.58m respectively.  
Table 6.3: Values of U1 
Audit  Yes No 
U1  -£200,000 0 
 
Table 6.4: Values of U2 
Action     Yes   No 
SSP  High  Average Low High Average Low 
U2 -£0.416m £159.584m £319.584m 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 6.3: BN Decision Making Model for Measuring the Shipping Company’s Profit 
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6.5 OPTIONS (step 3) 
After conducting decision tree calculations now there are the following three options available; 
1. Do not take any action and continue with existing HELM course arrangements. 
2. Follow the suggestions in section 5.3 to evaluate deck officers’ NTS taxonomy and 
behavioural markers system, integrate the HELM theory into the main course and run 
HELM simulator training at the end of the main course and implement an aviation style 
training cycle.  
3. In addition to following the suggestions in section 5.3, an assessment programme is 
implemented. 
 
By choosing option 1 the accidents will continue to happen, innocent seafarers will lose their 
lives and the industry will bear the cost of $541m per year caused by human error (P&I, 2014). 
It is apparent from the decision tree calculations (Equations 6.6 - 6.7) that there is more profit 
to the company by just carrying out the evaluation of deck officers’ NTS taxonomy and the 
behavioural marker system, integrating the HELM theory into the main course and running 
HELM simulator training at the end of the main course and implementing aviation style 
training cycle and not running the assessment programme. 
It can be concluded from the decision tree calculations that option 2 is the most profitable and 
feasible option to choose at this stage. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
After comparing the average performance of the groups with HELM and groups without 
HELM (Table 5.15) and after analysing students’ performance against their academic 
achievements (Table 5.16) in Chapter Five it became clear that the HELM course is not very 
effective in its present form. This chapter suggested the areas to improve HELM training based 
on other safety critical domains’ efforts into NTS research and training such as anaesthetics 
and aviation and the possibility of adapting some of their proven methods. The anaesthetics 
research method could be adopted to develop the deck officers’ NTS taxonomy and behavioural 
marker systems for the bridge simulator and training assessment. The aviation style training 
model implementation would help improve HELM training in the maritime domain. To 
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improve HELM training it would require further research, more resources and more time to 
train the deck officers. The cost of this additional research, resources and time was calculated 
by choosing an example shipping company. A cost analysis was carried out by the Decision 
Tree method, to work out if there are any benefits of applying such methods to improve HELM 
training to the industry. The results of cost analysis have shown that there is a benefit to the 
industry by carrying out further research and implementing further training. 
The next chapter discusses the findings of the overall research. A reflection on the satisfaction 
of objectives and thus the achievement of aims is given. It also highlights the contribution to 
research and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will bring together various researched threads that have been developed in 
previous technical chapters and will reflect on the satisfaction of the objectives and thus 
whether the aims were achieved. A reflection on the contribution to knowledge and avenues 
for future research will also be given.  
7.2 ACHIEVEMENT OF AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This section describes the satisfaction of the objectives and achievements of the aims of the 
thesis and the reflection on the achievement of each aim. 
7.2.1 Objectives 
There were seven objectives of the research which were accomplished as follows; 
Objectives One and Two were achieved in chapter Two by reviewing relevant literature on 
NTS and maritime accidents data and a link was established between them. Objectives Three 
and Four were achieved in Chapter Four by conducting interviews with experts to identify 
significant criteria and their contribution to deck officers’ NTS and the taxonomy was 
developed. Objectives Five and Six were achieved in Chapter Five by developing a 
methodology for assessing deck officers’ NTS in a bridge simulator and conducting the 
assessment. Objective Seven was achieved in Chapter Five by comparing the results of 
simulator observation data to assess the effectiveness of the HELM training programme and 
then in Chapter Six a training needs analysis was conducted and suggestions given for 
improving the HELM course further. 
7.2.2 First Aim  
The first aim of this research was designed to contribute to the development and assessment of 
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the NTS required by deck officers by investigating its current practice after analysing empirical 
data from this study. Based on the literature review the taxonomy of deck officers’ NTS was 
developed. Since it was not sufficient to rely on the literature review only it was deemed 
necessary to confirm the skills and elements contained in the taxonomy by experts, hence 
interviews were conducted and the taxonomy was confirmed. This proved useful as some 
elements such as ‘conflict resolution’ were removed from the initial taxonomy as it was 
suggested by some experts that it would be difficult to simulate this and thus it was not possible 
to easily assess in the simulator. The experts were asked to assign an appropriate weight against 
each skill and element by comparing with others. This was necessary to prioritise the 
importance of skills and elements in the list of taxonomy in the view of the experts. Different 
experts may have given a different order of prioritisation of skills but this is one of the 
limitations which is discussed earlier in the Section 1.5.  The expert weights were aggregated 
by the AHP mathematical model. This was necessary as aggregated weights were used in the 
further NTS observation assessments calculations. To this end the first aim was achieved 
successfully by developing the deck officers’ taxonomy of NTS. 
7.2.3 Second Aim 
The second aim was to develop a method which would enable trainers to quantitatively assess 
NTS in a ship’s bridge simulator and identify further training requirements and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of HELM training. Based on the taxonomy of the deck officers’ NTS behavioural 
markers were developed with the help of the literature review. Considering the time constraints 
and available resources this was the only feasible idea to develop behavioural markers this way 
i.e by reviewing the relevant literature. If there was more time and resources then behavioural 
markers could have been developed similar to those Gatfield (2008) has developed for 
engineering officers. He developed those as part of his PhD and his research was focused only 
to develop the behavioural markers where as in this research developing behavioural markers 
was only part of the second aim.  
By the help of developed behavioural markers and the mathematical decision making model, 
ER Algorithm, a unique method of deck officers’ NTS assessment in a bridge simulator was 
developed. The assessment model proved successful as it allowed assessors to easily assess the  
behaviour of participants on a five rating scale (from very good to very poor) and then by using 
the ER mathematical model and utility value approach, calculate the ‘final result’ or ‘crisp 
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number’ of a performance. This ‘final result’ or ‘crisp number’ allowed the researcher to make 
comparisons of different group performances. 
Twelve bridge teams divided into two major groups of ‘with HELM training’ and ‘without 
HELM training’ were observed and compared. More bridge teams at different institutes may 
have produced different results as explained in the Section 1.5 but this sample was deemed 
sufficient to carry out the observations for the purpose of this research.  
All twelve bridge teams’ NTS performances were observed and assessed, using the behavioural 
markers in the pre-planned bridge simulated scenarios. All bridge teams’ NTS observations 
were analysed by using the ER mathematical model developed earlier. The comparison was 
made of two major groups’ average performance result (Table 5.15) and it was found that the 
group with HELM training has performed only 0.8% better than the group without HELM 
training. 
As a result, based on the present study and considering its limitation, it may be suggested that 
the present setup of HELM training is not as effective as was expected. It may be too early to 
conclude this as the course is in its early stages and it needs more time to develop and evolve. 
Aviation’s CRM course did not show positive results in the beginning and took the industry 
about two decades to reach the present structure of the course, i.e the sixth generation, which 
is assumed to be quite effective (See Section 2.5.4). 
To explore the options for the improvement of the HELM training course, the research focused 
again on the other safety critical industries’ NTS achievements such as anaesthetics research 
into development of domain specific NTS taxonomy and aviation’s training model (See Section 
2.5), which may be adapted in the maritime industry for improving the NTS training.  
With options available to adapt the anaesthetics’ and aviation’s method, this would incur an 
extra cost. A cost benefit analysis was conducted by the Decision Tree Analysis method to 
discover if it is feasible to implement such methods to improve HELM training. An example 
shipping company was chosen, Costa Cruise Lines, with one accident caused mainly by human 
error, Costa Concordia. The research could have chosen any company or any other accident 
but Costa Concordia accident was chosen because it was a recent accident with one of the 
causes of accident being human error and the accident data was widely available. The results 
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may have been different if any other accident was chosen for the purpose of cost benefit 
analysis.  
After conducting the cost benefit analysis it was observed that after taking the options to 
improve the deck officers’ NTS performance the company will accrue a profit of £239,384,000 
(See Section 6.4). It is not desired that the research cost of developing the taxonomy of the 
deck officers’ NTS and behavioural markers is borne by one company. This is only a one-time 
cost and it could be spread over a pool of companies, flag state authorities and other stake 
holders. The cost of delivering HELM training, like aviation, may be borne by the shipping 
companies as it will be to the benefit of the companies, by developing company specific HELM 
courses.  
7.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
This study has conducted a detailed research into developing the taxonomy of the deck officers’ 
NTS and the behavioural markers for the assessment of the NTS behaviours in a ship’s bridge 
simulator. The research has conducted ship’s bridge simulator observations of Chief Mate 
students to analyse the effectiveness of the HELM course which, based on the observations in 
this study appears to be ineffective. Some suggestions for the improvement of the HELM 
course are given in this research which would improve the HELM training and will make for 
safer operations. 
This research has produced the taxonomy of the deck officers’ NTS which can be used in 
nautical training institutes for the training of NTS to deck officers. There were no 
comprehensive behavioural markers available before this research for the assessment of the 
deck officers’ NTS in the bridge simulator. This research has produced a simple behavioural 
marker system which can be used by nautical training institutes in the assessment of the deck 
officers’ NTS without the need for much training of the trainer as the behaviours described are 
very simple and easily observable. The ER algorithm can be used for aggregation of criteria 
and to obtain a single crisp number the utility value approach can be used. The utility value can 
be used to measure the overall NTS performance of an individual. It can be said that this 
research has provided an effective assessment tool for the maritime industry as well as maritime 
academies for the assessment of the deck officers’ NTS.  
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The suggestions for improving HELM training given in this research are based on some proven 
methods developed by other safety critical industries. It is assumed that once suggested 
methods are implemented, the individual performance onboard ship and shipping company 
performance may be enhanced. The implementation and evaluation of suggested methods 
needs conducting under another research for the effectiveness of those training methods in the 
maritime domain. 
7.4 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has provided a generic model for the assessment of the deck officers’ NTS. It is 
worth mentioning that this generic model is tested on a small scale due to time restrictions (i.e. 
one part time researcher working over the period of four years). The same research could be 
carried out, with the help of the proposed generic model, on a large scale with at least 3-4 
experienced full time researchers working on the project for 3-4 years. The research needs to 
be able to attract more volunteer experts to participate in the interview study and more bridge 
simulator observation data could be obtained from various different nautical institutes across 
different countries. Instead of observing students’ NTS it would be appropriate to invite the 
experienced seafarers into the roles of the scenarios. A comprehensive behavioural markers 
system of deck officers NTS may be developed following the methods used by Gatfield (2008) 
for engineering officers (See Section 2.5.3).  
This new research would also develop the training model of deck officers’ NTS and test various 
modes of study such as integrating NTS underpinning knowledge into the main course of study 
and then providing extensive simulator based practical training. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained how the aims and objectives were achieved by reflecting on the whole 
research. Some positive points came out of this research such as development of deck officers 
NTS taxonomy and a unique method of assessment of NTS behaviours in a ship’s bridge 
simulator. To this end it can be concluded that the aims of this research were successfully 
achieved. The next chapter provides the conclusion to the overall study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
The following conclusions have been drawn from this research. 
Human element is one of the major causes of accidents, which can be improved with 
appropriate training as has been proved by the efforts into NTS training and assessment by 
other safety critical industries. To improve the safety of shipping and to improve the 
performance of deck officers, the IMO implemented the HELM training course in 2012. 
The present structure of the HELM course has been shown to be ineffective when comparing 
various bridge team performances in a bridge simulator. The taxonomy of deck officers’ NTS, 
which includes decision making, situation awareness, teamwork and leadership, shows the 
skills and elements required to be possessed by a deck officer in a crisis situation to carry out 
safe operations. These skills and elements were not present as were expected when NTS 
simulator observations were carried out of the students who attended the HELM training course.  
A calculation was made by sample correlation formulae allowing the conclusion to be made 
that the practical performance of a student is not linked with his academic performance as 
students with good academic results have shown poor NTS performance in the bridge simulator. 
A method of assessment was developed where it is possible to quantitatively assess a deck 
officer’s NTS in a ship’s bridge simulator. Within this method the final result of the NTS 
performance (which is a ‘crisp number’) in a bridge simulator can be achieved using the ER 
Algorithm. Behaviours of deck officers can be observed by simple and overt behavioural 
markers. Using the behavioural markers developed in this research, an assessor does not require 
additional training because the markers are apparent and clear and are assessed on a five rating 
scale (from very poor to very good). 
The other safety critical industries’ efforts into NTS developments can be used to advantage 
by adapting their successful methods into the maritime industry’s NTS training such as the 
HELM course. 
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 Appendix 1: STCW Section A-II/2 
Section II/1 – The Operational Level Deck Officer 
Function: Navigation at operational level 
 Competence:  Maintain a safe navigational watch 
 Knowledge, understanding and proficiency:  
o Bridge resource management 
o Knowledge of bridge resource management principles, including: 
1. Allocation, assignment and prioritization of resources 
2. Effective communication 
3. Assertiveness and leadership 
4. Obtaining and maintaining situational awareness  
 Methods for demonstrating competence 
o Assessment of evidence obtained from one or more of the following: 
1. Approved training 
2. Approved in-service experience 
3. Approved simulator training 
 Criteria for evaluating competence 
o Resources are allocated and assigned as needed in correct priority to perform 
necessary tasks. 
o Communication is clearly and unambiguously given and received. 
o Questionable decisions and/or actions result in appropriate challenge and 
response. 
o Effective leadership behaviours are identified. 
o Team member(s) share accurate understanding of current and predicted vessel 
state, navigation path, and external environment. 
Function: Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board at the 
operational level. 
 Competence:  Application of leadership and teamworking 
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 Knowledge, understanding and proficiency:  
o Working knowledge of shipboard personnel management and training  
o A knowledge of related international maritime conventions and 
recommendations, and national legislation 
o Ability to apply task and workload management, including: 
1. Planning and co-ordination 
2. Personnel assignment  
3. Time and resource constraints 
4. Prioritization  
o Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management: 
1. Allocation, assignment, and prioritization of resources 
2. Effective communication onboard and ashore 
3. Decisions reflect consideration of team experience 
4. Assertiveness and leadership, including motivation 
5. Obtaining and maintaining situational awareness 
o Knowledge and ability to apply decision-making techniques: 
1. Situation and risk assessment 
2. Identify and consider generated options 
3. Selecting course of action 
4. Evaluation of outcome effectiveness 
 Methods for demonstrating competence 
o Assessment of evidence obtained from one or more of the following: 
1. Approved training 
2. Approved in-service experience 
3. Approved simulator training 
 Criteria for evaluating competence 
o The crew are allocated duties and informed of expected standards of work and 
behaviour in a manner appropriate to the individuals concerned. 
o Training objectives and activities are based on assessment of current 
competence and capabilities and operational requirements. 
o Operations are demonstrated to be in accordance with applicable rules. 
o Operations are planned and resources are allocated as needed in correct priority 
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to perform necessary tasks. 
o Communication is clearly and unambiguously given and received. 
o Effective leadership behaviours are demonstrated  
o Necessary team member(s) share accurate understanding of current and 
predicted vessel and operational status and external environment. 
o Decisions are most effective for the situation 
 
Section II/2 – Masters and chief Mates on ships of 500 gross tonnage or more 
Function: Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board at the 
management level. 
 Competence:  Use of leadership and managerial skill 
 Knowledge, understanding and proficiency:  
o Knowledge of shipboard personnel management and training  
o A knowledge of related international maritime conventions and 
recommendations, and national legislation 
o Ability to apply task and workload management, including: 
1. Planning and co-ordination 
2. Personnel assignment  
3. Time and resource constraints 
4. Prioritization  
o Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management: 
1. Allocation, assignment, and prioritization of resources 
2. Effective communication onboard and ashore 
3. Decisions reflect consideration of team experience 
4. Assertiveness and leadership, including motivation 
o Knowledge and ability to apply decision-making techniques: 
1. Situation and risk assessment 
2. Identify and consider generatde options 
3. Selecting course of action 
4. Evaluation of outcome effectiveness 
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5. Obtaining and maintaining situation awareness action 
o Development, implementation, and oversight of standard operating procedures 
 Methods for demonstrating competence 
o Assessment of evidence obtained from one or more of the following: 
1. Approved training 
2. Approved in-service experience 
3. Approved simulator training 
 Criteria for evaluating competence 
o The crew are allocated duties and informed of expected standards of work and 
behaviour in a manner appropriate to the individuals concerned. 
o Training objectives and activities are based on assessment of current 
competence and capabilities and operational requirements. 
o Operations are demonstrated to be in accordance with applicable rules. 
o Operations are planned and resources are allocated as needed in correct priority 
to perform necessary tasks. 
o Communication is clearly and unambiguously given and received. 
o Effective leadership behaviours are demonstrated  
o Necessary team member(s) share accurate understanding of current and 
predicted vessel and operational status and external environment. 
o Decisions are most effective for the situation 
o Operations are demonstrated to be effective and in accordance with applicable 
rules 
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Appendix 2: MNTB HELM (M) AIMS AND OUTCOMES 
SECTION THREE: HUMAN ELEMENT, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT – 
MANAGEMENT LEVEL  
Aim  
To give all masters and officers the education and training in the human element leadership 
and management at management level meeting the knowledge, understanding and 
proficiency (KUP) requirements set out in the following:  
 
Table A-II/2 (masters and chief mates on ships of 500 gross tonnage or more)  
 
Table AIII/2 (chief engineer officers and second engineer officers on ships powered 
by main propulsion machinery of 750kW or more)  
 
Function: Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board at 
management level  
 
Competence: Use leadership and management skills  
 
Entry requirements  
Learners shall hold a deck or engineering certificate of competency at the operational level 
and meet the minimum seagoing service requirements for the issue of a management level 
CoC.  
 
Outcomes  
There is one outcome to the training.  
 
Outcome: The learner can use leadership and managerial skills to control the operation of 
the ship and care for persons on board at the management level.  
Staff to learner ratio  
 
The trainer to learner ratio should not exceed 1:12. The training centre, having due regard 
to health and safety and the objectives of the training, should determine other staffing 
requirements.  
Training duration  
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The training is to be provided as a full-time block course of not less than 35 hours of 
instruction and assessment, spread over five days.  
Some training centres may have manpower, equipment and facilities such that the 
standards of competence can be achieved over different timescales. Any departure from the 
above guidelines is subject to the approval the MCA’s chief examiner.  
 
Certification and documentation  
A certificate cannot be issued prior to approval of the training by the MCA. On 
achievement of the desired standard of competence, a certificate will be issued by the 
centre in the format shown in annex F. The centre shall maintain a record of the certificates 
issued as per the conditions of approval. 
 
 
OUTCOMES  
 
Outcome 1  
The learner can use leadership and managerial skills to control the operation of the ship 
and care for persons on board at the management level.  
 
Learning objectives  
1. Identify the principles and good practice in shipboard human resource management.  
2. Explain the relevance of the ‘human element’ in shipboard operations.  
3. Apply relevant and related international maritime conventions and recommendations, 
national regulations, codes of practice and guidelines, while using leadership and 
managerial skills to control the operation of the ship and care for persons on board 
at the management level.  
4. Apply the principles of task and workload management, including planning, co-
ordination, allocation and prioritisation of human and physical resources.  
5. Use project management as an aid to decision-making.  
6. Explain effective resource management techniques with regard to:  
a) Allocation, assignment and prioritisation of resources for effective task and 
workload management including:  
i. The difference between leadership and management;  
ii. Attributes of an effective leader;  
iii. Attributes of an effective manager;  
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iv. Models of best practice in leadership and management;  
v. Identifying and selecting appropriate leadership and management styles;  
vi. Judgement and decision-making; and  
vii. Leadership in normality and crisis including recognising and countering adverse 
reactions in stressful situations.  
b) Effective communication principles and practice including:  
i. Communicating effectively with those on board and ashore;  
ii. Listening clearly; and  
iii. Providing constructive feedback.  
c) Leading and managing teams including:  
i. Considering team experiences;  
ii. Recognising team potential and limitations;  
iii. Optimising the skills and abilities of the team;  
iv. Leading multi-cultural teams effectively; and  
v. Establishing a culture of fairness and respect.  
d) Assertiveness and leadership, including:  
i. Basic motivation theories;  
ii. Motivating the team;  
iii. Setting clear and achievable goals;  
iv. Using authority and influence effectively;  
v. Setting and maintaining high standards; and  
vi. Avoiding a blame culture and promoting a ‘just culture’.  
e) Obtaining and maintaining situational awareness including:  
i. How to obtain and maintain situational awareness;  
ii. Challenges to obtaining and maintaining situational awareness; and  
iii. Ensuring that teams have ‘shared mental models’ (‘shared situational 
awareness’).  
7. Apply the principles and practice of decision-making while:  
a) Taking account of the situation and of the risk assessment;  
b) Identifying and generating options; 
c) Using creative problem-solving strategies;  
d) Applying lateral thinking strategies;  
e) Selecting a course of action; and  
f) Evaluating outcome effectiveness.  
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8. Lead and manage the development, implementation and oversight of standard operating 
procedures.  
9. Identify the principles and good practice in shipboard training, learning, coaching, 
mentoring, assessment and developing shipboard personnel. 
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Appendix 3: LJMU ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
 
 
By email 
 
 
15 October 2012 
 
Dear Farhan, 
 
Proportionate Review – Full Ethical Approval:  Application for Ethical Approval No.: 
12/ENR/003    An analysis of Deck Officers’ non-technical skills in the crisis situation 
 
Dr Sue Spiers and Dr Adam Mackridge have considered the application on behalf of Liverpool John 
Moores University Research Ethics Committee (REC).  I am pleased to inform you that ethical 
approval has been granted and the study can now commence. 
 
Approval is given on the understanding that: 
 
 any adverse reactions/events which take place during the course of the project are reported to 
the Committee immediately; 
 any unforeseen ethical issues arising during the course of the project will be reported to the 
Committee immediately; 
 the LJMU logo is used for all documentation relating to participant recruitment and 
participation eg poster, information sheets, consent forms, questionnaires. The LJMU logo can 
be accessed at http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/corporatecommunications/60486.htm  
                                                 
Where any substantive amendments are proposed to the protocol or study procedures further ethical 
approval must be sought.  
 
Applicants should note that where relevant appropriate gatekeeper / management permission must be 
obtained prior to the study commencing at the study site concerned. 
 
For details on how to report adverse events or request ethical approval of major amendments please 
refer to the information provided at http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/RGSO/RGSO_Docs/EC8Adverse.pdf 
 
Please note that ethical approval is given for a period of five years from the date granted and therefore 
the expiry date for this project will be October 2017.  An application for extension of approval must be 
submitted if the project continues after this date. 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Mrs Maria Roberts 
Research Support Officer 
Research Support Office, 4th Floor 
Kingsway House 
Hatton Garden 
Liverpool, L3 2AJ 
t: 0151 904 6464 f: 0151 904 6462 
mailto: m.e.roberts@ljmu.ac.uk 
web: http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/ 
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Appendix 4: INTERVIEWEE INTRODUCTION LETTER 
Interviews to identify deck officers’ non-technical skills 
As part of the project to develop taxonomy of deck officers’ non-technical skills, interviews 
are conducted with experienced deck officers at management level to help identify the key 
skills that need to be included in the taxonomy. The interview will follow a semi-structured 
format using methods developed for analysing cognitive tasks. Thus the aim of the interview 
is to find out about the non-technical aspect of deck officers’ task in crisis situations on the 
bridge of a ship and the required skills (i.e thinking and teamworking skills, and not to make 
judgements about individual performance). There are no right or wrong answers to any part of 
the interview. 
The interview is divided into three parts: 
Part 1: Performance example – You will be asked to describe a real case from your own 
experience that was particularly challenging and possibly difficult for you as a senior deck 
officer. This can be a real critical incident/near miss or a normal case that just really tested all 
your skills as a senior deck officer and where your experience was a significant outcome. It 
would be very helpful if you could think of this example before the interview. You are 
welcome to bring any notes of the event if this helps you. This event will be discussed to 
identify the key non-technical aspects. 
Part 2: Distinguishing skills – You will be asked to think of the skills and attributes you 
consider to be characteristic of the effective performance in the crisis situations on the bridge 
of a ship. 
Part 3: Weighting task – You will be asked to compare the elements as shown in Appendix C. 
Approximate times for the three interview parts are: Part 1 – 45 minutes, Part 2 – 15 minutes, 
Part 3 – 15 minutes. To assist in collecting the information, with your agreement, a digital 
voice recording device will be used. This reduces the amount of time that has to be spend 
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making notes and so allow better discussions to develop. The voice recorded files will be 
permanently deleted once the audio is transcribed. 
All the information you give will be held in confidence and will be de-identified to ensure 
participants and any other individuals are not recognisable; results will be prepared at a group 
summary level only. 
The interview will take place in private room at an agreed place and time convenient to you. 
If you have any further questions about the interviews or project in general, please contact me 
at the numbers given below. 
Thank you for your interest in the project, and I look forward to your possible involvement in 
the study. If you decide to take part we can discuss the practical arrangements and details of 
the interview nearer the time. 
 
Farhan Saeed 
Senior Lecturer Maritime Studies 
Liverpool John Moores University 
James Parsons Building, Byrom Street, 
Liverpool L3 3AF 
0151 231 2468 
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APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Part 1 – Performance Example 
Explain task: 
You were asked if you could think about a case from your experience in advance – I hope you 
were able to do this. (If not describe the requirements and give a few minutes for the 
interviewee to think about it.) 
Will be asked to “walk-through” the case a number of times: 
 Brief description of case. 
 Interviewer repeats back the key aspects to check  time frame and understanding. 
 Describe the case in more detail focusing on non-technical aspects. 
 Interviewer will ask questions where necessary to help understanding. 
Re-iterate: not interested in making any judgement about your performance. 
Request: as much information as possible but not specific personal details about any bridge 
team member. 
Begin: 
Thinking of your case, please could you describe it to me from your perspective, starting from 
the point you first encountered the situation. Please remember to focus on the non-technical 
aspects. 
I will probably make some notes to help me and start constructing a time line of events to help 
our discussion and my understanding. 
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Interviewee describes the case 
I will now repeat the case back to you, as I have understood it. Please correct me if I have not 
understood anything properly. 
Interviewer repeats back event 
Interviewer and interviewee develop timeline 
Question: Can you tell me why you picked this case? Why was this case so challenging for 
you? 
Building on this description of the event I would now like you to go through the case again, as 
you experienced it, giving me a detailed description of the type of things you were thinking 
about, decision you had to make, communications with colleagues, planning and co-
ordination of tasks, etc. 
If I think something is particularly important I will ask questions for more information.  
Interviewee re-describes the event, interviewer probes as required 
Additional questions: 
 Now that we have been through the event, is there anything else you would like to add 
about non-technical skills in this situation? 
 What kind of things could have gone wrong for you in this situation? 
 How do you think someone with less experience (e.g. a junior deck officer,) might 
have handled the situation? Can you think of any problems they might have 
encountered? 
 What were you thinking about? 
 Was there any breakdown in communication? 
 What sort of teamwork was there within the bridge? 
 Who was in leadership role? 
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 What would have happened if the team members had been different (less, more, 
unknown, experienced)? 
 What cues were you using to help understand the situation? 
 What information did you use in recognising the situation / making the decision? 
 What non-technical skills were you using in dealing with the situation? 
 Were you able to draw on any comparisons from previous experience? 
 What were your goals during the managements of the case at this time? 
 What options were open to you at that moment? How did you decide which option to 
take? Was there any influence from the team? 
  How did you arrive at your chosen course of action? What factors affected your 
decision? What strategy did you use in reaching your decision? 
 How did you maintain situation awareness? To what extent did some of your situation 
awareness come from the team? What sort of projections were you making into the 
future? What sort of things would you have to be anticipating for? What are the major 
elements you have to keep track of to develop/maintain the big picture? 
 What sort of resources did you have available to support you? 
 What factors might have influenced your performance? What role did the team have 
on the case? 
 What is the importance of the education/training you had to become a senior deck 
officer in dealing with such situation? What improvement do you want to see in the 
deck officer training? 
Part 2: Distinguishing Skills 
I want you to think about the type of skills that you think make a good and effective deck 
officer (in terms of non-technical skills) and that distinguish a really experienced deck 
officer from an inexperienced deck officer (if indeed you think these skills are developed 
with experience or training). 
Question: What kind of non-technical skills do you think are important or make a good 
deck officer? Again I am particularly interested in the non-technical skills aspect of the 
performance. 
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Senior deck officer gives examples, interviewer probes/confirms as required 
Additional questions: 
 How do you think these skills are currently developed? For example how might a 
trainee gain these vital non-technical skills? 
 Do you think there are any differences or similarities between skills needed for normal 
situation and crisis situation? 
Part 3: Weighting Task 
Part 3: Weighting task – The interviewee will be asked to assign a number in front of a non-
technical skills taxonomy presented against the each skill and element (Attached). 
 
End of interview – questions; thanks; contact details. 
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APPENDIX6: AHP WEIGHTING TASK FORM 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
          
Leadership 
 
                 
Teamwork 
 
                 
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision Making’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
          
Teamwork 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
 
Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building and 
maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
          
Supporting 
others 
                 
Communication 
 
                 
Information 
sharing 
                 
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
                 
Communication 
 
                 
Information 
sharing 
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting Others’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
                 
Information 
sharing 
                 
 
 
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skills 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
          
Planning and 
co-ordination 
                 
Work load 
management 
                 
Prioritisation 
 
                 
Task delegation 
 
                 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
                 
Work load 
management 
                 
Prioritisation 
 
                 
Task 
Delegation 
                 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and Co-
ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
                 
Prioritisation 
 
                 
Task 
Delegation 
                 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
                 
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
                 
Task 
Delegation 
                 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
                 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
                 
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task Delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
          
Awareness of 
time 
                 
Situation 
assessment 
                 
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
                 
Situation 
assessment 
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
          
Risk 
assessment and 
option selection 
                 
Outcome 
review 
                 
 
 
 
Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment and 
option selection 
                 
Outcome 
review 
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Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk assessment 
and option review’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
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An analysis of Deck Officers’ non-technical skills in the crisis situations 
Farhan Saeed, Sr. Lecturer, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime 
Operations. 
You are being invited to take part in a research study regarding the importance of the non-
technical skills for the deck officers in the crisis situation . Before you decide it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to 
read the following information. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would 
like more information. Take your time to decide if you want to take part or not. 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
Accidents in maritime industry are not new and a major contributing factor to most of these 
accidents is human error. Analysis in a number of industrial sectors has indicated that up to 
80% of accident causes can be attributed to human factors. Non-technical skills is relatively 
new concept in maritime industry and thus so far a little research has conducted.   
The objective of the first part of the project is to develop and validate the taxonomy of non-
technical skills required for deck officers’ in the crisis situations. Within this project the term 
‘non-technical skills’ is used to describe senior deck officers’ attitude and behaviours in crisis 
situations not directly related to technical skills used to navigate a ship or to use the bridge 
equipment. A non-technical skills taxonomy is developed from literature review and will be 
validated by conducting interviews with experts.  
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT 
INFORMATION SHEET 
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Once the taxonomy of the non-technical skills is validated in the first part, a simulator study 
will be conducted in the second part of the project to assess the validated non-technical skills. 
A set of volunteer students, who have completed DipHE Nautical science, will be assess in 2-
3 simulated scenarios with crisis situation which would require the students to apply the non-
technical skills.  
A second set of volunteer students, who have completed DipHE Nautical science and HELM 
(IMO approved non-technical skills course), will be assess in the same simulated scenarios 
which were used with first set of the students. The results of the both simulator assessment 
will be compared, hence validating the taxonomy of the non-technical skills for the deck 
officer in the crisis situations. 
2. Do I have to take part? 
You are invited to take part in the first part of the study, ie interview. This is a voluntary 
participation and it up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do you will be given 
this information sheet and asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw will not affect your rights/any 
future treatment/service you receive. 
3. What will happen to me if I take part? 
The interview will take upto 90 minutes. The date and time of the interview will be agreed 
with you in advance. The interview data will be kept anonymous and you will not be 
contacted after interview is completed. 
The research will take about three years to complete. The outcome of the research can be send 
to you if you decide to receive this information. 
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4. Are there any risks / benefits involved? 
Interview process is a short process and unlikely to cause any risk. There is no specific benefit to 
individual but there is overall benefit to the whole maritime industry. 
5. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes, taking part in the study will be kept confidential.  
 
Contact Details of Researcher 
 
Farhan Saeed 
Senior Lecturer Maritime Studies 
Liverpool John Moores University 
James Parsons Building, Byrom Street, 
Liverpool L3 3AF 
0151 231 2468 
f.saeed@ljmu.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 8: ISIMULATOR PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
An analysis of Deck Officers’ non-technical skills in the crisis situations 
 
Farhan Saeed, Sr. Lecturer, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime 
Operations. 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study regarding the importance of the non-
technical skills for the deck officers in the crisis situations. Before you decide it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to 
read the following information. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would 
like more information. Take your time to decide if you want to take part or not. 
 
6. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Accidents in maritime industry are not new and a major contributing factor to most of these 
accidents is human error. Analysis in a number of industrial sectors has indicated that up to 
80% of accident causes can be attributed to human factors. Non-technical skills is relatively 
new concept in maritime industry and thus so far a little research has conducted.   
The objective of the first part of the project is to develop and validate the taxonomy of non-
technical skills required for deck officers’ in the crisis situations. Within this project the term 
‘non-technical skills’ is used to describe senior deck officers’ attitude and behaviours in crisis 
situations not directly related to technical skills used to navigate a ship or to use the bridge 
equipment. A non-technical skills taxonomy is developed from literature review and will be 
validated by conducting interviews with experts.  
Once the taxonomy of the non-technical skills is validated in the first part, a simulator study 
will be conducted in the second part of the project to assess the validated non-technical skills. 
A set of volunteer students, who have completed DipHE Nautical science (without HELM 
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
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course), will be assess in 2-3 simulated scenarios with crisis situation which would require the 
students to apply the non-technical skills.  
A second set of volunteer students, who have completed DipHE Nautical science and HELM 
(IMO approved non-technical skills course), will be assess in the same simulated scenarios 
which were used with first set of the students. The results of the both simulator assessment 
will be compared, hence validating the taxonomy of the non-technical skills for the deck 
officer in the crisis situations. 
 
7. Do I have to take part? 
 
You are invited to take part in the second part of the study, ie simulation observations. This is 
a voluntary participation and it up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do you 
will be given this information sheet and asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw will not affect your 
rights/any future treatment/service you receive. 
 
8. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
There will be two simulations observations of three hours each. In one scenario you will be 
sole watchkeeping officer and in the other you will be working with a team. 
The research will take about three years to complete.  
 
 
9. Are there any risks / benefits involved? 
 
The process is same as you have already attended in the NAEST simulator exerices during the 
DipHE Nautical Science course so there is no risk in these exercises.  
These exercises may improve your non-technical skills.  
 
 
10. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes, taking part in the study will be kept confidential.  
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Contact Details of Researcher  
 
Farhan Saeed 
Senior Lecturer Maritime Studies 
Liverpool John Moores University, James Parsons Building, Byrom Street, 
Liverpool L3 3AF, phone: 0151 231 2468, email: f.saeed@ljmu.ac.uk 
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An analysis of Deck Officers’ non-technical skills in the crisis situation 
Researcher: Farhan Saeed 
School:  School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime  
   Operations 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect my legal rights. 
I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be 
anonymised and remain confidential 
I agree to take part in the above interview study. 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
Name of Researcher   Date   Signature 
Note: When completed 1 copy for participant and 1 copy for researcher 
 
 
APPENDIX 9: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX 10: SIMULATOR PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
 
An analysis of Deck Officers’ non-technical skills in the crisis situations 
 
Researcher: Farhan Saeed 
School:  School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime  
   Operations 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect 
my legal rights. 
 
3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will 
be anonymised and remain confidential 
 
 
4. I understand that the simulation observations will be video recorded and I 
am happy to proceed  
 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above simulation observation study. 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant     Date    Signature 
 
Farhan Saeed     
Name of Researcher    Date   Signature 
 
Note: When completed 1 copy for participant and 1 copy for researcher 
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
CONSENT FORM 
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Appendix 11 – AHP Weighting Data 
Table A11.1 - Expert weights - Participant 01 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
x          
Leadership 
 
       x          
Teamwork 
 
       x          
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Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
  x        
Teamwork 
 
         x        
 
Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
         x        
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
 x         
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
      x           
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
        x         
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
          x       
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
  x        
Planning and 
co-ordination 
       x          
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
      x           
Work load 
management 
      x           
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
       x          
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
 
Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
           x      
Initial Crisis 
Management 
          x       
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
  x        
Awareness of 
time 
         x        
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
         x        
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
      x           
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
  x        
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
       x          
Outcome 
review 
       x          
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Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
      x           
Outcome 
review 
      x           
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
       x          
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Table A11.2 - Expert weights - Participant 02 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
  x        
Leadership 
 
       x          
Teamwork 
 
          x       
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Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
x          
Teamwork 
 
          x       
 
 
Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
         x        
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
x          
Supporting 
others 
       x          
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
       x          
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
         x        
Communication 
 
         x        
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
         x        
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
  x        
Planning and 
co-ordination 
         x        
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
         x        
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
  x        
Awareness of 
time 
         x        
Situation 
assessment 
         x        
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
       x          
Situation 
assessment 
         x        
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
  x        
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
         x        
Outcome 
review 
        x         
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Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
245 
 
 
Table A11.3 - Expert weights - Participant 03 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
    x      
Leadership 
 
        x         
Teamwork 
 
        x         
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership       x 
 
          
Teamwork 
 
        x         
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Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
          x       
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
  x        
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
        x         
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
       x          
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
       x          
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
        x         
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
        x         
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
x 
          
Planning and 
co-ordination 
       x          
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
 
 
 
 
250 
 
 
Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
        x         
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
       x          
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
 x         
Awareness of 
time 
         x        
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
         x        
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
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Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
   x       
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option Generation 
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How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
       x          
Outcome 
review 
       x          
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
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Table A11.4 - Expert weights - Participant 04 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
  x        
Leadership 
 
        x         
Teamwork 
 
        x         
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
   x       
Teamwork 
 
          x       
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Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
         x        
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
 x         
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
        x         
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
         x        
Communication 
 
         x        
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
         x        
Information 
sharing 
         x        
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
 x         
Planning and 
co-ordination 
         x        
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
         x        
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
        x         
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
Prioritisation 
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How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
 x         
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
         x        
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
  x        
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
         x        
Outcome 
review 
        x         
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Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
         x        
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
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Table A11.5: Expert weights - Participant 05 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
   x       
Leadership 
 
         x        
Teamwork 
 
         X        
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
 x         
Teamwork 
 
        x         
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Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
        x         
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
  x        
Supporting 
others 
         x        
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
        x         
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
 x         
Planning and 
co-ordination 
      x           
Work load 
management 
      x           
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
     x            
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
        x         
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
       x          
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
     x            
 
Prioritisation 
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How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
     x            
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
 x         
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
      x           
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
      x           
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
      x           
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
   x       
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
      x           
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Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
      x           
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
     x            
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Table A11.6: Expert weights - Participant 06 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
  x        
Leadership 
 
       x          
Teamwork 
 
        x         
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
  x        
Teamwork 
 
        x         
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Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
        x         
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
 x         
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
        x         
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
       x          
Communication 
 
         x        
Information 
sharing 
       x          
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
         x        
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
         x        
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
   x       
Planning and 
co-ordination 
        x         
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
       x          
Task 
delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
       x          
Work load 
management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
      x           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning and co-ordination 
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How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
       x          
Task 
Delegation 
       x          
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
       x          
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
Prioritisation 
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How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
 x         
Awareness of 
time 
       x          
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
       x          
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
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Awareness of time 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
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E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
 
Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
x          
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
         x        
Outcome 
review 
       x          
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Option Generation 
How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
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Table A11.7: Expert weights - Participant 07 
Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
   x       
Leadership 
 
        x         
Teamwork 
 
        x         
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
 x         
Teamwork 
 
      x           
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Leadership 
How important is 
‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
     x            
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B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
 
Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
 x         
Supporting 
others 
          x       
Communication 
 
          x       
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
        x         
Communication 
 
          x       
Information 
sharing 
          x       
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Supporting others 
How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
        x         
Information 
sharing 
        x         
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
        x         
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C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
 
 
Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
   x       
Planning and 
co-ordination 
             x    
Work load 
management 
          x       
Prioritisation 
 
          x       
Task 
delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
        x         
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
    x             
Work load 
management 
        x         
Prioritisation 
 
        x         
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
     x            
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
      x           
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
      x           
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
 
 
 
 
 
D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
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Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
x 
          
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
        x         
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
 
Awareness of time 
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How important is 
‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
        x         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
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Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
      x 
 
          
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
      x           
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option Generation 
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How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
         x        
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Less important Equally 
Important 
More important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
 
Table A11.8: Expert weights - Participant 08 
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Taxonomy of the Non-technical Skills for Deck Officers in Crisis Situations 
A. Goal: To Select the most important non-technical skills for deck Officers 
 
Situation Awareness 
How important is 
‘Situation 
Awareness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Decision 
Making 
       
 
 x         
Leadership 
 
      x           
Teamwork 
 
         x        
 
Decision Making 
How important is 
‘Decision 
Making’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Leadership        
 
 x         
Teamwork 
 
          x       
Leadership 
How important is Unimportant Equally Important 
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‘Leadership’ 
compared to .. 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Teamwork 
 
          x       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Goal: To Select the most important element of teamwork 
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Teambuilding and maintaining 
How important is 
‘Team Building 
and maintaining’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Considering 
others 
       
 
  x        
Supporting 
others 
           x      
Communication 
 
       x          
Information 
sharing 
          x       
 
Considering others 
How important is 
‘Considering 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Supporting 
others 
       x          
Communication 
 
    x             
Information 
sharing 
      x           
Supporting others 
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How important is 
‘Supporting 
Others’ compared 
to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communication 
 
     x            
Information 
sharing 
       x          
 
Communication  
How important is 
‘Communication’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Information 
sharing 
       x          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Goal: To Select the most important element of Leadership and Managerial Skillls 
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Use of authority and assertiveness 
How important is 
‘Use of authority 
and 
assertiveness’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Providing and 
maintaining 
standards 
       
 
       x   
Planning and 
co-ordination 
        x         
Work load 
management 
           x      
Prioritisation 
 
          x       
Task 
delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
       x          
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Providing and maintaining standards 
How important is 
‘Providing and 
maintaining 
standards’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Planning and 
co-ordination 
    x             
Work load 
management 
     x            
Prioritisation 
 
      x           
Task 
Delegation 
    x             
Initial Crisis 
Management 
  x               
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Planning and co-ordination 
How important is 
‘Planning and 
Co-ordination’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Work load 
management 
         x        
Prioritisation 
 
          x       
Task 
Delegation 
       x          
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
 
 
Work load management 
How important is 
‘Workload 
management’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prioritisation 
 
         x        
Task 
Delegation 
        x         
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
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Prioritisation 
How important is 
‘Prioritisation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Task 
Delegation 
         x        
Initial Crisis 
Management 
    x             
 
 
Task Delegation 
How important is 
‘Task delegation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Initial Crisis 
Management 
   x              
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D. Goal: To Select the most important element of Situation awareness 
 
Awareness of bridge systems 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
bridge systems’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
       
 
 x         
Awareness of 
time 
          x       
Situation 
assessment 
      x           
 
Awareness of external environment 
How important is 
‘Awareness of 
external 
environment’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Awareness of 
time 
          x       
Situation 
assessment 
       x          
Awareness of time 
How important is Unimportant Equally Important 
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‘Awareness of 
time’ compared 
to .. 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Situation 
assessment 
    x             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Goal: To Select the most important element of Decision Making 
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Problem definition and diagnosis 
How important is 
‘Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option 
generation 
       
 
 x         
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option Generation 
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How important is 
‘Option 
generation’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Risk 
assessment 
and option 
selection 
        x         
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
Risk assessment and option review 
How important is 
‘Risk 
assessment and 
option review’ 
compared to .. 
Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Outcome 
review 
        x         
 
 
 
Appendix 12: Group 1 - 17th April 2013 – AM (NO HELM) 
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Table A12.1: Teamworking (Group 1) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
 x    Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
   x  Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
   x  Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
   x  Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x   Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A12.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 1) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
   x  Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
    x Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
  x   Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
   x  Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
   x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
   x  Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
    x Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly     x Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
    x Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A12.3: Situation Awareness (Group 1) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x   Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
   x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
  x   Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
    x Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A12.4: Decision making (Group 1) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
 x    Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
    x Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x   Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
    x Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 13: Group 2 - 18th April 2013 – AM (NO HELM) 
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Table A13.1: Teamworking (Group 2) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
   x  Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
  x   Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
    x Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
   x  Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
   x  Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
  x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x   Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A13.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 2) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
  x   Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
   x  Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
  x   Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
  x   Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
    x Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
   x  Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly    x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A13.3: Situation Awareness (Group 2) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
   x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
   x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
  x   Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
    x Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
   x  Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
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Table A13.4: Decision making (Group 2) 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
   x  Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
   x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
   x  Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
    x Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14: Group 3 - 19th April 2013 – All Day (NO HELM) 
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Table A14.1: Teamworking (Group 3)  
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
   x  Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x   Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of 
other team members into 
account 
   x  Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting others Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
  x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
   x  Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A14.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 3) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if situation 
requires 
   x  Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
   x  Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
  x   Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
   x  Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
    x Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task Delegation Delegates all tasks properly     x Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
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Table A14.3: Situation Awareness (Group 3) 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x   Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
   x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
   x  Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
  x   Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
  x   Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A14.4: Decision making (Group 3) 
328 
 
 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
   x  Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
  x   Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
  x   Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x   Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
  x   Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 15: Group 4 - 07th May 2013 – AM (NO HELM) 
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Table A15.1: Teamworking (Group 4) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x   Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of 
other team members into 
account 
   x  Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
    x Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting others Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
   x  Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
   x  Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
   x  Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
    x Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
    x Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A15.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 4) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
    x Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if situation 
requires 
   x  Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
   x  Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
  x   Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
   x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
    x Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
   x  Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task Delegation Delegates all tasks properly    x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
    x Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
Table A15.3: Situation Awareness (Group 4) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
   x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
    x Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
   x  Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
    x Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A15.4: Decision making (Group 4) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
    x Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
   x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
  x   Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
    x No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
 Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
    x Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
    x Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 16: Group 5 - 08th May 2013 – PM (NO HELM) 
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Table A16.1: Teamworking (Group 5) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
 x    Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
   x  Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
  x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x   Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A16.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 5) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
  x   Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
   x  Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
   x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
   x  Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
   x  Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly    x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A16.3: Situation Awareness (Group 5) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x   Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
   x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
  x   Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
    x Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
  x   Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A16.4: Decision making (Group 5) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
  x   Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
    x Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
    x No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
   x  Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x  Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 17: Group 6 - 09th May 2013 – All Day (NO HELM) 
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Table A17.1: Teamworking (Group 6) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x   Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of 
other team members into 
account 
x     Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting others Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
 x    Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
 x    Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
 x    Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
 x    Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A17.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 6) 
338 
 
 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if situation 
requires 
 x    Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
 x    Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
 x    Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
 x    Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
  x   Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task Delegation Delegates all tasks properly x     Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
  x   Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
Table A17.3: Situation Awareness (Group 6) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
   x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
 x    Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
 x    Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
 x    Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A17.4: Decision making (Group 6) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
 x    Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
  x   No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
  x   Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
   x  Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x  Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 18: Group 7 - 05th August 2013 – AM (WITH HELM) 
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Table A18.1: Teamworking (Group 7) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
   
x 
  Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  
x 
   Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
 x x   Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  
x 
 
x 
  Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
 x x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
    
x 
 Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x x  Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A18.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 7) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
  x   Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
  x x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x x  Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
  x x  Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
   x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
   x  Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly   x x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
  x   Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A18.3: Situation Awareness (Group 7) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
 x    Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
 x    Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
 x x   Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
  x   Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
  x   Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A18.4: Decision making (Group 7) 
344 
 
 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
 x x   Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
  x x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
  x   Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
    x Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x   Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x  Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 19: Group 8 - 05th August 2013 – PM (WITH HELM) 
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Table A19.1: Teamworking (Group 8) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
   x  Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
   x  Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
   x  Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
    x Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
    x Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
   x x Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
   x  Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
   x  Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
   x  Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A19.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 8) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
   x  Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
    x Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x x Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
   x x Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
   x  Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
   x x Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
    x Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
   x  Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly   x x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
    x Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A19.3: Situation Awareness (Group 8) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
  x x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
   x x Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x x Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
    x Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A19.4: Decision making (Group 8) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
   x x Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x x No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
    x Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x x Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x x No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
    x Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x x Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 20: Group 9 - 07th August 2013 – All Day (WITH HELM) 
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Table A20.1: Teamworking (Group 9) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x x  Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of 
other team members into 
account 
  x   Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
    x Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting others Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
   x  Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
   x x Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x x  Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
   x  Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
   x x Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A20.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 9) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
   x  Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if situation 
requires 
   x x Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x x  Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
   x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x x  Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
   x x Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
  x x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
   x  Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
   x  Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task Delegation Delegates all tasks properly   x  x Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
Table A20.3: Situation Awareness (Group 9) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x   Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
   x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
   x  Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
   x  Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A20.4: Decision making (Group 9) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
   x x Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
  x x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
   x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
  x   Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x x  Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x  Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 21: Group 10 - 27th November 2013 – (WITH HELM) 
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Table A21.1: Teamworking (Group 10)  
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x   Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x   Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
     Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
   x  Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
 x x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
 x x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
  x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x   Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A21.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 10) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
   x  Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x x  Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
  x x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
  x   Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
 x x   Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
     Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly    x x Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A21.3: Situation Awareness (Group 10) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
  x x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
 x x x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
 x x   Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
  x x  Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A21.4: Decision making (Group 10) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
  x x  Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
  x x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
  x x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
  x x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x   Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
   x  Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 22: Group 11 – 28th November AM (WITH HELM) 
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Table A22.1: Teamworking (Group 11) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
 x    Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
 x    Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
     Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
     Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
  x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
  x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
 x x   Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A22.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 11) 
358 
 
 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
  x x  Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
 x x   Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
  x   Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
     Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
     Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
  x   Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
     Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly    x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x  Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A22.3: Situation Awareness (Group 11) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
 x  x  Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
  x x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
 x  x  Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
  x x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
  x x  Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A22.4: Decision making (Group 11) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
 x    Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
  x   No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
   x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
 
   x  Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
   x  No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
 
  x   Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
 
  x   Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
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Table A23.1: Teamworking (Group 12) 
Element Very Good Practice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Team building 
and maintaining 
Fully encourages input and 
feedback from others 
  x x  Keeps barriers between team members 
Considering 
others 
Take notice of the 
suggestions of other team 
members 
  x x  Ignores suggestions of other team members 
Considers condition of other 
team members into account 
     Does not take account of the condition of other 
team members 
Provide detailed personal 
feedback 
     Show no reaction to other team members 
Supporting 
others 
Provide ample help to other 
team members in 
demanding situation 
  x   Do not help other team members in demanding 
situation 
Offers very good assistance 
 
  x   Does not offer assistance 
Communication Establish total atmosphere 
for open communication 
 x x   Blocks open communication 
Communicates very 
effectively 
 
 x x   Ineffective communication 
Information 
sharing 
Shares information  
 among all team members 
  x x  Does not share information properly among all 
team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A23.2: Leadership and Managerial Skills (Group 12) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Use of 
Authority and 
assertiveness 
Takes full initiative to 
ensure crew involvement 
and task completion 
  x   Hinders or withholds crew involvement. 
Takes full control if 
situation requires 
   x  Does not show initiative for decision 
Totally reflects on 
suggestions of others 
  x x  Ignores suggestions of others 
Providing and 
Maintaining 
standards 
Demonstrates complete will 
to achieve top performance 
  x x  Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Planning and 
Co-ordination 
Completely encourages 
crew participation in 
planning and task 
completion 
  x   Does not encourage crew participation in 
planning and task completion 
Plan is well clearly stated 
and confirmed 
     Plan is not clearly stated and confirmed 
Well clearly states goals and 
boundaries for task 
completion 
  x x  Goals and boundaries remain unclear 
Workload 
Management 
Completely notifies signs of 
stress and fatigue 
     Ignores signs of fatigue 
Allots good  time to 
complete tasks 
  x   Allots very little time to complete tasks 
Prioritisation Demonstrate very good 
prioritisation of tasks  
  x   Demonstrate no prioritisation of tasks 
Task 
Delegation 
Delegates all tasks properly    x  Does not delegate tasks 
Initial crisis 
management 
Identifies initial crisis 
situation very quickly and 
respond accordingly 
   x x Does not identify initial crisis situation 
 
 
Table A23.3: Situation Awareness (Group 12) 
363 
 
 
Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Awareness of 
bridge systems 
Fully monitors and report 
changes in systems’ states 
 
   x x Do not monitors  changes in systems’ states 
Awareness of 
external 
environment 
Collects full information 
about environment (own 
ship’s position, traffic and 
weather) 
  x x  Does not collect information about environment 
(own ship’s position,  traffic and weather) 
Shares complete key 
information about 
environment with team 
members 
  x x  Does not share key information about 
environment with crew 
Awareness of 
time 
Fully discuss time 
constraints with other team 
members 
 
   x  Does not discuss time constraints with other CM 
Situation 
Assessment 
Makes full assessment of 
changing situation 
 
    x Does not make an assessment of changing 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A23.4: Decision making (Group 12) 
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Element Very Good Practice 5 4 3 2 1 Very Poor Practice 
Problem 
definition and 
diagnosis 
Gather all information to 
identify problem 
   x x Failure to diagnose the problem 
Review all casual factors 
with other crew members 
 
   x  No discussion of probable cause 
Option 
generation 
States all alternative option 
 
 
   x  Does not search for information 
Asks crew members for all 
options 
   x x Does not ask crew for alternatives 
Risk 
Assessment 
and option 
selection 
Considers and shares all 
estimated risk of alternative 
options 
    x No discussion of limiting factors with crew 
Confirms and states all 
selected options/agreed 
action 
    x Does not inform crew of decision path being 
taken 
Outcome 
review 
Complete checking of 
outcome against plan 
   x x Fails to check selected outcome against plan 
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